Rather Suu Than Shwe?

he divergence in perception between India and the West over Myanmar was best illustrated in US President Barack Obama’s speech to the Indian Parliament. He prompted New Delhi to play a role in restoring freedom and democracy there. This divergence has only grown even as Myanmar held an election after a hiatus of two decades and then released pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The West dubbed the election as a sham; the Indian foreign policy establishment hailed it as a “step in the right direction” and cited these two developments as achievements of their quiet diplomacy with Myanmar’s powerful military leaders. Says former foreign secretary Shyam Saran, “It’s an opening. But how it widens will depend on Myanmar’s internal dynamics, particularly on how much rope the generals are willing to give the other political actors in the country.”

The generals have been extremely niggardly in giving rope to their opponents, violently crushing even feeble protests against the military junta. Their unpredictability and volatility prompts Saran and others to temper their optimism with realism. You can’t assume the generals are on their way to dismantling the cage that Myanmar is in and allow the bird of freedom to take wings. As Saran argues, “The cage may disintegrate one day or the generals could violently withdraw the rope they are now offering other political actors.”

It won’t be wrong to say the release of Suu Kyi, hailed worldwide, could itself provide the future script for a confrontation between forces representing democracy and the generals. This scenario the Indian foreign policy mandarins dread, as it would mount pressure on India to finesse its engagement with Myanmar’s military junta even further. For a country such as India, it’s impossible to pursue its interests to the complete exclusion of morality. And it won’t be just because New Delhi fears its support for the ‘butchers of Myanmar’ could erode its credentials to bag a permanent seat in the reformed United Nations Security Council, a link Obama in his speech to Parliament candidly established.

Obama’s opinion apart, there’s a growing constituency in India critical of New Delhi’s Myanmar policy. For instance, in a piece in Outlook (issue dated November 15, 2010), Nobel laureate Amartya Sen was scathing in his criticism of India’s persistent support for the junta. Already voices in the foreign academia, with which progressives in India bond well, are speaking out against New Delhi. As Maung Zarni of the London School of Economics told Outlook, “Like most Burmese, I am outraged and dismayed by the fact that the country of Lord Buddha, Gandhi and Nehru, which we used to look to as the cradle of our philosophical civilisation and a beacon of political liberalism as opposed to authoritarian China, has thrown any pretensions to ethics, compassion and civilisational values in exchange for cheap resources and military strategic needs to befriend the generals in Myanmar. It is an utterly unbalanced stance driven solely by the Indian elite’s interests and pursued at the expense of 55 million Burmese.” (Many still prefer to use Burma instead of Myanmar, a name the military junta bequeathed.)

However, a parallel fact is that security as much as business interests drive India’s Myanmar policy. Four of India’s northeastern states—Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland—share a 1,600-km-long border with the country. Both Myanmar and India became independent in the late 1940s, and the initial years of warmth between them soon segued to a period of chill, largely due to the 1962 military takeover in Rangoon, or Yangon as it is now called. No less a factor was the ‘nationalisation’ programme of the military rulers, which drove Indians out from the country.

Warmth seeped into the Indo-Myanmar relations because of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in 1987, only for the chill to set in again as the military rulers brutally suppressed the pro-democracy forces following the 1990 elections. A change of guard in New Delhi saw P.V. Narasimha Rao take over as PM, and his now famous Look East policy brought Myanmar into the sweep of his pragmatic gaze—he engaged the military rulers but, simultaneously, the Nehru Peace Prize for International Understanding was awarded to Suu Kyi in 1992.

nderlying India’s decision to engage the junta were deep concerns about China’s expanding influence there, particularly in the gas and oil sectors. It stoked fears of China encircling India in the neighbourhood, and exacerbated the Indian establishment’s insecurities as, around the same time, insurgent groups active in the Northeast started operating from Myanmar. Its oil and gas resources were also considered vital to satiate India’s hunger for energy brought about in the years following the liberalisation in 1991. And, finally, Myanmar was the door through which India had to pass to look east.

Says Lex Rieffel of Washington’s Brookings Institution, “I can easily understand the strategic interests that are driving the Indian government to strengthen its ties with Myanmar. I can also understand the voices within India that wish to see Myanmar become a successful democracy and would like New Delhi to support Myanmar’s democratic opposition.” In other words, you could say there’s some sympathy for India’s tightrope walk on Myanmar. In the miry waters of international relations, after all, idealism rarely ever inspires a country to eject its interest to achieve a moral goal.

Yet the question remains—should the military and Suu Kyi slip into a confrontation, will New Delhi root for pro-democracy forces? Zarni is pessimistic: “The Indian government appears to have already made the decision in favour of retaining its friendship with military rulers than to stand up for Suu Kyi.” The Indian establishment, though, believes its Myanmar policy is reasonable, opting, as it does, for a change based on reconciliation than confrontation. As Saran says, “We have been telling the generals in Myanmar that confrontation is not good for them nor is it  good for the neighbours.”

But not all cards are held by the generals. Suu Kyi too holds some—but  though her initial remarks after her release highlighted the need for reconciliation, she could in her attempt to democratise her country find an insecure military junta opt for violent tactics. In such a bloody confrontation, New Delhi could find it difficult to ignore its own citizens protesting against the junta.