Pakistan has been surviving on international charity for much of its existence, and this has not strengthened the country, or created a sound domestic production base and economy. Pakistan is, at best, and temporarily, a 'rich beggar', and cannot be expected to retain this status unless it radically restructures both its politics and its economy. There is little evidence, yet, of such restructuring, and any transformations that may have occurred have only tended to entrench the Islamist extremist elements even deeper in the nation's politics.
And yet, despite the growing international recognition of Pakistan's continued role in supporting and sustaining international terrorism, there is virtual acceptance of the fact that Musharraf will come away from Camp David with significant 'rewards' for 'helping America' in its war against terrorism. It is useful, within this context, to assess what it is the General will seek at Camp David, and the strategy he would employ to secure what he wants.
The first component of the General's quest is 'more of the same' - further financial aid in the form of a waiver of bilateral debt to the tune of US $ 1.8 billion. America had already written off $ 1 billion as a reward for Pakistan's 'support' in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and had also helped secure large external inflows, concessional multilateral loans and grants that have helped Pakistan build up foreign exchange reserves of US $10.5 billion form a position of near bankruptcy.
The second crucial component is to force the acceptance of a 'clear road map for resolution of the Kashmir conflict' on what is being propounded as the 'Chenab' formula, which envisages the division of Kashmir along religious lines, with Muslim-majority areas going to Pakistan. This formula would reconfirm Pakistan's underlying ideology of religious exclusion - the two nation theory -, would confer a quantifiable 'victory' on its strategy of cross border terrorism, and would further the Islamist fundamentalist enterprise within the region.
The third component - currently being actively pursued - is a renewed role in Afghanistan, as America struggles to contain the revival of the Taliban movement. Pakistan is, once again, offering to 'step in' to fill the power vacuum by 'mediating' with Taliban survivors, as well as other radical Islamist groupings such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami. With American frustrations in Afghanistan mounting, the possibility of a revival of a surrogate Pakistani influence in that country is being actively sought, and threatens to give rise to another political travesty, if the US succumbs to the imperatives of expediency.
Musharraf will also seek to negotiate a 'free hand' for himself and his military regime in Pakistan. The rigged elections of October 2002 have not produced the compliant Parliament and State Assemblies that Musharraf had hoped for, and these bodies are now creating problems on the General's continuance as both President and Chief of Army Staff. In addition, the Talibanised Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) administration in the North West Frontier Province is proving to be a source of both domestic and international embarrassment, and there is significant speculation in Pakistan that Musharraf would seek carte blanche for the suspension or dismissal of these 'elected' bodies in case present political maneuvers fail to secure his continuance with full powers, or if the Parliament or Assemblies present him with unacceptable difficulties.
Finally, Musharraf would like to come away with a lifting of the present embargo on military supplies to Pakistan, and a substantial package of Arms, including the delivery of a batch of 40 F-16s that have been sought by Pakistan since the early 1980s.
It is in the last of these that Pakistan's strategy of negotiation is most clearly demonstrated. During his present international tour, in an interview to The Times in London, Musharraf argued that, with a rise in India's defence spending, coupled with restrictions on Pakistan's acquisition of military equipment, a 'dangerous imbalance' was emerging in the force levels between the two countries. In such circumstances, he declared, "Pakistan would have no choice but to rely on its nuclear weapons."
This pattern of continued nuclear blackmail has consistently been at the heart of Pakistan's case for concessions, aid and a heightened threshold of international tolerance for its sponsorship and support to Islamist terrorism. To understand how this works, it is useful to conceive of Pakistan as a state acting as a suicide bomber, arguing that, if it does not receive the extraordinary dispensations and indulgences that it seeks, it will, in effect 'implode', and in the process do extraordinary harm to others.