A Lesson Unlearnt

EVEN as the civil and military establishments in Pakistan retreat to lick their wounds, a question which still remains unanswered is: has anyone learnt anything from Kargil's 'harvest of folly?' It does not appear so, if the private and public pronouncements of the foreign office and Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) are to be believed. Determined to keep a stiff upper lip, they take no time in stating that Pakistan's 'isolation' is just in the minds of people and that the army had shown its mettle once again, demonstrating its capability of defending every inch of the country's sacred territory and thwarting the nefarious designs of the enemy. As to the issue of the mujahideen, when asked about the casualties and the area where they will retreat to, the ispr says it has no figures of the dead or wounded as 'they do not come into our hospitals', while the foreign office replies, 'they will melt away as they are not a proper force'. 'Naturally, the armed forces have ensured that Lahore has not been attacked and it is safe!', is another cynical response at a time when for the first time in all wars Pakistan has fought with India, a letter from the mother of a young officer who died asks publicly in a newspaper the reason behind her son's sacrifice.

The foreign office meanwhile received a scathing comment from The News in its latest editorial. 'It is of utmost importance that the government and that intellectually impoverished haven of arrogance the foreign office take a dispassionate view of events, their own role in them, the many setbacks and turning points, and devise better policies and crisis-management mechanisms for the future. Of particular importance is the need to make political decision-making more consultative and as open as possible. Shared wisdom and responsibility are good for the country as well as the government.'

Prime minister Nawaz Sharif himself, in his address to the nation, did not shy away from the fact that there were complications on the diplomatic front. Though he did not elaborate, there is a strong urgency for Islamabad in the post-Kargil scenario to gear up for the next round of diplomatic effort and use all available opportunities to bring New Delhi back to the negotiating table.

And it certainly won't be easy. For one, there is no real need for New Delhi to oblige so quickly. It is also time for Pakistan now to explain its policy on Kashmir to the world. One of the issues which will be raised in any such diplomatic venture would be the status of the Line of Control (LoC). 'Having sacrificed hundreds of lives on the battlefields of Kargil, the Indian armed forces will not allow their political leaders to give away territory which they have regained with their blood,' says Lt Gen (rtd) Kamal Matinuddin. With the West saying that Kashmir was as yet not ripe for mediation, and US president Bill Clinton maintaining he will not mediate, and the rest of the

G-8 still viewing Islamabad suspiciously, there appears to be very little room for Pakistan to manoeuvre diplomatically in the conceivable future. Combined with this is India's reluctance to have UN observers on the Line of Control.

The question is: with the slaughtering of its troops in Kargil, will India go for a rethink on a decision which could have saved those lives? Writer Brian Cloughley, an expert on the Pakistan army, says that the 'main task for the UN mission monitoring the LoC has been eroded. With its present resources, the observer group cannot perform its tasks properly. Having walked and climbed in the Dras/Kargil sectors, and having observed the LoC on official and other visits over the past 20 years, I believe the presence of more UN observers would result in fewer violations of the line, which would be in the best interests of both countries'. There are fears that with the withdrawal of all those who had crossed the LoC, it has now become a de facto international border, while Benazir Bhutto, currently on a diet of strawberries and cream, is clamouring for the opening of all borders as a near solution to Kashmir. Except for the Organisation of Islamic Conference (oic) and Bangladesh there has been virtually no support. And stubborn silence from other world capitals that Islamabad was looking to for support. 'Image had virtually replaced the printed word as the natural language of politics, domestic as well as international...diplomacy as a vocation in Pakistan had to start virtually from scratch in an environment shaped by traditions of the imperial secretariat and the military barracks,' are the words of advice from columnist Najmul Saqib Khan. On the military front, New Delhi has succeeded in dragging down the image of one of the finest fighting armies in the world down to a 'rogue army' comparable to the rag-tag Taliban outfit next door. This, more than anything, is what the planners of the Kargil offensive are not being forgiven for by the common Pakistani. After the political pygmies who have ruled Pakistan this last decade, it was the army which in the same time had tried to wean away from its lead role of 'guiding democracy'. But Kargil has taken the shine away from the brass.

None other than a former coas, General Mirza Aslam Beg, realises what this means to the khaki. 'Arrogance of power is essentially self-defeating. Only last May, when Pakistan carried out nuclear tests and fired Ghauri and Shaheen missiles, the higher-ups in the government and many others proudly claimed that none would dare look at Pakistan with an evil eye, and that missiles combined with atomic power would help withstand all aggressions against Pakistan. But lo and behold, the myth is so easily shattered, India using its dexterous diplomacy achieved a remarkable victory with full support from the US'.

However, others do not fully agree and say that not diplomatic but other problems like the economic one and the fear of a full-scale war made the military stop in its tracks. 'When once the generals had decided on the Kargil operation and succeeded to a great extent, then they should have fought to the last man. Did they not know the consequences of such an operation? Even Indira Gandhi, as a woman, took a decision to dismember Pakistan and stuck to it,' is one viewpoint. This has also opened up another debate amongst the public, to once again address decision-making where instead of looking for scapegoats, a more honourable manner of accepting victories and defeats is made.

A beginning of sorts was made by Syed Abida Husain, a former cabinet member of Nawaz Sharif, who suggested at a party meeting the need to go for a national security council where such major decisions such as Kargil could be debated upon. Since one coas (Jehangir Karamat) was shown the door for a similar suggestion, there are no strong voices now which could influence such a major decision. 'It would also suit Sharif to keep a lame-duck coas like Pervez Musharraf with him so that he does not have too much room to manoeuvre,' says one political analyst. The death toll of soldiers on Pakistan's side of the LoC is something where realistic figures are difficult to come by, but they have certainly been less in the Punjab as compared to those in the north where the figure of 300 in all is often quoted. 'If all these dead bodies were arriving in the Punjab then the whole issue would have been seen differently,' sums up one non-Punjabi. But the military has also learnt the bitter truth that in today's world there is no room for lone rangers and 'however brilliantly conceived, military operations can run afoul if adequate diplomatic and media homework is not done. This is the age of diplomacy and the global environment has to be carefully considered before launching any major plan, military or otherwise'. Among those who came to the nation's help to counter big time dollars that India was spending in a campaign abroad, were New York's Pakistani cab drivers.

And as Sharif finally wraps up Pakistan's disaster of the century saying he is willing to give diplomacy a chance to solve the Kashmir dispute, guess who'll head the new media wing for more effective propaganda? None other than Mushaisaahib. Read Mushahid Hussain of bbc's Hardtalk fame.