To the extent that the fate of the monarchy, and hence, the creation of a Republic, were left to the authority of the'first meeting of the Constituent Assembly' (and rightly so, since the interim governmentand constitution have no electoral or constitutional mandate), the rising insistence, since mid-April 2007, on an immediate declaration of a Republic in Nepal is irreconcilable with the commitments accepted by the Maoists, including the commitment to consensual resolution of issues of national interest, and to the right of the Nepali people to participate in the CA elections without fear, influence, threat or violence.
To understand, consequently, why the Maoists have taken the extreme steps of withdrawal from thegovernment, and threatened the disruption of the electoral process, it is necessary to'rewind' somewhat, to the circumstances within which the opportunistic alliance with the SPA was forged.
At the time when King Gyanendra seized power in February 2005, the Maoists had successfully imposed an'ugly equilibrium' in which Kathmandu had lost its powers to govern in vast areas virtually across the country, but where the Maoists lacked the capacity to quickly neutralizeKathmandu's residual power. Two principal poles of power existed at this time--the Maoists, with their PLA, on the one hand; and the King and his RNA, on the other. The political parties, fractious, marginalised and discredited, were utterly irrelevant to developments in the country. With no easy victory in sight, the Maoist purpose was to disempower the King and to paralyse or undermine the RNA. This was the objective of the collaboration in the Loktantra Andolan (Democracy Movement) of April 2006, which ended KingGyanendra's 'direct rule', and of the succession of agreements with the SPA.
T
he gains of this strategy have now been exhausted. TheKing and the monarchy have been comprehensively discredited, and no political entity could seek their restoration within the system. The Army, confined to barracks, demoralised and directionless, is less a threat to the Maoists now than was the case before theinterim government took charge. The Maoist power, while it appears to have been diluted in the Terai, has, in fact, grown, with many parts of the country earlier outside their armed sway--including the Kathmandu Valley--having been targeted for mobilisation and recruitment over the past months.