June has proved to be a crucial month for Kashmir. Real autonomy may be afar yet, but thanks to talks, speeches, informal parleys and an acrimonious attempt at legislation in the state assembly, the 50-year-old issue moved a quarter of an inch towards its goal - more than it has in the last few decades. And at the end, even if it remains inconclusive, there are clear signs that the tussle for Kashmir's autonomy, as well as its trifurcation, could have just begun.
How did the autonomy question come about? Political analysts say it's been a two-way process. At one level, New Delhi set the ball rolling by releasing Hurriyat detenus languishing in several Indian prisons leading to informed speculation that New Delhi was willing to talk to Hurriyat leaders. Then, the Centre also put up queries to the state government on its autonomy report, an unnecessary action which made it mandatory for the state government to react. And that was all a beleaguered Farooq Abdullah wanted. He grabbed the opportunity by calling a special session of the state assembly, ostensibly to debate and vote on the autonomy motion. Just when the noise threatened to become a din, Abdullah, in characteristic fashion, pulled the plug by announcing that there would be no voting on the motion.
The credit for stoking the autonomy fire must lie with the Centre. PMO officials were quite aware of events. "There's little doubt that the prime minister is well-disposed towards a permanent solution to Kashmir. The release of Hurriyat leaders is a pointer to that," says a PMO source. There was more. In June, two seminars were held in Srinagar, both sponsored by the PMO. The seminars were organised by a former militant Firdaus Syed (also known as Babar Badr), the key participants included a host of track two diplomats and key Vajpayee trouble-shooters: editor R.K. Misra, former diplomat Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra, academic S.D. Muni, Kashmir group activist Tapan Bose and others. The theme was autonomy and its various permutations: pre-1953, pre-1974 and other related issues.
Around the same time, and well within wraps, another group was travelling to Washington. This included National Conference (NC) rebel and former cabinet minister Saifuddin Soz, lawyer Ashok Bhan and bureaucrat V.K. Grover, an old hand in the Union home ministry dealing with Kashmir. Well-placed sources say this group held wide-ranging talks with Kashmiri separatist groups and individuals. The conclusion was mostly the same: despite varying perceptions, the autonomy question needed to be looked at seriously, beyond mere political announcements like those made by former PMs P.V. Narasimha Rao and Deve Gowda.
The views obtained in Washington echoed what a high-profile New York-based study group had proposed a month before President Bill Clinton's visit to India. The group, called the Kashmir Study Group and led by influential US businessman Farooq Kathwari, includes 25 leading Americans: a senator, two members of the House of Representatives and six former ambassadors. The group's suggestions could be considered 'outrageous' - sovereignty for Kashmir, with or without India and Pakistan. In its report entitled "Kashmir: a way forward, February 2000", the group suggests the Valley and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir could become two sovereign entities on either side of the LoC. Or they could merge to form a sovereign state straddling the LoC. Alternatively, this combined entity, the group proposed, could have its own defence and foreign affairs mechanism. While the creation of such an entity would require both India and Pakistan's assent, an Indian official who read the group paper told Outlook that the reaction within the Indian government was "guarded while being generally positive, at least there was a talking point from where negotiations could be started. ''
Meanwhile, another scene was unfolding in Kashmir itself. Chief minister Farooq Abdullah, under fire for his misgovernance and flamboyant style of functioning, was watching the whole scenario with some amount of trepidation. After all, could there be a Kashmir solution without his participation and even worse, with the inclusion of the Hurriyat, his archrival in the Valley? So when New Delhi raised queries on the state autonomy report prepared by his own government in 1996 (and submitted to the Centre in 1998), it was too good an opportunity to resist. Farooq immediately summoned a meeting of his cabinet and endorsed the report.
The next step was even more mystifying. Farooq, piqued at being left out by the BJP-led Centre, called a special assembly session to discuss and vote on the autonomy motion. The session itself was a divided house, as most sessions are, with both the BJP and Congress opposing the pre-1953 status the report proposed. If debating autonomy on the floor of the assembly wasn't enough, the spectre of a vote loomed large. If the vote was taken and adopted, it would set off a chain of reactions that could not only be highly embarrassing for New Delhi but had the potential to put things beyond its reach as well.
The key question is whether Farooq, known to change statements and positions to suit himself, was whipping up a populist frenzy to buoy his 'popularity'. Says Nasir Mustafa, a research scholar in Srinagar, "Autonomy for Farooq or what? He wants more autonomy to continue in power, to destroy anything and everything that's left of the state. By holding the special session Farooq wanted to convey to New Delhi that he should not be taken for granted. But also suggested in the same breath that a national debate on the issue should be held, conveying that he is not a man to burn all his boats.''
The chief minister's actions have set off differing reactions within the state. Jammu and Ladakh are already up in arms against the demand and Kashmiri pandits are also opposing the move. While the Ladakhis are observing a strike against autonomy, Kashmiri pandits in New Delhi set ablaze copies of the report as a mark of protest. It isn't only Dogras, Bodhs and Pandits but the Hurriyat Conference, Shabir Shah, Mufti Sayeed, G.M. Shah, Azam Inquilabi and others who also seem opposed to the demand.
But that didn't deter NC leaders from taking a very hard line on the issue. Education minister Mohammed Shafi, a senior party leader and Farooq's close confidant, while defending the demand for autonomy went to the extent of justifying the armed struggle launched by Kashmiri separatist youths and even warned New Delhi that in a changing global situation, India could be isolated in case it went ahead with its "supressive and oppressive measures." Shafi referred to the denial of democratic rights to the people of Kashmir and said that "when the verdict of the ballot isn't respected, the only alternative left was armed struggle." Another senior NC legislator Shafi Butt, while flaying the Centre for not providing the state enough financial assistance to meet its requirement, asked India to leave Kashmir. "If the Indian government thinks it is giving us money in charity, let it leave us so that we can accede elsewhere for financial requirements," Butt told the assembly when the CM was present. Another NC legislator Sadiq Ali warned that "UN resolutions on Kashmir are still valid," adding for good measure that the West can pressurise India any time into implementing them.
Observers in Srinagar say that by calling a special session of the state assembly, Farooq is in fact addressing the galleries. This has prompted the question whether his and the BJP's honeymoon is coming to an end. So while New Delhi seemed interested, albeit feebly, to open communication links with the Hurriyat, the CM feels isolated as a New Delhi-Hurriyat dialogue would render him irrelevant. So, just how serious Farooq is about autonomy was evident on June 21 when he told the assembly that a national debate is needed on the issue.
Many of Farooq's problems can be traced to his internal troubles as well. His election (lame duck as it was in 1996), came on a pro-autonomy plank. Cynical as the people were, there was hope in some quarters that Farooq would turn a new leaf, get 'serious' and begin cleaning up the mess in Kashmir. But right in the first few months he was back to his golf, Bollywood parties and joy rides in state planes. Even more significantly, the resentment within the NC has also been growing. Many legislators were left out of the ministry and even more were disgruntled that Farooq had left the governance to a few chosen bureaucrats who couldn't care less about what party legislators said. Now, the autonomy card has come handy in containing the wrath of these legislators, who at least temporarily, have been forced to toe the party line.
The recommendations of the state autonomy committee itself make for interesting reading. Drafted by a high-level NC team, it calls for restoration of the status the state enjoyed before 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed. Then Delhi only had jurisdiction over three areas in the state: defence, foreign affairs and communication, the rest were in the state's hands. Another crucial recommendation: to have a constitutional understanding between the state and the Union of India which provides that no provision of the Indian Constitution could be made applicable to J&K except those extended by virtue of the presidential order of 1950 and the Delhi agreement of 1952 that was arrived at between the Sheikh and Jawaharlal Nehru.
Political parties in Delhi have reacted predictably. The BJP's Narendra Modi says that reverting to a pre-1953 status will be undoing what has been achieved during the last 50 years or so. The Congress too, having offered autonomy in the past, is now dithering saying that such a move was entirely disagreeable. If anything, it's the Hurriyat which seems to be well-placed in the ongoing debate. Says political analyst Noor Mohammed Baba: "If it is conceded, it's a step ahead. If it is not accepted by the Centre, it'll further delegitimise the Indian government in Kashmir." Union home minister L.K. Advani, during his foreign trip, has already said that 'informal' talks with the Hurriyat - minus Pakistan - is now a reality. The crucial question now is if the Centre will actually begin talks with the Hurriyat which has so far remained cool to the Centre's proposals. And then, just how will the NC react to such a move?
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