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Shell-Shocked

The Pak shelling on Kargil seems part of a deliberate strategy

SEPTEMBER 30 was no different from other days. It was a placid but cold morning. But soon it was to turn into the bloodiest Tuesday in recent times for the nearly 14,000 inhabitants of Kargil, located at 9,000 ft, close to the Line of Control (LOC). The first Pakistani shell landed on the military targets around Kargil at 11.15 am. Townspeople were unperturbed—firing or shelling on military targets around the town is a routine, almost daily, event and they've learnt to live with it. At 1.15 pm, the first shells landed in the town. In the next five hours, nearly 110 shells rained down, according to Indian army estimates. The toll at the end of the day: 17 people, including two children, killed and 60 injured. Numerous buildings, including a hospital and a school, destroyed or damaged. The wall of a mosque also damaged. And Kargil was once again a ghost town, reminiscent of the aftermath of a similar incident this April.

Over the next few days there were heavy exchanges of fire along several points on the LOC, particularly in the Uri, Kupwara and Nawgam sectors. Heavy artillery was also used. Meanwhile, there was a spurt of activity on the diplomatic and political fronts. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral rang up his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif on October 1 on the hotline and called for steps to de-escalate tension on the LOC. Foreign secretary K. Raghunath summoned the Pakistan high commissioner in New Delhi, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, and lodged a protest over the civilian deaths.

The tension brewing since the end of the inconclusive foreign secretary-level talks last month had clearly peaked. Pakistanis had returned to Islamabad without getting India to agree to a working group on Kashmir. Sharif too had failed to secure any assurance from Gujral when they met in New York on this issue. Added to this was the US stand that it would not interfere in the bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan despite all efforts by Pakistan to get the US involved. As the heat from the LOC reached Islamabad, an angry Sharif told his cabinet colleagues that he would review Pakistan's policy on Kashmir.

He forgot he had said, "I like this man, he is a good man," about Gujral at Male in May. Instead he said: "I have no desire to meet the Indian leader just for the sake of formality unless meaningful discussions take place." This means that he may not have bilateral meetings with Gujral on the sidelines of the Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh later this month and the economic summit in Dhaka in November.

Gujral's call to Sharif was interpreted in Pakistan as a knee jerk reaction. "Gujral must have raised the issue of the LOC firing, but he would have also been curious about Sharif's statement about reviewing the Kashmir policy," said a Pakistani observer. The Pakistan media had panned Gujral for his silence over Sharif's offer of a no-aggression pact made at the UN General Assembly.

But none of this explained why there was firing on civilian targets in Kargil. The most charitable explanation emanating from Islamabad was that someone got carried away and unintentionally opened fire on the town; certainly there were no orders from the top to do so. But Ashok Kapur, Brigadier General Staff, 15 Div, in Srinagar, differed. He said the "decision to fire at civilian targets could not have been taken without clearance from the top".

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Signs of frustration? Anyway, it has only hardened the Indian position. The Pakistan foreign office stand that dialogue resumption hinges on a "substantive and specific discussion" on Kashmir isn't likely to bother New Delhi overmuch. Increasingly, there is a feeling that if Pakistan does not want a dialogue, it can have it that way. After all, there was no dialogue between 1994 and 1997. In any case, resumption of dialogue doesn't mean a reduction in support to Kashmiri militancy. India has lived without a dialogue, it can continue doing so. Besides, Kargil-type incidents only further reduce Gujral's domestic manoeuvr ability in dealing with Pakistan or giving any more concessions to Islamabad. As it is, he is under pressure from the Congress and the BJP to formulate an adequately strong response to firing from across the border.

But for Sharif, things seem to be spinning out of control as far as the dialogue is concerned—one of his much-trumpeted poll planks. There are several aspects to understanding the shelling on Kargil:

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  •  The Pakistani military has not looked on Sharif's diplomatic initiative with India very kindly. Indian officials say that an incident like Kargil could sabotage the bilateral dialogue or at least make things more difficult. Essentially, for the Pakistan army any solution to the Kashmir problem that's not in accordance with Pakistani wishes is just not acceptable.
  •  Any heightened tension means internationalising the issue and inviting a third party to intervene. It is a Pakistani message to the US that it can't afford to stay out of the Indo-Pak dialogue.
  •  Kargil is a choice target as it is located on the strategic Srinagar-Leh highway. With winter about to set in—and this year it is expected to be an early winter, with snowfall expected in the third week of October—there is particularly heavy traffic on the highway since it is time for stocking up for the winter in Leh and Siachen. Any disruption on the highway can throw awry the whole schedule of winter stocking.
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  •  Kargil is a predominantly Shia town which has not cooperated with the Kashmiri militants. And this is an easy method to teach it a lesson.
  •  But most importantly, the Pakistani positions opposite Kargil overlook the Indian positions and it is easy to simply launch off. This time, with the bilateral dialogue going nowhere and complete silence from India on the no-aggression pact, there is a much bigger message to be conveyed to India by making Kargil the unfortunate target.

    But the strong response from the Indian army appears to have cooled off the Pakistani army for the moment. Some years ago, a Pakistani officer had laughingly told his Indian counterpart at a flag meeting that every time they have to open fire on the Indian positions along the LOC they simply start off. But for the Indians, prior permission from New Delhi is a must. But things have changed. Defence Ministry sources confirm the government has allowed the Indian commanders on the LOC to take all the necessary operational decisions. Now they need not wait for instructions from New Delhi, though they have to keep their bosses informed.

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    The firm response resulted in the Indian high commissioner Satish Chandra being called into the Pakistan foreign office. A protest was lodged at the "deplorable act of targeting civilians and their homes and hearths which appears to be intended to generate feelings of anger and dissatisfaction towards the government's policy for a constructive dialogue with India". Added another Pakistani official: "These are barbaric attempts to terrify the civilians." Exactly. That's what is felt in India too. Indian officials say they have not attacked civilians areas though they have destroyed many Pakistani bunkers and, according to Brig Kapur, there have been 45 to 50 army casualties on the Pakistani side. And shelling of a civilian area like Kargil also blows holes in the dialogue process.

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