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A Mismatched Priority

Tackling Naga militancy is proving problematic for the state because New Delhi does not wish to jeopardize the ongoing talks with the NSCN-IM.

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A Mismatched Priority
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The frontier state of Arunachal Pradesh faced no problems of militancy in the decades following its creation in 1972, unlike some states in the Northeast. With the passage of time, however, insurgency has been pushed into this peaceful state, primarily by factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), which have long created havoc in the neighboring state of Nagaland. In Arunachal, the areas most affected now are the districts of Tirap and Changlang.

Traditionally, Arunachal's porous and un-administered borders with Nagaland and Myanmar have been used by several militant groups of the Northeast in their journeys to China and Myanmar. Militants found it less cumbersome to use various rivulets, especially near the Pansu Pass to transport essential items like medicines, arms and drugs through the area. Among the major objectives of these militant groups was the acquisition of military training from Myanmarese insurgent groups.

Following the vertical split in the NSCN in 1988, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) spread its influence to Changlang and then to Tirap in early 1990. Apart from the geographical proximity of these districts to Nagaland, their tribal composition also contributed to the onset of insurgency. The Nocte and Wangcho tribes of the Tirap district identify themselves as 'Nocte Nagas' and share a cultural affinity with the Konyak Nagas of the Mon and Tuensang districts of Nagaland bordering Arunachal Pradesh. 

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Similarly, the Tangsa tribals, who dominate the Changlang district, claim that they are 'Tangsa Nagas'. According to official records, the Tangsas have close cultural affinities with the Tangsas living in Myanmar. Even though the NSCN-K did engage in forcible recruitment of local youth in these two districts, the organization largely remained dormant and avoided encounters with the handful of security forces' personnel present in these districts. They primarily engaged in abductions and extortion activities, maintaining a low profile as far as their political agenda was concerned.

The story of insurgency in Arunachal Pradesh is also a story of the politician-insurgent nexus in the state. Till the year 2000, the NSCN-K enjoyed dominance in Tirap and Changlang and in spite of its rivalry with the Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland, the latter never made any forays into what was known to be a Khaplang stronghold. The credit for strengthening the NSCN-K base in Tirap goes mainly to Chipu Menon, a self-styled 'colonel' of the outfit, who also happens to be a close relative of the one of the senior ministers in the present Mukut Mithi's ministry. It is believed that it was primarily through Chipu and his mentor in state politics that the NSCN-K made its presence felt in the political arena.

Intelligence sources disclose that the NSCN-K, taking advantage of its political connections, organized a conclave at Jeduwa in Tirap district on December 15, 1998, under Chipu Menon's active leadership. All the twelve elected representatives (Members of the Legislative Assembly, MLAs) of both Tirap and Changlang districts, along with some political opponents of the then Chief Minister Gegong Apang, attended the conclave and took a decision to dislodge the Apang government. Their attempt bore fruit in January 1999, when the Apang government was toppled.

From such a position, the NSCN-K could only grow stronger. Subsequent to Apang's dislodging, the twelve legislators from these two districts brought a Resolution in the state Legislative Assembly in the first half of the year 1999, demanding Union Territory status for Tirap and Changlang districts. The Resolution, however, failed to be passed by the House under the leadership of the Mukut Mithi. Thereafter, in the elections held in the latter half of the year 1999, Mukut Mithi secured a thumping majority in the state and formed his ministry on October 11, 1999. It was during this election that some political leaders of the area were isolated and denied ministerial berths.

This paved way for the arrival of the IM faction of the NSCN in the state. These disgruntled leaders were instrumental in inviting the NSCN-IM to 'protect' them from the NSCN-K's onslaught. Thus, the internecine clashes between these groups in Nagaland were extended into Arunachal Pradesh as well. However, it is the common people of these districts who became the ultimate victims of the fight for supremacy and control of territories between the warring factions of the NSCN.

With the passage of time, both factions stepped up extortions, abduction and killing, besides engaging with the security forces. Payment of 'taxes' (extorted revenues) to both the factions by people from all walks of life is a commonplace. Even government employees were made to part with a portion of their salaries towards 'developmental funds' for the insurgent groups.

Available statistics suggest a pattern of escalating insurgency over the last three years. Twenty-seven incidents were reported in 1999, increasing to fifty-one in the subsequent year. In 2001, the number of fatalities declined to forty-seven reported incidents. These numbers may appear insignificant, particularly within the context of the widespread troubles of India's Northeast, but in a state with a population of just 1.1 million, this incidence is a matter of serious concern.

A senior police official, talking to this writer, put the number of NSCN-IM militants stationed at Tirap and Changlang at about 250. Neither of the groups, however, has any designated camp in the districts and both find it convenient to operate from villages which provide them adequate opportunities to mingle with civilian populations. The NSCN-K directly monitors its operations from Myanmar, while the NSCN-IM controls its cadres from the Tuensang district of Nagaland.

Gradually, both the groups are extending their activities into other parts of the state, with occasional forays into the capital, Itanagar, where cadres have been arrested on a few occasions, a good 673 kilometers from Changlang. The response of successive governments in the state, however, has been that they want their territory free from influence of the NSCN factions. The Central government, however, remains ambivalent in its orientation.

The Mithi government, in a bid to control the situation, passed the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organized Crime Act (APCOCA) in September 2002. Annoyed with the enactment of this anti terror law, the NSCN-IM initiated an unsuccessful yet disturbing move to topple the state government with the help of legislators from the areas under its control. The state government had recently conceived a counter-insurgency operation in the two districts on the pattern of Operation Rhino and Operation Bajrang in Assam in the early 1990s, with the intention of flushing out rebels from the insurgency infested districts.

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Planned to be executed jointly by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), India Reserve Battalion (IRBN) and Arunachal Pradesh Police (APP), 'Operation Hurricane' was initially scheduled for June 20. But New Delhi refused to give the green signal and to allocate the necessary central forces. Citing 'logistical problems', the centre turned down the Chief Minister's request for additional central forces. It appears that New Delhi has its own difficulties and does not wish to jeopardize the ongoing talks with the NSCN-IM. Clearly, any concerted move against the NSCN-IM would never be acceptable to its leadership, which has been engaged in a dialogue process with the Centre since 1997.

The presence of the Naga militants in parts of Arunachal Pradesh is a serious problem not only for this strategic frontier state but for the nation as a whole. The NSCN's 'extra-territorial activities' can only be contained if the central and the state governments come together, and take concerted action to put stop to the anti-national activities of the militants.

T.T. Tara is an Itanagar-based journalist with The Telegraph. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal

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