Kissinger: Now on the Indian who’s waiting; the basic problem is to givehim a combination of both sympathy, so that he can go home with—to Mrs. Gandhiand—
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: —and great firmness. Now I have, in addition to what you will say,but with Sisco there you won’t have much of a chance to. I’ve told Yahyathat he had a personal channel through me to you. I’m just trying to keep them[the Indians] from attacking for 3 months. Now, if you could say that you aredirecting, that $60 million be made available for refugee support after July 1.
Nixon: Do they know that yet?
Kissinger: No. This is why it would be very helpful.
Nixon: Does Sisco know?
Kissinger: No, but it’s based on a recommendation from the State Department.
Nixon: That’s all right.
Kissinger: Out from the Embassy there. They’ll be delighted.
Nixon: Fifty thousand?
Kissinger: Yeah, and $20 million. You will see whether you can get $20 millionfrom other programs this month. Now, they wanted to take it out of Pakistan. Istopped that.
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: But we can take a little from Turkey and a little from Indonesia andpay it back to them after July 1st. But if you could give those two figures,then you’ll get the credit for it and—
Nixon: And that we are concerned.
Kissinger: Well, he’ll have a story. And that we cannot—that you think thatovert pressure on Pakistan would have a counter-productive effect, and that youare working with Yahya in your own way. It’s a little duplicitous, but thesebastards understand that.
Nixon: I must say I am not too damned impressed with Keating. I think he’sjust gone overboard. Now I must say maybe there’s a hell of a problem on whichthe TV is starting to pick it up now.
Kissinger: Oh, it is a hell of a problem.
[Omitted here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
Nixon: I don’t want to see [unclear, them start war?] just now.
Kissinger: Because you saw harm on it from Pakistan.
Nixon: I know, but I don’t want to see it more. You see? I just, they’rewasting my time. I just [unclear].
Kissinger: That really depends what we have to do. We have to keep them fromattacking for our own reasons.
[Pleasantries were exchanged as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Ambassadors Jhaand Keating, and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco entered the Oval Office. TheWhite House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.]
Singh:Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmth and greetings. Shegreatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear] conveyed in thatand she asks me to convey her greetings to you [unclear].
Nixon: Sure. I appreciate that. Tell her that we were all very impressed by hergreat political victory out there. It gave her the stability that she, that sheneeds now. It’s much, much better to look after a very successful electionlike that. [unclear] There’s a lot more to this. She has more confidence thanpreviously.
Singh:Yes [unclear]—
Nixon: Things are going well from what Ambassador Keating tells me.
Singh:Yes, she has always had confidence, but now she also has strength to—
Nixon: That’s right.
Singh:—put them on [unclear]—
Nixon: Oh, I know. I know.
Singh:And, in fact, she was looking for a period when, as a result of thisvictory—
Nixon: Yeah.
Singh:—she’d have both peace and opportunity to implement thesocio-economic content of the program on the basis of which she won.
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Singh:But suddenly she’s confronted with a—
Nixon: Yeah.
Singh:—type of situation not of her making.
Nixon: Oh. Yes.
Singh:Not to place blame here. . .
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Singh:. . . [unclear] being subjected at this present moment.
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Singh:[unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to convey, Your Excellency, thelatest situation, as the present one has no [unclear] and we are coming and thatevery second [unclear, refugees they come?]
Nixon: Every second?
Singh:Every second. So this is the type of situation that we face. And this hascaused a tremendous problem to us, because they come in an area thattraditionally is very dependent, both politically and economically.
Nixon: Would you like some tea or coffee?
Singh:Thank you very much.
Nixon: [aside] Ken?
Singh:I’m all right.
Nixon: [aside; whispering] Some tea perhaps, please. Thank you.
Singh:[unclear]
Nixon: No, I can’t.
Singh:Politically, economically adept. And if another six million people areready to come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute, that adds to the[unclear] ability and the social-economic tension that all of them have created.[unclear] We’ve reduced any financial [unclear]. In this situation, that weseek your advice how we should achieve that objective. But perhaps mostimportant thing in that situation [unclear] will use this movement of refugeeswhich always [unclear]. Technically, on this issue, we gave a clear [unclear,signal?]. We [unclear] the objective will be [unclear]. In this situation wherewe [unclear] many field commanders that we called feel it’s their own problem.It ceases to be an internal problem and it should affect [unclear] tension[unclear]. And it’s the best end right now that we’ve got. Support for thisapproach of ours and help with [unclear]. How to meet this objective, we believethat if the building of the [unclear] can be seen [unclear] make up their minds.[unclear] can be sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear].
Nixon: Hmmm.
Singh:And secondly, then, the condition that they are to be restored shouldenable you to return that. In the statements we are prepared to take, we mustperhaps create this. [unclear] And for this, obviously some political settlementis needed. You mentioned in your letter to the Prime Minister you are engaged inthis task in your quiet manner and tried to impress on them what you have done.We believe that the return from [unclear] is possibility if the military actionsof trying to solve a situation [unclear]. Apparently those people who have nowdemonstrated [unclear] that they enjoy the confidence of the people [unclear].In the long range there are really two guys [unclear]. This will be a situationin which [unclear].
Nixon: What do you think is the, what do you think is the benefit of [unclear]being able to—East Pakistan will to have to become independent, or whathappens in the long run? This does not mean that your personal view, Iknow—that’s not what I meant. How do you see the historical process workingdown there?
Singh:I have a feeling, Mr. President, that showing, telling the United Nationsthat there’s a very good chance of saving Pakistan and [unclear]. [unclear]maintain central authority in an area of confrontation of the [unclear] can theyhandle central authority?
