India’s New Doctrine: Operation Sindoor Signals End of Strategic Restraint with Pakistan

The missile-based response to the Pahalgam terror attack, known as Operation Sindoor, was not a mere retaliation—it is emblematic of a new doctrine shaping India’s relationship with Pakistan. Targeting nine terror facilities in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), this operation is a continuation of an evolving strategic shift that began with the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and matured with the Balakot airstrikes in 2019.

What makes this moment significant is not just the military precision or the symbolism, but the clarity with which India has chosen to abandon the shackles of its earlier doctrine of strategic restraint. This transformation has been catalysed by Pakistan’s unwavering use of cross-border terrorism as a tool of statecraft, protected under the illusion of a nuclear shield.

The End of Strategic Restraint

For decades, Pakistan has operated under a calculated assumption: that its nuclear capabilities would deter India from responding to terror strikes in any meaningful military manner. This playbook allowed Pakistan to wage an asymmetric war against India through non-state actors.

The evolving Indian posture is altering that logic. India, sensitive to the domestic call for justice and accountability after each major terror strike, has moved towards a more proactive and punitive strategy. From surgical strikes to aerial bombardments, and now precision missile attacks, the threshold of tolerance has narrowed. While the red line for retaliation may remain undefined publicly, India has made it clear that provocation—especially attacks targeting civilians and tourists—will trigger a response.

This new doctrine hinges on measured escalation and diversified response mechanisms. The post-Uri and post-Pulwama responses were significant in signalling this shift, but Operation Sindoor adds a new dimension by incorporating long-range weaponry. This minimises the need to cross the border, but maximises pressure on the Pakistani military and terror infrastructure.

Importantly, these responses are no longer episodic. They are part of a broader, institutionalised shift in India’s strategic calculus. India’s retaliation now follows a template that is calibrated, proportionate and designed to inflict pain without entering into a full-scale war, thus keeping global opinion relatively neutral and avoiding a spiral into nuclear brinkmanship.

The immediate fallout of this shift has been evident. Terror camps have reportedly moved deeper into Pakistan’s western regions, where Islamabad now faces increasing threats from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baloch insurgents and cross-border instability from Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan’s ability to sustain an aggressive stance against India has been compromised by internal insecurity.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC) lies in tatters, as frequent small arms and artillery exchanges cause renewed civilian suffering. Yet, India appears prepared for this escalated state of engagement, relying on robust domestic support and international diplomatic acceptance.

The Diplomatic Vacuum

Diplomatic engagement between India and Pakistan remains at its lowest in years. India’s message is clear: diplomacy cannot exist in a vacuum of trust and must be underpinned by concrete action against terrorism. Despite being a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Pakistan has found little traction for its narrative. Multilateral platforms no longer function as escape hatches for states abetting terror. The global community, while urging restraint, has largely condemned the Pahal­gam attacks and acknowledged India’s right to defend itself.

India, for its part, has smartly engaged bilaterally with UNSC members—ensuring that New Delhi’s counter-terror narrative is understood and respected. The external affairs minister’s assertion that “India does not need preachers” manifests the growing confidence and autonomy in handling its regional security.

The Indus Waters Treaty: A Strategic Lever

Perhaps the most quietly transformative move has been India’s recalibrated posture on the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Without formally abrogating the treaty, India has begun pursuing independent measures that reduce Pakistan’s leverage. Infrastructure development, including deeper reservoirs, hydroelectric projects and water flow management, is picking up pace in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

While these efforts are within India’s rights under the treaty, they are also geopolitically strategic. They send a message that India is willing to exploit every available lever—economic, environmental, and infrastructural—to raise the costs for Pakistan. The psychological impact of this slow-burning strategy is already evident, with Pakistani media and officials expressing alarm over the potential consequences on their agrarian economy.

Any Pakistani threat to retaliate by targeting Indian hydro infrastructure would invite disproportionate responses—given Pakistan’s far more vulnerable and outdated utilities. Much like the nuclear threat, the water war rhetoric may prove to be more bluster than actionable strategy.

Since 1947, Pakistan has believed that Kashmiris inherently side with them—a myth that led to the failed Operation Gibraltar in 1965. Today, targeted attacks on Hindus and civilians again aim to exploit communal divides. But the ground reality has shifted. Post-election, J&K is embracing normalcy, development and tourism. Notably, Indian Muslims, especially in J&K, have condemned the Pahalgam attack, signalling unexpected internal unity—perhaps Pakistan’s most overlooked strategic failure.

The China Factor: An Uneasy Ally

China, Pakistan’s closest ally, is treading carefully. Focused on the US, Taiwan and trade tensions, Beijing is avoiding fuelling instability in South Asia. The troubled China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, plagued by delays and security risks, adds to its caution. As economic pressures mount and financial aid to Pakistan grows burdensome, China is unlikely to back Pakistani moves that risk provoking India. Stability, not adventurism, now guides Beijing’s regional approach.

Beyond China, Pakistan’s regional clout is waning. While anti-India rhetoric surfaces occasionally, South Asia’s broader consensus now favours India. Nations such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and even Iran increasingly view stability and growth through closer ties with New Delhi.

Pakistan’s sway in Afghanistan, once deemed its strategic depth, is diminishing. The Taliban shows little inclination to align closely with Islamabad and harbours anti-Pakistan elements. In contrast, India’s quiet diplomacy and pragmatic engagement reflect an interest-driven approach, diverging from Pakistan’s ideological rigidity.

Between the Pahalgam tragedy and Operation Sindoor, India’s global standing has continued to rise—both economically and diplomatically. Its position among the world’s top economies has strengthened, and its free trade negotiations and multilateral engagements signal growing global relevance.

The strategic message from India is unmistakable: cross-border terrorism will no longer go unanswered. Whether through airstrikes, missile attacks, economic measures or diplomatic isolation, India is building a comprehensive toolkit to respond to Pakistani provocations.

More importantly, India has normalised the idea that retaliatory action need not wait for global permission. This shift, underpinned by public support, growing military confidence and diplomatic clarity, marks a tectonic change in the India-Pakistan equation—one where the old rules no longer apply, and where the costs of terrorism are being recalibrated with every strike.

India’s progress has clearly unsettled Pakistan, prompting repeated attempts to undermine its stability. However, in today’s world of transactional bilateralism, Pakistan lacks the peace, stability and economic heft to attract meaningful global engagement. Disruptions in trade, transit and people-to-people ties highlight that dialogue with Pakistan—composite or comprehensive—is not on the Indian government’s agenda. Unless Pakistan addresses India’s core concerns, diplomatic engagement remains unlikely. India will continue responding in a responsible, firm and measured way—while showing decreasing tolerance for Pakistan’s provocations and internal fault lines.

(Views expressed are personal)

Gurjit Singh is a former ambassador and author

This article is part of Outlook’s May 22, 2025 issue, ‘Is This War?’, covering the tense four-day standoff that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. It appeared in print as 'Long-Range Response'