With the general elections round the corner, Left wing Extremists - popularly termedNaxalites - of the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML), People's War Group (PWG), and theMaoist Communist Center (MCC) have begun efforts to resolve their differences and work towards anorganizational merger, potentially creating a grave threat to the electioneering process in the areas theydominate. In keeping with their ideological opposition to Parliamentary democracy in India, they have alreadycalled for a boycott of the election process, and large-scale preparations are said to be underway to ensurethe success of the boycott. Vigorous efforts are in evidence for the organisation of training camps,procurement of illegal firearms, fund-raising, as well as outreach and propaganda activities to gain publicsympathy.
Available reports suggest that the PWG and the MCC would merge under a new identity: the All India MaoistCommunist Center (AIMCC), and would acquire a more militant 'avatar'. Intelligence sources indicate that theMCC is currently holding talks with the PWG and a few other like-minded organisations in India, as well aswith Nepal's Maoist insurgents. Leaders of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) are believed tobe acting as mediators to strengthen the extreme Left in the region. Given the significant increase inNaxalite activities in Central India after the August 11, 1998, merger of the PWG with Party Unity, anotherrevolutionary group operating in Bihar, the possible union of the MCC and the PWG creates probabilities of asubstantial force multiplier for Left Wing insurgencies over a vast landscape.
The MCC is distinguished by its commitment to an earlier version of the 'Charu Mazumdar line' [Mazumdarinitiated the 'Naxalite' Movement in the mid-1960s], which envisions 'protracted armed struggle'. The MCC'sphilosophy revolves around two premises. The first is that, within the country, a revolutionary mass struggleexisted and the people were fully conscious and even prepared to take part in revolution immediately. Thesecond was that militant struggles must be carried on, not for land, crops, or other immediate goals, but forthe seizure of power. These assumptions are reflected in all their views, whether on organization, on strategyor on tactics. As a result, participation in elections, propaganda, meetings, demonstrations, education ofpeople through papers and pamphlets, are all viewed as being totally unnecessary, and all efforts andattention is firmly focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power.
Though the PWG also held a similar view till the early 1980s, it has since shifted stance and establishedseveral political front organisations. The PWG gradually discarded its initial assessment of the people'slevel of preparedness for an armed struggle, and consequently revised its strategy of immediate seizure ofpower. Though the armed struggle is not discarded, considerable differences emerged on the issue of theappropriate modus operandi. There is now increasing emphasis on the processes of party building and theencouragement of mass political organizations. Party organisation, though, remains secret in nature. Theirperspectives on strategy and tactics are also somewhat more nuanced, and there is an acknowledgement that theissues on which the struggle should be conducted necessarily depend on the level of people's consciousness andthe nature of problems faced by them.
Despite these differences, both the organizations share their belief in the 'annihilation of class enemies'and in extreme violence as a means to achieve the organisation's goals. The PWG and the MCC have beenresponsible for the maximum number of violent attacks and fatalities in Naxalite-related violence in the nine statesthat are significantly affected by Left wing extremism. While the MCC operates in Jharkhand and Bihar, the PWGdominates Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Despite a decline in the number of incidents and marginaldecline in total fatalities over the past year (2003 witnessed 546 incidents and 509 deaths whereas 2002 hadseen 1465 incidents and 482 deaths), Left wing extremist violence spread into new areas through 2003.
Thus, in Andhra Pradesh, a total of 280 persons were killed, including 164 Naxalites and 99 civilians, in2003. A break-up reveals an increasing number of killings in the Andhra Pradesh state Committee (APSC) zone,which had been comparatively less violence-prone in the past, as compared to the area under the NorthTelengana Special Zone Committee (NTSZC) and the Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zone Committee (AOBSZC). Themovement out of the areas of traditional dominance may be the consequence of a combination of factors,including: