Memories Of Camp David

A possible Gujral-Clinton summit—and whether it would be derailed before it begins—was the hot topic among diplomats and observers last fortnight. A PTI report that Prime Minister I.K. Gujral would only accept an US invitation if Indo-Pak talks did not figure in the discussion was met by gasps of incredulity both in the US State Department and among foreign policy experts. But the Indian Embassy in Washington made immediate attempts at damage control. A phone call to the South Asia bureau by a senior unnamed embassy official reassured the Americans that the Indian PM was not trying to set the agenda or impose conditionalities.

In Delhi, the government too rushed to do its bit. It handed out Gujral's entire speech in Parliament, in which he had said he welcomed the proposed meeting with US President Bill Clinton if it is in the "context of bilateral relationship. But we do not want any impression being given of any intervention in our relationship with Pakistan". The gist: Indo-Pak ties shouldn't be raised.

Meanwhile, when Gujral's statement first appeared in Washington, a source at the Indian Embassy said it would be 'crazy' to think that the US would give India "any assurances about what would or would not be discussed" at the meeting. "The Americans are too clever for that," he added. In fact, in New Delhi too foreign policy circles were very surprised, with Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) officials totally taken aback.

But a day later Gujral was let off the hook. Given the reaction in India and Gujral's almost apologetic response, the State Department gave a measured reply. A senior official told journalists in Washington: "The Prime Minister has said he believes the principle focus of the meeting will be on our bilateral relations and that is what it will be on." Though there was no formal response from the Indians, this had cleared the decks for the meeting. Even before the US statement, Indian officials were rushing around for a country with which to swap Gujral's dates for addressing the UN.

The issue was seemingly simple. According to the original programme, Gujral was supposed to be in New York by September 29 to address the UN General Assembly the next day. The Americans, rather late in the day, requested the Indian government to advance the trip by a week, so that Gujral could be in New York on September 22 when Clinton would also be there to address the General Assembly. Clinton was already scheduled to meet Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on that day. Now Washington was seeking to persuade Gujral to meet Clinton on the same day.

The timing made the whole plan complicated. The proposal came at a time when reports had been circulating that the US had suggested a trilateral dialogue between the US, India and Pakistan to sort out Indo-Pak problems, which was denied by the US. Then the border clash in Kashmir took place and there was yet again talk of a trilateral dialogue. A rather defensive Gujral suddenly did not know how to accept the invitation without sending wrong signals domestically, especially after he and the MEA had let it be known that the trip would not be rescheduled. Hence, the rather curious statement in Parliament.

The twists and turns in the policy could not be missed and the whole controversy was entirely self-inflicted. Indian officials had earlier argued against rescheduling the visit. They saw the US invitation as an attempt to equate India and Pakistan, a perception New Delhi has been working hard to change. It was felt that even though the meeting would be at a bilateral level, it would appear to be a trilateral affair, since Sharif would meet Clinton the same day.

Indeed, the late invitation baffled many. But a State Department official explained that they wanted the Gujral-Clinton meeting because "it would somehow be a waste if Gujral came all the way, spoke at the UN and did not meet Clinton". He tied the visit to Clinton's proposed visit to India next year and a meeting now would perhaps set the mood for later interactions.

But in New Delhi, Gujral's old friend, Bhabani Sengupta, added to Gujral's miseries. He told an English newspaper that Gujral had bypassed his own Ministry of External Affairs and opened a direct line of communication with the White House. The hint was that it was done through him. He claimed that he knew more about Gujral's visit than the MEA. Sources told Outlook that the Prime Minister was furious. So were the ministry officials. As if there wasn't already enough confusion about Gujral's visit to New York.

Sengupta, who is going to be in New York at the same time as the Prime Minister, on his part, later told Outlook, that he was completely misquoted by the English daily. But foreign policy observers were not quite willing to accept this denial. His comments were damaging to Gujral and yet the Prime Minister had been tolerating this for so long.

But observers are still stunned at the controversy. Mike Krepon, who heads the Henry Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think-tank that closely tracks South Asia, was appalled over the PTI story: "If this is right, it is most unfortunate. A meeting with India where Indo-Pak relations is not a subject would be a very peculiar meeting indeed. If, as a result of this condition, Gujral does not meet with Clinton but Nawaz Sharif does, in what way does it help India? It makes Gujral a smaller man and shows just how constrained he is. This is an example of Indian sensitivities run amok." Krepon wondered why India should get suspicious about Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering talking about a "strategic dialogue" when it was India itself that had been "pushing for one for years".

 A Clinton Administration official said he was "really ticked" with the "shoddy reporting" by the press on this subject. According to him, about a week ago, the US envoy to Pakistan, T.W. Simon, had said he was pleased that bilateral meetings were taking place in New York, which some Pakistani journalists misreported as trilateral. "Simon never said it," said the official. Asked about the subsequent Reuters story, which reported a State Department official as saying the US was concerned about the Kashmir dispute and was willing to mediate if both parties were agreeable, the source responded: "This was again a case of misreporting. Reuters used the term 'mediated' instead of helped and got everyone excited in India."

Another Administration official said: "When we saw that PTI story, we shook our heads. But we were privately told by the Indian Embassy that it did not happen. But that won't change the atmosphere. At no time has the US ever expected to do a trilateral meeting. We have requested Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to do a number of South Asia things in New York that will be for the 50th Anniversary. At this point we don't know what she will or won't do. It is possible that both Gujral and Sharif will be present at the same place at the same time. But it is not our intention to bring them together or to attempt a Camp David style summit."

Incidentally, a few weeks ago, Congressman Richard Gerhardt—not considered an expert on South Asia—spoke about convening a Camp David-like summit between India and Pakistan. The idea, it is stressed, does not have the sanction of the administration. A senior State Department official put the whole issue to rest in a chat with the press. Referring to the Indo-Pak dialogue, he declared in no uncertain terms: "We are not going to be a mediator but a supporter. We can only see so much progress as the parties themselves are able to make. We support the dialogue. We certainly hope the prime minister will accept the invitation for a meeting with Clinton. We hope that will take place and we look forward to it."