'When In Doubt, Shut Up'

When Mulford’s intemperate remarks provoked an outburst of criticism in New Delhi, the Bush administration promptly swung into damage control mode. State Department officials declared the ambassador’s remarks to be his "personal opinion", the equivalent of a diplomatic reprimand. During the Republic Day reception at Indian ambassador Ronen Sen’s residence, undersecretary of state R. Nicholas Burns sought to further soothe ruffled feathers. He said, "We respect India, we respect its sovereignty.... But we have a right in international politics to articulate our own views, and the ambassador and I have both done that."

But voicing personal opinion can prove perilous in international relations. That’s why Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington says, "Ambassadors don’t have the luxury of having personal opinions when they talk to the press." Robert M. Hathaway, director of the Asia Programme at Washington’s Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, thinks Mulford has "forgotten the first rule of diplomacy: when in doubt, shut up".

Hathaway, however, admits Mulford’s perception was not inaccurate about the sentiments prevailing in Washington. "He was merely articulating a viewpoint widely held on Capitol Hill. But it was impolitic for him to have said this. Mr Ambassador: the truth will not always set you free," declares Hathway.

Sumit Ganguly, professor of political science at Indiana University, believes Mulford should have articulated his views through appropriate diplomatic and institutional channels. "This was clearly a diplomatic gaffe of some proportions," Ganguly remarks.

Gaffe apart, Krepon feels Mulford’s remarks, however inappropriate, were stretched to suit political purposes. But that was inevitable, argues Ganguly, because the Left’s opposition to the US left the Manmohan Singh government with no option but to react sharply. Analysts say Mulford’s remarks provided ample room for speculations: did he talk at Washington’s bidding? Were his remarks an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of India, as the Left believes? Or does Washington feel the Iran issue could goad Congress to abort the Indo-US civil nuclear deal?

There are indeed no free meals in international relations. Sample some remarks. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Mulford was "reflecting the view that on Capitol Hill there are very strongly held feelings about Iran and the need for the international community to act decisively and firmly...." A senior congressional source told Outlook that the "general sense" in the House International Relations Committee—the top House panel in Congress where the deal is being debated—is that if India does not back the US against Iran, it would be a "deal breaker". "For changes to be made to US law on the nuclear front, members need to be assured of various issues, particularly that India will be a reliable ally on non-proliferation efforts such as those related to Iran and thePSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)," the official said.

Congressman Joseph Crowley, New York Democrat and former co-chairman of the Congressional caucus on India and Indian Americans said it is "fair that this (US-India) relationship comes with the expectation that India will look towards the United States and our allies in western Europe in standing strong to prevent a nuclear Iran". In fact, opposition in Congress to India’s relationship with Iran also encompasses the proposed gas pipeline between the two. The senior congressional source explains why: "If the nuclear deal is to help address India’s energy needs and help our friends in India diversify India’s energy resources, then why is India engaged with Iran’s energy sector, which provides Iran with the financial resources to engage in its terrorist activities...and its nuclear pursuits?"

At Sen’s residence, Outlook asked Burns whether he thought the nuclear deal would be jeopardised if India decided not to vote with the US on Iran. Burns replied: "I learnt as a spokesman (of the State Department) ten years ago never to answer a hypothetical question." This is one tip Mulford could have done with. Even if in the bargain he seems to have conveyed the dominant feeling in Washington.