Why doesn't India emulate Israel? This was the chorus on July 13 when the Israeli cabinet decided to go to war in Lebanon, and India was still recovering from 7/11. As the cease-fire came into effect, a re-look at the options and ground realities.
Just a week earlier, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had gone into a similar huddle with his cabinet colleagues. On their agenda was a similar situation that had gripped the Israeli government. "How do we respond to the latest terror attack?" the Indian cabinet asked themselves. Hours before the meeting, the Prime Minister had spent a considerable amount of time discussing with his security establishment on the kind and level of response that India must shape to continued acts of cross-border terrorism. With Secretary (R) PK Hormese Tharakan in tow, the man carrying the burden of effecting such a response, the meeting examined all the possibilities that India could exercise to send out a strong message – that India was not ready to take such terror attacks lying down. But, as sources within the security establishment told this correspondent, the Israeli way was a perfect example of what Indian will and cannot do as a response to terrorism.
But, on Monday, as the cease-fire came into effect, Israel almost seemed glad that they had been given an "honorable exit". A week ago, an Israeli friend, who is also one of the most respected political commentators and reporters wrote to me pointing out that the political scandal after the war was over would be immense. His summary was that the (Prime Minister) Ehud Olmert –(Defence Minister) Emir Peretz team had failed to deliver. Like all political masters, trying to shape an answer to terror attacks, they were trying to balance the political fall out at home as well as abroad and in this case, both Olmert and Peretz proved to be unsuccessful.
But six years later, as the IDF went back into southern Lebanon, first a thrust of seven kilometers and, as of the Israeli cabinet decision on August 9, right up to the Litani River. This operation, insists the Israeli ambassador to India, Daniel Danielli, is a "just war" because Israel launched its attack from "their side of the international border". According to him this is war is not just about the kidnapping of two soldiers but also about the hundreds of rocket attacks that has been launched by the Hezbollah to "target Israeli civilian pockets". Israel also claims that the war has also helped reveal the "sophisticated war material that the Hezbollah has" and cites rockets with ranges up to 50 kms that have been rained on Israel to justify Operation Change of Direction.
In fact, the Israeli cabinet's decision to "expand the war" added another dimension to Israel's war against terror. After all, Israel has been the first one to push the envelope when it came to using innovative methods to combat terror. They sent in covert teams to hunt down those they suspected of being the brains behind the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin sent Israel's Special Forces to Entebee to rescue 103 passengers hijacked to the Ugandan capital. Israel also barely batted an eyelid when it came to contributing to the Iran-Contra affair for their self-interest. Similar diplomatic initiatives ensured that Israel was on better terms with apartheid-ridden South Africa and China when the rest of the democratic world balked at doing so.
The idea was that Israel would do just about anything to ensure its survival. In fact a key rationale that Israeli commentators offer for the rest of the world for the present war is that it has a miniscule population of just six million people. So when people die in terrorist or rocket attacks, its is viewed as a serious threat to its survival. As Israeli embassy officials in New Delhi insist, a key strategic aim is to make the Hezbollah realise that Israel will make it pay for each and every attack.
But, India's response has been mixed at best. On one hand India insists that the Kashmir issue, the key to cross-border terrorism, is a "bilateral issue". But after every major terrorist attack, Indian diplomats in Washington take pains to explain to their American counterparts the evil designs of Pakistan-based jehadi groups. That said, the response occasionally shaped by the security-establishment, has found little space from the political firmament.
If it comes to covert action, India has debated between losing, what a former R&AW chief calls, the "very thin moral ground that India has over Pakistan". His reasoning is that covert or overt action will deliver little. "At the end of the day it will boil down to the fact that both sides will have to sit down and talk. Any covert or overt action would mean the deaths of innocents," he says. But a serving intelligence official disagrees. "The jehadi psyche across the border understands only one language, A bloody nose. As long as Indian maintains restraint, it will continue to work towards destabilising India." His logic is simple. "Every attack means that the terrorist is now more confident of a bigger attack. If there were blasts in Delhi that killed 60 people, then the next one in Mumbai was more spectacular and killed more lives. And in a country the size of India it will be impossible to ensure foolproof security. So the only option left is to try and give them the bloody nose," he says.
During the NDA regime, officials within the security agencies say, there was a better understanding on security issues. But then, the NDA went through three major embarrassments. The systemic intelligence failure in Kargil and the hijack of IC 814 to Kandahar, coupled with Operation Parakram proved disastrous. While several options were closely looked at during the hijacking crisis, including bombing the airfield by the Indian Air Force which would fly from "friendly countries", none were exercised. Finally, officials travelled with then foreign minister Jaswant Singh while a team of anti-hijack specialists stayed behind in the aircraft.
But an interesting statistic provided by the Israelis in the present conflict might have some lessons for us. Of the nearly 400 Hezbollah fighters killed in the war, Israeli officials claim that the majority of them were killed by their "elite units". The Sayeret Matkal and its naval commandos have been operating in Lebanon and some of their most spectacular raids have come from these "elite units". Could this possibly be an option for India – the covert option? Unfortunately, over two decades the Indian security establishment has systematically whittled down its covert capabilities. There is little or no political direction, and most available infrastructure has been left adrift.
The military, with its Rs 88,000 crore annual budgets has actually gone from bad to worse. It has been steadily losing its covert capabilities, and for a brief stint in Sri Lanka during IPKF operations when the Indian military had experimented with special operations. Since then, little thought has been paid to bolstering India's covert capabilities and marry them to India's intelligence services. Intelligence and credible special operations, most security experts agree, would be the ideal deterrent against non-state actors such as terrorists, as well as states which serve as the hot bed of terrorism.
Unfortunately, neither the military has displayed enough foresight to correct this, nor have the political masters shown an inclination to invest in acquiring such a capability. Most officials within the security agencies agree that post-1995, when the (Prime Minister Inder Kumar) Gujral Doctrine came into effect, India's capabilities for covert action have been watered down significantly.
While countries bordering India have their own fault-lines, none have been exploited adequately or in a focussed manner to India's advantage. Instead, most actions have been piecemeal and have failed to deliver any concrete results. With India's security apparatus caught in a time warp, it seems that the initiative is still with the terrorists.