It is useful to place the overall violence of the NDFB in the context of its history of acrimonious and violent relationship with the erstwhile BLT, especially between 1998 and 2000. Interestingly, both the groups originated with claims of representing'Bodo rights'. While the NDFB wanted a 'sovereign' Bodoland, the BLT -- widely believed to have been supported by the intelligence agencies as a counter-force to the NDFB-- had the relatively limited objective of a 'separate'state of Bodoland. Both before it opted for a ceasefire with the government and thereafter, the BLT has borne the brunt of NDFB violence, which has systematically targeted its leaders, cadres and sympathisers.
BLT's Memorandum of Settlement with the union and Assam governments on February 20, 2003, was followed by the en masse surrender of its 2,641 cadres on December 6, 2003. Much of its cadre strength has since been absorbed into the Central Para-military Forces (CPMF), while the leadership and remaining cadres have formed the Bodo People's Progressive Front (BPPF). The BPPF has since been split into the Hagrama (H) and the Rabiram Brahma (R) factions. The BPPF-H controls the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), headquartered at Kokrajhar and is also a partner in the ruling coalition led by the Congress Party instate capital Dispur.
The BTC deal with New Delhi had proven a decisive nail in the coffin for the NDFB, whose capacities were further degraded following the December 2003 military operations in Bhutan, where the bulk of its cadres were based. The ineffective ceasefire and the political rivalry between the two factions of the BPPF are, however, allowing the NDFB to revive influence and operations. The BPPF-H is clearly worried by NDFB's campaigns beyond the group's traditional stronghold in Udalguri. Of late, the NDFB has moved into Kokrajhar to exploit the differences between the BPPF-H and BPPF-R. The latter, in order to revive its political fortunes, has chosen to ally with the NDFB and was in the forefront of rallies that condemned the March attack on the NDFB's Medaghat camp. Political rivalries have also driven the ABSU, Bodo Women's Justice Forum, and the All Bodo Peace Forum into the NDFB camp, and these groups have taken out rallies in support of the insurgent outfit.
While the struggle for political space, interspersed with some violence, may still be acceptable within the Northeast's troubled scenarios, the NDFB's recent revival of relations with its former comrade-in-arms, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), sends more disturbing signals. Intelligence reports indicate a tactical alliance between the ULFA and the NDFB, with the latter assisting the ULFA to increase its dominance in the western Assamdistricts and for gaining entry into Bhutan. As part of the pact, the NDFB is also said to have assisted ULFA in the abduction of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) Executive Director, N. Ram on April 17 from Guwahati. A ransom of INR 210 million was demanded for the senior executive, who remains currently untraceable, though the Assam Police has confirmed his confinement in the Baskadistrict bordering Bhutan.
NDFB's resurrection is a natural corollary not just of the political rivalry in the Bodo heartland, but also of the flawed character and free dispensation of ceasefire agreements in the region, which have released militant groups from the threat of security force operations, but have failed to bind insurgent cadres to a working code of conduct that can protect civilians and prevent extortion, intimidation and armed violence. Regrettably, these defective deals with terrorists remain thecentre's preferred tool for containing extremist activities in the region.