One Man On An Island

• Prime Minister Manmohan Singh may be a Congressman, but he is an economist first
  
• Being a technocrat, he has little stake in politics
  
• He'd rather achieve his goals like operationalise the nuclear deal even if it means his government falls or the Congress risks an early election
  
• Like some other prime ministers before him, he wants his place in history
  
• Economic reforms is literally a religion for him. It often disconnects him from his party.
  
• His worldview envisages close economic and military ties with the US
  
• He's said to be a simple soul, but the PM's really a complex man who keeps his cards close to the chest

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• Upset with the possible implementation of the Malhotra Committee recommendation for the finance sector, Manmohan Singh threatened to resign
  
• Offered to quit when pressurised by the Centre to allow the now-defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International to open a branch in Mumbai

• Threatened to put in his papers after the then PM Rajiv Gandhi, described the members of the commission as a "bunch of jokers"

• Talk of resignation surfaced when the Congress Party protested the hike in fertiliser prices in 1991
  
• Offered to quit after the stockmarket scam of 1992 involving Harshad Mehta broke
  
• Repeated the offer when the Joint Parliamentary Committee submitted its report on the scam and partly blamed the finance ministry for it

• Within three months of taking over as prime minister in May 2004, Manmohan reportedly offered to quit on grounds that some ministers were showing disrespect to him
  
• Did it again in December 2004 after a verbal spat with the then CPI(M) general secretary Harkishen Singh Surjeet. The PM alleged that the Left parties were adamant on discrediting his government.
  
• In July 2006, the stockmarket lost 258 points after word spread that the PM is likely to quit.
  
• Following an interview to The Telegraph in August 2007 in which he dared the Left to withdraw support over the nuclear deal, there was talk of Manmohan Singh putting in his papers.
  
• Threatened to quit in June 2008, after giving the party an ultimatum that it had to back him on the nuclear deal.

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"The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars, but in ourselves that we areunderlings."
—Julius Caesar, in the Shakespearean play

But where he falters, they say, is when he needs to make a political call. Manmohan Singh, they say, tends to get bogged down by matters which could be dealt with by, say, district-level officials (as happened when activist Medha Patkar went on a hunger strike), finds himself helpless when dealing with incompetent ministers/bureaucrats who have powerful backers—officials point to the lack of progress in infrastructure, roads and the power sector where the Left had no role at all. Files relating to important appointments in government lie on his table for months because he can't take a decision on them. As happened in the case of the chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Authority—since the selection panel suggested one name and a then powerful bureaucrat wanted another, the PM kept the file on hold till the said bureaucrat retired and all controversy was averted.

So how does this sort of indecisiveness square up with the do-or-die position Manmohan has taken on the nuclear deal? It has, in large measure, to do with the fact that he sees its completion as a fitting legacy of his tenure as PM. But his political detractors would also like to attribute the man's present intransigence to his "intellectual vanity", where anyone who does not agree with him is seen to be questioning his patriotism and intellectual capabilities. They recall his response to the Harshad Mehta scam when he was Union finance minister in the P.V. Narasimha Rao government. "His speech in Parliament was extraordinary," says a political observer. "He behaved as though the criticism of the scam was an attack on his personal integrity and on the wisdom of economic reforms."

Of course, the PM's preoccupation has clearly been with doing for foreign policy what he did for the economy in the early '90s, of projecting India as a global player, a powerhouse of the 21st century. The Left's worries have centred around its fears that the deal would set the stage for a closer military and strategic alliance with the US which would end in India playing subordinate to the US internationally. The deal, CPI(M) general secretary Prakash Karat wrote in party journal People's Democracy in 2007, "is only one part of the wide-ranging alliance that the UPA government has forged with the United States. This agreement covers political, economic, military and nuclear cooperation. Prior to the joint statement of July 2005, the UPA government signed a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement with the United States. It is evident that without the defence agreement, the Americans would not have agreed for the nuclear cooperation. The first serious conflict with the Left arose when the UPA government did a volte-face on the Iran nuclear issue. The government voted along with the US...in September 2005 and was not even prepared to go along with the Non-Aligned Movement countries."

Of course, the Congress has not yet given up hope of a miracle. "There'll be a decision in four or five days (that is, by the month-end)," authoritative sources in the Congress told Outlook. "We are still working towards doing the deal without precipitating an early election. Wider consultations are still on." Sources close to the PM say the urgency within the party to take a decision on the deal stems from two factors: one, the deadline on the deal is drawing near and, two, Manmohan's growing impatience with the lack of a decision and the realisation that his position is only growing untenable by the day.

But even as the country anxiously awaits the outcome of these "consultations"—things put on hold, a real decision or continuing efforts towards consensus—other questions are being asked in government and party circles. Did the Congress fail the PM in failing to manage the contradictions within the coalition? Or was it the PM himself, and his advisors, who are responsible for his confrontation with the Left and differences within his own party, the Congress?

Top government sources blame it on the inefficient use of the mechanism of the UPA-Left coordination committee (and not just the one set up to look into the nuclear deal alone). "It should have dealt with all issues," says one source. "From the nrega and other social sector issues to the nuclear deal. That way, it would have created a greater atmosphere of give and take. Instead, the committee only dealt with contentious issues, those that the Left was opposed to—like reforms in the insurance sector or the nuclear deal."

If this is something these sources say should have been the responsibility of the Congress, the PM, they add, erred by relying far too much on the capacity of West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya and party veteran Jyoti Basu to deal with the CPI(M) leadership. "Don't forget that the CPI(M) operates very differently—its leadership suspended both Kerala chief minister V.S. Achuthanandan and Pinarayi Vijayan from the politburo," says a source. "Buddhadeb, like all other chief ministers, was only interested in getting more projects for his state—he was not in a position to dictate party policy. This was a fundamental mistake."

If the government finally decides to go ahead with the deal—and face the wrath of the Left—it will definitely be a victory for Manmohan Singh, who has virtually staked his reputation on it. But if it decides against it, will the PM really quit? "Why should he?" asks a cabinet minister. "He wants to be PM again. Look, he is a man who keeps his cards very close to his chest." But is that fair to a man who is widely regarded as a decent soul, well-intentioned, intellectually head and shoulders above his colleagues and that rarity in politics—squeaky-clean? Or does he suffer from a hubris that has brought this government to the precipice? Only future generations will decide Dr Manmohan Singh's place in history.