T
here is, of course, an influential stream of opinion in Pakistan that suggests that the Lal Masjid crisis, like other crises before, has simply been orchestrated by the regime in order to conjure its dramatic and proximate'resolution'--no doubt with the loss of some expendable lives--that would help cementMusharraf's crumbling image as a bastion against Islamist extremism and the Talibanisation of national politics. There is some inconclusive evidence that the crisis may have been collusively orchestrated by elements within the establishment and the intelligence services, and the fact that the crisis was permitted to fester and, indeed, to cyclically escalate, from the first incidents--the takeover of a public library by women students of the Jamia Hafsa--in January 2007, gives some credence to such an assessment. As with virtually every aspect of politics in Pakistan, there are contradictory elements in play, underlining the complex relationships between the jihadi elements within the country and the military leadership.
As with the strategy of 'management' of radicalism in the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), however, this approach has inherent risks and limitations. While the Army remains committed to a nationalist perspective--albeit increasingly tainted with elements of the Islamist extremist and jihadi ideology--at least some of the jihadi groups go beyond the boundaries of the sarkari (officially sanctioned) ideology to embrace a puritanpan-Islamist dogma that rejects the primacy of nationalist or State interests. It has, till now, been possible to direct much of the fury of this radicalised Islamist terrorist element outwards--towards Afghanistan and India--but there is evidence of an increasing proportion of this rage turning inwards.