Shocked And Awed?

Within the past month, Iraq has been the scene of jubilation and some angry protests. Major fighting hasended, but major reconstruction has yet to begin. Regional reaction has ranged from relief to resignation anddespair. What firm conclusions, then, can be drawn about reactions to the war from the Arab world? Dependingon where one looks, one can come up with different conclusions.

The region is still in shock over the speed and ease with which the American and British forces swept intoBaghdad. This is all the more true because pro-Iraq, anti-American propaganda broadcasts by regional mediaoutlets were widely accepted in the Arab world. Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, the former Iraqi Information - orrather Disinformation - Minister, became famous in America for his outrageous misstatements of fact, includinghis steadfast denial that U.S. forces were even in Baghdad. It is difficult to estimate the extent to whichArab viewers actually believed his reports, but indications are that they certainly wanted to believe in aferocious Iraqi resistance.

To cite two examples, when I appeared on a panel discussion program on Lebanese television, I was shouteddown by Arab co-panelists, who insisted that U.S. forces were carpet-bombing Baghdad's residential neighbors.Al-Jazeera satellite television, which is a fairly typical example of Arab media coverage, presented oneexpert who claimed that the United States was only able to capture Baghdad because it used nuclear weapons toincinerate thousands of Republican Guard troops.

In considering Arab reaction to these events, one must first establish the type of information and analysisavailable to that audience. By doing so, it is possible to conceive a view very different from that which wasengendered by Western media coverage.

Not surprisingly, the primary reaction in the Arab world - from politicians, the media, opposition leaders,and establishment intellectuals - was very much along the lines of traditional thinking. Victory over Iraq wasseen as one more humiliation by Western imperialism and international Zionism. Saddam is viewed as either afailure because he didn't fight to the last Iraqi, or the victim of a criminal conspiracy. While many Arabintellectuals who now condemn the U.S. action once claimed to revile Saddam as an oppressive dictator, few ofthem rejoiced at his actual downfall and the liberation of the masses who suffered from his rule.

As for the war's future implications, most simply repeat age-old maxims. Pan-Arab nationalists insist thatgreater Arab solidarity is needed to redress their weaknesses. Islamists suggest that Saddam's failure wascaused by a failure to apply Islam by that regime. Egyptian leaders are once again proposing an Arab securitysystem, led by Cairo, which would mediate all disputes without the need for foreign intervention. Al-Qaeda,Osama bin Laden's organization, says the Iraqi defeat merely underscores the inadequacy of conventionalmilitary and vindicates their reliance upon guerrilla terrorist tactics.

None of this is necessarily the last word, of course. What we have seen so far is only the first act of alonger-term drama. Much hinges on what reactions we might see to the scenes still to come, including: theestablishment of a new Iraqi government, the turnover of oil assets to it by the United States, theinstitution of Iraqi democracy, the departure of U.S. forces, and the enjoyment of a better life by Iraqis.The Arab reaction following some or all of these developments will be more important than the initial responseto the war itself.

Equally valid is the reality that what is largely seen by observers is the official version of thereaction, coming from sources interested in downplaying the significance of these events. Arab governments ingeneral, state-owned media, establishment intellectuals and journalists, and leaders of militant oppositiongroups - in other words, the vast majority of those in a position to speak on these subjects - have a vestedinterest in defending the Arab status quo, denouncing U.S. policy, demanding resistance, and rejecting theneed to draw any lessons from the experience.

There are, however, some within the Arab world who take a very different view of events. First andforemost, there are the Iraqis themselves, at home and abroad, who are very pleased with the outcome of thewar and the fall of Saddam. They are grateful to the United States for liberating them, even though questionsabout what it should do now remain controversial.

It should be understood, though, that there is an enormous gap between these Iraqi perspectives and whatthe rest of the Arab world hears or seems to think. Arab media sources present a disproportionately highnumber of anti-American Iraqi voices, at the expense of potentially dissenting moderate views that applaudSaddam's downfall, which are usually expressed nowadays by Kuwaitis, Saudis, and to a lesser extent, thosefrom the other Gulf Arab states.

One argument, commonly articulated by more moderate Egyptian and Lebanese intellectuals, might be calledSaddam exceptionalism. Their point is that Saddam was such a terrible dictator and such a threat to the regionthat the United States was justified in overthrowing him. Even if they do not support broader political changeor any further action by the United States, they are glad to see the end of Saddam's rule

Indeed, this argument is popular because it fits well with a popular moderate spin on the traditionalperspective: that Saddam was terrible in part because his adventurism and extremism provoked U.S.intervention, which all Arabs should oppose out of nationalistic considerations. Paradoxically, the fact thatSaddam forced the United States to attack him provided one more reason why Arabs who generally oppose U.S.intervention should be glad that American forces eliminated him. The implication is that without Saddam in thepicture, everything can go back to normal.

There are also some Arab liberals - most prominently in Kuwait - that are enthusiastic about the idea ofregional change and democracy. They view the war and its outcome not as an Arab defeat, but rather as thepotential basis for the greatest of all Arab victories: the creation of successful, developed, peacefulsociety where human rights are respected. Even Gulf governments seem more enthusiastic about at least theappearance of reform and democratization.

One trend accelerated by the war is the rapidity with which some Arab states have embraced at least somegesture toward political change. Parts of the Arab world usually considered more socially and politicallybackward have seemed capable of greater flexibility than those places that pride themselves on their advancedthinking. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and even Saudi Arabia seem more open to talking about serious change andconsidering new ideas than Egypt, Syria or even the Palestinians. This is an important trend to watch closelyin the post-Saddam Middle East.

At the same time, it is easy to overestimate any direct effect of events in Iraq on the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. Saddam's downfall removed a man who Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat saw as his greatest Arab allyand arguably offers a lesson that it is better to work with the United States and avoid extremism. Butdevelopments on that other front, including the fate of the proposed international road map for a peaceprocess, seem to be going along the same lines as they were before the war.

There is a great debate in the West about the impact of the Iraq war and its aftermath on the Arab MiddleEast. Some believe it is going to create a new and enlarged constituency that advocates democracy, reform, andmoderation. Others expect that there will be little effect or perhaps even a backlash against the Americanintervention. Though there are several indicators so far, conclusions and closure will remain elusive for sometime. The final act of this drama remains to be played out not only because of the time needed for Arabresponse to develop but also because Iraq itself is in an early stage of transition.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research inInternational Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle EastReview of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book is The Tragedy of the Middle East(Cambridge University Press). His book, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography, co-authored with Judith ColpRubin, will be published by Oxford University Press in August, 2003.

Rights: © Copyright 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization where this piece first appeared.