Moreover, the CRPF’s independent signals intelligence capabilities, unlike those of the ‘G-Branch’, are rudimentary; its staff, unlike that of theBSF, has not acquired an intimate knowledge of the wireless operators of jihadi groups. Finally, the CRPF’s medium-weapons and explosives capabilities are frugal, as is appropriate for a policeorganisation. While such resources are rarely used in counter-terrorism work inSrinagar, they have on occasion been essential to success.
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o all of these concerns there are, of course, credible counter-arguments. Much signals-intelligence work in Srinagar now relies not on the interception of traditional wireless traffic but of mobile phone communication, a task which is in the domain of India’s domestic covert service, the Intelligence Bureau. Given this fact – and the existence of Indian Army’s sophisticated signals intelligence apparatus – the loss of the G-Branch’s technical assets could be argued not to be of great significance.Second, the J&K Police, which will be the principal director of counter-terrorism operations, has demonstrated considerable competence in both offensive counter-terrorism operations over recent years. Its counter-terrorism officials have long worked with the G-Branch and, in many cases, have jointly handled its assets. As such, the handover may be smoother than might be expected in other circumstances.
India’s apparent willingness to experiment with its counter-terrorism formations has been in no small part enabled by the significant scale-back in the activities of the Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HM), and can be read as an effort to test the seriousness of Pakistan’s commitment to continuing its de-escalation of its not-so-covert war in J&K.
The largest terrorist group in J&K – and the one of greatest political significance, since its cadres for the most part hail from thestate and have linkages with local political formations, both mainstream and secessionist – the HM has carried out few strikes of importance since 2002. Its posture has led politicians to call for efforts to bring about a ceasefire with the group, although it has rejected such overtures. India had ordered its Forces not to initiate offensive combat operations in the wake of the Kargil war, after some elements in the HM initiated a dialogue process with New Delhi. While that enterprise collapsed, amidst an escalation of violence Indian military commanders have made clear they have no wish to see repeated, some politicians believe it ought to be resuscitated.
Could something of the kind be brought about, at least in the mid-term? Since the May, 2004 elimination of Abdul RashidPir, the HM has not had an overall ‘commander’ for operations in J&K.Pir, a trusted confidante of the organisation’s Muzaffarabad-based ‘supreme commander’, Mohammad Yusuf Shah aka SyedSalahuddin, had been attempting to build a new support base for the organisation among mainstream political groups, like the ruling Peoples Democratic Party, following its desertion by its long standing patron, the J&KJamaat-e-Islami. His loss was a considerable blow to the HM, coming less than five months after the killing of his predecessor, Ghulam Rasool Dar, just over a year after the elimination of the previous commander for operations, Ghulam Rasool Khan. Through the last several months, the HM also lost a number of powerful provincial commanders, notably Arif Khan, ShabbirBhaduri, and, this March, Ashiq Butt.
For reasons that are unclear, the HM never despatched Amir Khan, Pir’s intended successor, to J&K. The alias GhaziMisbahuddin, which the organisation now uses to refer to its ‘operational commander’, is in fact used by a several separate functionaries. Indian intelligence analysts, for the most part, believe the HM’s failure to despatch a ‘commander’ reflects organisational weakness. Another explanation is, however, possible: the HM may have learned its lessons, and sees no reason to have a single-point leader who can be targeted with ease. As things stand, the tasks of command have now been handed over to relatively low-profile second-rung leaders like Ibrahim Dar, a long-standing military aide to Shah, who has returned to J&K from Pakistan in recent months, and an individual code-named SalimHashmi, believed to be a South Kashmir resident with over a decade of field experience with the HM.
If this second explanation is correct – and it should be underlined that it is at best speculative – there is the possibility that the HM’s relative quiescence in recent months is not only the consequence of its mainly-ethnic Kashmiri cadre’s wait-and-watch attitude on the peace process.
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rime Minister Manmohan Singh’s September 11, 2005, declaration that he can "do business" with General Pervez Musharraf points us in the direction of an important component of the détente process in South Asia. There is, however, another component: getting security issues right within J&K itself.
If the somewhat quixotic conduct of Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s governmenton security issues is a guide, there is at least some reason for concern. Consider, for example, its use of the Public Safety Act, a legislation that enables the preventive detention of terrorism suspects. In recent weeks, Chief Minister Sayeed’sgovernment used the PSA to detain Asiya Andrabi, the head of an ultra-right Islamist women’s group known as the Dukhtaran-e-Millat(DeM). Andrabi’s offence was to have carried on a raucous campaign against restaurants in which men and women committed the crime of sitting together, as well as the sale of liquor. While Andrabi’s conduct during the protests was without dispute disgraceful, her activities posed no great threat to thestate. Her arrest seems to have been carried out to embarrass the Hurriyat Conference, which had claimed New Delhi’s willingness to review the detention of PSA prisoners as a major gain from its talks with Prime Minister Singh.
On the other hand, Chief Minister Sayeed has shown a conspicuous unwillingness to act against those who do pose a demonstrable threat to both citizens and thestate. In 2003, the Jammu and Kashmir Police detained Nasir Ahmad Jan, a government-employed engineer, on charges of having aided terrorists who attacked a telephone exchange in Srinagar’s Indira Nagarneighbourhood, killing an Army officer, two CRPF troopers and an employee of the telephone company in the process. Jan’s arrest was based on thestatements of Janzeb Kashmiri, a member of the two-person fidayeen squad who is now in jail in Jammu. Two years on, the Sayeedgovernment has refused to issue PSA warrants enabling Jan’s arrest – as indeed, it has done in hundreds of terrorism-related cases across Kashmir. Since Andrabi’s arrest makes it clear the Sayeedgovernment has no principled objection to the PSA, its conduct is mystifying.
Such conduct is symptomatic of a larger malaise. Officials complain that covert funds sent by New Delhi for use in counter-terror operations have not reached cutting-edge formations: intelligence operations conducted by both the BSF and J&K Police have suffered from the hoarding of these funds bystate officials for the last ten months. Service regulations within the police service have also been flouted, with a crippling impact on officer morale. Where vacancies existed for 37 officers to be promoted to the rank of Superintendent of Police, for example, 59 were granted the job – the last on the list, in order of seniority, being a member of the personal security staff of the Chief Minister. All of this is, of course, part of business-as-usual in J&K. Suchstate-level messing with the apparatus of counter-terrorism, however, makes it that much more likely that the worst-case possibilities opened up by the BSF withdrawal will be realised – something that ought to merit, at the very least, a discreet nudge from New Delhi.