…for what would be the point of anything, if nothing is remembered?
Two dramatic attacks in rapid succession in the Malkangiri district of Orissa – on June 29 and again on July 16, 2008 – demonstrated the utter irrationality of force deployment in anti-Maoist operations in much of India
…for what would be the point of anything, if nothing is remembered?
-- Louis Bernieres
The result is, senior force commanders continue to throw small contingents of men – particularly highly trainedspecial and central paramilitary forces – into areas of Maoist dominance, with little backup or possibility of reinforcement, poor linkages, and difficult terrain, in the apparent conviction that superior training and individual fighting skills are sufficient to prevail in any situation. This ‘Rambo model’ – apparently conceived byforces’ leaderships in the security of far-away headquarters – has resulted in an unending succession of devastating debacles, in which isolated detachments have been trapped and decimated.
Often located in makeshift camps and deployed in an unequal battle with entrenched Maoists, forward unit commanders are required to constantly reinvent the wheel, learning ‘on the job’, and falling prey to the same tactics that have been employed in operation after operation by the Naxalites in theatres across the country. Such practices impose tremendous costs in wasted resources, wasted efforts, but most significantly, wasted lives, and yet, the security establishment seems incapable of deriving rational protocols, tactics and strategies from an enormous pool of experience, and of implementing these across Forces on the ground.
Indeed, it would seem that there is nothing that answers to the title of ‘strategic community’ in India. Specifically, in the armies of bureaucracies in theunion and state home ministries, in the top echelons of the ‘elite’ Indian Police Service (IPS), in the command centres of the proliferating para-military forces there appears to be no institutional arrangement effectively charged with studying the multiplicity of India’s internal security challenges, the varied strategies and tactics adopted in the past, and their relative efficacy – or lack thereof.
By the end of 2007, however, they barely registered a marginal presence in fivedistricts along the Andhra-Orissa and Andhra Chhattisgarh border – Khammam, Karimnagar, Warangal, Visakhapatnam and Vizianagaram – essentially by way of quick cross-border strikes in the densely forested and hilly terrain of the Dandakaranya belt, followed by rapid withdrawals into poorly policed territory in Orissa or Chhattisgarh.
But ask any police officer, senior bureaucrat in the security establishment, or political leader (outside a handful from Andhra Pradesh who are aware of the realities of the counter-insurgency effort in thestate) what the ‘Andhra Pradesh model’ is, and he will simply respond ‘Greyhounds’. The idea appears to be that all it takes is a small group of highly trained commandos – acting in virtual isolation – to ‘neutralize’ Maoists in areas where they have established significant dominance.
This, however, is nonsense. Pitching the Greyhounds – or any other ‘elite’force – into unfamiliar terrain, without a comprehensive support network and critical intelligence is, as the June 29 incident demonstrated, simply to set them up as targets. Indeed, the limited capacities of specialised forces to secure dramatic results in unfamiliar terrain has been repeatedly and clearly demonstrated, as in the case of the deployment of the top counter-terrorist National Security Guard (NSG) in Bihar after the Jehanabad jailbreak in November 2005. Some 280 personnel of the NSG were airlifted and deployed in the areas around Jehanabad on November 16, 2005, two days after the jailbreak, in pursuit of the raiders. Within a week of fruitless ‘raids’ and ‘combing operations’, the units were withdrawn, with theunion ministry of home affairs (MHA) declaring, "Deploying paramilitary forces won’t help, since localpolice are unable to gather any workable evidence on Naxals operating in as many as 36districts out of total 42 districts (of Bihar)."
But this has not prevented such irrational deployments, in the absence of ‘workable evidence’, in other theatres. The Greyhounds – as well as other paramilitary, armed Police and Special Forces – are repeatedly sent out for operations in unfamiliar terrain, without an adequate support structure and, more importantly, operational intelligence.
Indeed, it is useful to recall the continuity of politic rhetoric and promises since the first Maoist swarming attack in Orissa (which was the first such attack in the country), at the armoury at Koraput, on February 6, 2004, after which the Orissagovernment had drafted an ‘action plan’, including capacity augmentation across thestate police force. As always, implementation has remained fitful and utterly inadequate. Unlike the situation in the past, financial constraints are not a significant part of the problem today.
Indeed, utilisation of central Police Modernisation Funds (PMF) has been poor in thestate, at just 51.37 per cent in 2005-06. While a state-wise breakup for 2006-07 is not yet available, MHA data indicates that utilisation of PMF for all affectedstates was just 63.71 per cent – and it is improbable that Orissa’s performance will be above this average.
There has also been a complete failure to address the problem of endemic deficits in sanctionedpolice strengths at all levels. There is a particular crisis at leadership level, with just 98 out of a sanctioned strength of 159 officers in the top IPS cadre currently in position – reflecting a deficit of as much as 38.4 per cent. In February 2008, Chief Minister Patnaik had boasted that as many as 98 Police Stations and 20 armouries had been fortified in thestate, and fortification of the rest would be ‘completed soon’. With a total of 465 Police Stations in thestate, it remains to be seen what ‘soon’ really means in the lexicon of Orissa’s bureaucracy.
Crucially, sanctioned strengths on all parameters, which were defined in terms of peacetime policing requirements in the 1980s, are today, no more than a small fraction of what is currently needed – but there appears to have been no comprehensive assessment of present needs. All projected ‘action plans’ and ‘comprehensive strategies’ remain couched in incremental terms, seeking principally to cover existing deficits, or to marginally and selectively augment sanctioned capacities.
Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal