Does it make sense for the government to continue with its current policy vis-a-vis Kargil?
Does it make sense for the government to continue with its current policy vis-a-vis Kargil?
Yes, says the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). "The policy of restraint that we have adopted has paid rich dividends. The international community has, in one voice, backed us and isolated the Pakistanis. Militarily, we are making steady progress. An escalation of the conflict at this point, apart from not being something we as a responsible nuclear power desire, is not in our national interest. There is a price to pay, but India as a nation is strong enough to bear it; our policy is going to have long-term benefits as well. Of course, if there is a mad caper from the other side, we reserve our right to respond stringently," says a prime ministerial aide.
The army position is that though it is gaining ground, the progress has been very slow. According to a senior officer at the army headquarters, 12 out of 31 posts have been recaptured but the enemy has redeployed itself. "If we have gained ascendancy in Tiger Hills and Tololing, then new enemy posts have come up in the Kaksar and Batalik sectors. As a result, this looks like a long operation with the possibility of increasing casualties," he says. The army feedback from officers on the battlefront is that the operations need to be stepped up if the enemy is to be driven out before the September, when winter sets in and the entire sector becomes snowbound.
Is crossing the Line of Control an option if the war drags on?
Though restraint is the government's present mantra, nobody is willing to rule it out "if the situation so demands". Militarily, the onset of the monsoon-making the terrain in the western sector a slushy plain and thereby hindering an armoured corp (tank) advance-and the standing crops yet to be harvested are cited as reasons for "no immediate plans". More importantly, it is not lost on the government, loath though it is to admit it, that the prospect of the international community's support dissipating the moment India is seen as "escalating" the conflict is very real.
But heavy shelling by the Pakistan army in the Poonch and Rajouri sectors, reports of fresh infiltrations in Akhnoor and the upping of the ante in the Valley with "soft targets" being killed with impunity (39 killings in three days last week; nearly 50 killed since Operation Vijay was launched), means that the pressure to cross the LoC is ever-present. As the army sees it, the undeclared war in Kargil is being fought till now on terms set by the enemy. The topography gives the intruders the edge and the troops have been fighting with what many officers feel is an unfair handicap. If strategists are to be believed, the encirclement of enemy positions is essential for quick eviction of the intruders and reducing casualties on the Indian side; this would mean crossing the LoC in some areas. The argument is that since Pakistan has crossed the LoC, India should also retaliate in a similar manner. This view, however, is not endorsed by the top brass which is toeing the government line.
Is India's use of the nuclear option a possibility under any circumstance?
The government says that it is "irresponsible" to even mention the option in the current scenario. Says a PMO official: "We have a clearly enunciated policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and the prime minister has repeated this in the context of Kargil as well." Official sources, however, point out that the fact remains that Pakistan, though under severe international pressure, is not wary of indulging in nuclear blackmail. In an interview to the bbc on its Hardtalk programme, Pakistani information minister and Nawaz Sharif aide Mushahid Hussain admitted that "Pakistan hopes it will not come to that (using nuclear weapons)" but refused to rule out a first strike by the "first Muslim country with the bomb". In fact, he virtually used the nuke threat to send out a message to the world community: intervene in Kashmir, or else...
The Indian government feels Hussain's statement and that of others in the Pakistani establishment strengthen its case for "severe sanctions" against an irresponsible "terrorist state". But it's yet to come out with a credible explanation against the accusation levelled by many that Pokhran II gave the other side the opportunity-to go nuclear-it was waiting for. That in turn enabled Pakistan to indulge in the kind of adventurism it has. As for the members of the "nuclear powers club", the Indian bomb was obviously not tested with them in mind, considering the overtures to China, the US et al for support against Pakistan.
Will India consider offering "safe passage" or "voluntary withdrawal", call it what you will?
The army is strongly against giving "safe passage" to intruders unless Pakistan throws in the towel and agrees to withdraw the intruders from the Indian side of the LoC. To put it simply, the army-engaged in the biggest operation since '71-would like Pakistan to admit defeat before it agrees to letting the intruders "withdraw safely" to their side of the LoC. Minus this gesture from Pakistan, offering safe passage to the enemy would severely demoralise the troops, army officers maintain. However, those negotiating at the political or diplomatic levels understand this is rather simplistic and that Nawaz Sharif needs a face-saver. The military hawks and religious fundamentalists in his country have threatened him with dire consequences should he make any peace overtures to India. On the other hand, questions are being raised within Pakistan about Sharif's misadventure in Kargil and the economic fallout of a possible war. Sharif's domestic compulsions are therefore being factored into peace moves. Also, Vajpayee is naturally keen to ensure that any resolution should not be seen as a compromise on his part. That's why he has been adamant in stating that "no secret deals will be worked out". After the cover of the back channel being blown by hawks in Islamabad and later Delhi, this becomes even more crucial.
Official sources do point out that any method which could get the infiltrators out and de-escalate the situation (which was what the back channel was working on) would be welcomed by India "because we want peace, not war". The idea had been that the intruders would withdraw and India could claim that army action was the reason for this (which would be true to an extent), preparing the ground for talks at a later date. Pakistan, on its part, could claim that the "mujahideen" action had led to India placing Kashmir on the agenda for discussion. The result would have been a war averted and both sides calming public passions. But the sabotaging of the back channel has laid these plans to rest for the time being. "As Vajpayee has stated, the Lahore process can be taken forward but enemy occupation of our territory has to end first," says a top official.
Is converting the LoC into the international border a solution?
Observers have long been advocating this as a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem. In private, politicians are increasingly veering around to this thinking. But they know that it is politically incorrect, perhaps suicidal, to advocate it openly, leading to a section of the bjp using "sympathisers" to "throw the debate open". But the problems are many. From within
the Sangh parivar, such a suggestion is likely to be strongly resisted by a large majority. Then there is the fact that the Congress would make political capital out of it and even the public mood could be against a deal with the enemy which would involve giving up India's claim to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). And last but not the least, there is a standing resolution passed unanimously by Parliament authorising all means to take back PoK which will have to be overturned. A sensible option, but a bit far-fetched.
Is a long-drawn war a feasible project?
According to a US senate study on the arms balance in South Asia, India's numerical superiority in terms of men and weaponry is to its advantage in a full-scale conventional war. But in limited mountain conflicts, like the one in Kargil, this edge is to a large degree blunted. However, as PMO officials point out, a declared war waged over a period of time increases the chances of a nuclear conflagration. With the Indian establishment viewing Pakistani control over its bomb as highly suspect, this is one reason why a full-scale war is sought to be avoided.
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