Born-Again Peace?

• Self-governance of Kashmir by leaders chosen by Kashmiris
• Joint management of Kashmir's security by India and Pakistan
• Open border to facilitate trade, people-to-people contact
• Demilitarisation of Kashmir on both sides of the LoC
• This arrangement to be reviewed every 10-15 years

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Chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference Mirwaiz Umer Farooq says, “We had supported the proposed agreement and we think it should be revived at the earliest.” Agrees another Kashmiri leader, Sajjad Lone, “The need of the hour is to revive the agreement without waiting for something to implode or explode in Kashmir.” Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Bhat is also optimistic: “That could well be the launching pad for taking the peace process forward, and the basis for a solution to the Kashmir dispute.”

From all accounts, the signature-away solution was hammered out after three years of hectic negotiations, hard-nosed bargains and back-channel diplomacy between India and Pakistan. Apart from Kasuri, nobody of eminence has spelt out the contours of the 2007-2008 agreement, but its basic features are essentially five in number and applicable across the Line of Control to both parts of Kashmir—self-governance by Kashmiris, a joint Indo-Pak mechanism to oversee security, an open border, demilitarisation, and a provision to review the agreement every 10-15 years. Says Lone, “I certainly think it was the way forward because, short of secession, the proposed agreement talked about giving a lot of power to the Kashmiris.”

That formula had found acceptance because Kashmiri leaders, particularly those clubbed as secessionists, were kept in the loop right through. It was also decided that before the agreement was finalised, Kashmiri leaders would travel to Pakistan and those from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir would visit New Delhi to furnish their consent. The agreement was initially supposed to be signed in 2007 in Pakistan, where Manmohan was to fly down for this specific purpose.

A diplomatic source says, “By 2006, Musharraf was keen to push through the deal, but India was reluctant to rush into it. However, when India was ready to sign it, Musharraf’s position in Islamabad became untenable.” He was referring to the events in Pakistan in 2007, when then president Pervez Musharraf provoked, through his sacking of the chief justice of Pakistan, a prolonged countrywide protest. Amidst mounting pressure from the coalition government after the general election in February 2008, Musharraf resigned from office in August that year, and hopes of resolving the ‘problem from history’ were dashed again.

The proposed deal wasn’t Manmohan’s brainchild, but was an outcome of a chain of events dating back to 2004, when then PM A.B. Vajpayee had travelled to Pakistan to tell its leaders that only cessation of cross-border terrorism could be a pre-requisite for a peace deal. Not only did Manmohan take Vajpayee’s initiative forward—for instance, beginning the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service—he appointed a former diplomat to engage Musharraf’s national security advisor Tariq Aziz in a feverish bout of back-channel diplomacy.

Even in the Valley, pessimism segued into optimism, and though the people had no clue then about the agreement, they keenly supported the confidence-building measures. Kashmir Image editor Bashir Manzar says, “When the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service started, it elicited a huge response. Though people had no clear idea of what was happening, they were happy that something positive was taking place after years.” Manzar and others therefore feel that attempts to revive the 2007 formula now will still have popular support.

Obviously, there are naysayers. Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Jamaat-e-Islami told Outlook, “Self-determination is the only way forward, anything short of that is unacceptable. If we accept what was being offered in the proposed agreement, Kashmiris will put us in a mental asylum.” In fact, the one weakness of the package was its top-down approach—leaders who would have been tasked to sell the peace formula to the people were taken into confidence. Says Firdaus Syed, a former militant-turned-columnist: “Though not a complete package, the deal tried to break the status quo. But the crucial input from the people of Kashmir was missing in it, and no agreement can work unless you take them along.”

Then there were other shortcomings. Some Hurriyat leaders wanted greater clarity on the joint mechanism—did it mean India and Pakistan jointly patrolling the state? The leaders had suggested raising a new security force comprising Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiri troops. They also wanted the subjects listed for self-governance to include more than just water, agriculture, trade and culture, and were keen to have greater say in security matters and foreign relations pertaining to Kashmir. Their other demand was to accord recognition to the currencies of both India and Pakistan in all market transactions. Yet what made them accept the proposal was the provision of review incorporated in it.

Can the 2007 deal then be revived? A senior source told Outlook, “If and when the time comes for that, we would at least have something on the basis of which we can take the dialogue forward.” He and others in South Block feel nothing can move forward until Islamabad takes action against the Mumbai masterminds and dismantles the terror apparatus. New Delhi is wary of reviving the deal for another reason: it isn’t sure who calls the shots in Pakistan—the army or the political establishment. Both must support a Kashmir deal for it to be fully acceptable.

The Kashmiri leaders feel New Delhi must seize the moment now—or the window of opportunity opened in 2007 could be slammed shut permanently. Says the Mirwaiz, “Delhi comes to us when there’s a crisis and forgets all about us when there is peace.” Another crisis, a terror attack say, could well sound the death-knell for the 2007 deal.