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Singh:[unclear] There’s a very good chance to have. Even the course of thenegotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear] more thancontained in their six-point program in the direction. [unclear] withoutdirection of this nature, and we have authority to create [unclear], so it couldbe saved. The Council has become most angered because they [unclear]. Theconfidence has been very rudely shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan canstill bring back the country themselves, those for the present moment who findthemselves in the [unclear].
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Singh:[unclear] Then it appears that they’re pushing them more and more intothe point of, the position of the point of no return. And it appears [unclear].They must. We have an opposition quite clearly; it’s developed between thecentral authority of Pakistan and the leaders. So that [unclear] anything thatwe want to. They do not realize that from our point of view is when theyseparate from [unclear]. But we are bothered by the continuance of conditions ofinstability. Continuation of the conditions there you will find [unclear];continuation of conditions where the military rule is pitted against almostunited will of [unclear] people. [unclear] We’ll do that to maintain controlof the situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. [unclear]from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and maybe even fromyour point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to resort to that. Thatyour country and ours, we can work together, work in a [unclear] manner. To thatextent [unclear] stability, so much in common. We should not.
Nixon: You don’t, you don’t have a feeling that the situation would be toyour interest to have a, to have an independent country? What would be inIndia’s best interest? To have it independent or under the central government,for example—
Singh:No, we have—we have no fixed position on that.
Nixon: That’s up to them, isn’t it?
Singh:On this matter we leave it up to the Pakistanis and the leaders of theAwami League to decide about their future in any manner they like. We will notpress one or the other solution, or [unclear] to it. We are interested inobserving the neutrality in [unclear] considering the situation.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Singh:That being our fixed position.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Singh:[unclear] silent spectators all [unclear] agreeing with what, to ourarrangement to [unclear] the people and until then, it seems to me, there willbe unstable conditions, at least.
Nixon: Yes.
Singh:And we are conscious of our responsibility and even when we were facingthis big trouble in the end with these people when we [unclear] did our best.[unclear] All provisions are to be clear which were settled by [unclear]extra-constitutional means. [unclear]
Nixon: Sure. First let me say that we, that you couldn’t have a man more[unclear] in so far as bringing this matter to our attention, than your ownAmbassador here. He’s talked to our people and he’s a very persuasive manand has let us know what the position is. And, of course, he has—we have greatrespect for him. And on our part we couldn’t have a person who is morevigorous in presenting this point of view which you have described. Of course,you would describe it in a more precise way than, which you naturally can inyour position. It’s obvious that Ambassador Keating, of course you know an oldfriend of mine in the House and Senate. He lives here. We had a long talkyesterday. We went over all these matters.
Singh:[unclear]
Nixon: He is, he is just—he is concerned as your Ambassador, and of coursewe’re aware of this. So I am keenly aware of the problem. I’m aware, too, ofthe enormous agony that must be caused—I have not been, Rogers has been onlyonce. [unclear] I have not been to Dacca, but I know that part of thesubcontinent, that the problems of poverty are serious, very serious. And addedto it is this instability. However simple their homes may be, they are theirhomes. And pouring into an already overcrowded city. This must be a terribleagony for a country to go through. We’re aware of this thing. Also imposedupon your country, big as it is, 600 million people. Nevertheless, five millionpeople is a lot of people, because. . .
Singh:We count six, Mr. President.
Nixon: Six million. Yeah, that’s right.
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: One every second, that’s 60 every minute.
Singh:[unclear]?
Nixon: [unclear] That’s over 600 an hour.
Singh:[unclear]
Nixon: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now the, the—I am sure you realize, too, that whatwe can do, you know, what we feel is one thing; what we can do is another. Wehave the deepest sympathy and we will try to do as much as we can. We don’twant to do anything that would be, that has the opposite results from what wewant, you know. Naturally, our—with regard to the Government of Pakistan, weof course have our contacts with them, our relations with them, with thePresident, of course. It’s terrible. The question is how we can discuss thismatter with them in a way that will maybe, may bring about action that wouldlead to amelioration of the situation. Or how we, or—and avoiding [unclear,the woodshed?] might set up, as often is the case when such things are done toopublicly, which would set up an antagonistic attitude. I’m not speakingpersonally from the standpoint of those who would look for something to beantagonistic about. That might just upset it all. We, I would like to say this:that we, I think that under best course of action—I’d like to talk first ofall what would we need your advice with regard to what we can do with themeeting situation—the best course of action we think as a Government is for usto, is for you to have confidence, and I want you to convey this to the PrimeMinister, on a completely off-the-record basis. Discussions that are publiclytalked about would have exactly the opposite effect on that. You’ve got to,you must have confidence that one, I am acutely aware of the problem. I amdeeply concerned about the problem for humanitarian [unclear, reasons?] and I amconcerned about it for its foreign policy implications, for all this could eruptinto some armed conflict. We know that. Now—therefore, we, I will use all thepersuasive methods that I can, but I must use them in the way that I think isthe most effective, in a way perhaps that, say, she might never use, in a waythat any nation would want used when we talk with their leader and so forth. ButI am aware of the problem, I shall try to use my influence as effectively aspossible at least if effectively means not using it in a public, blunt way. AndI [unclear] such and such is, had been. Not only has our concern been expressedbut that you will have this in mind in future discussions that we have that wehave to do it this way. And that has to be answered. The second thing is, ofcourse, looking at the immediate problem that you need more funds; theAmbassador has discussed with us the various options that we have. We have animmediate problem between now and July 1st, and it’s just for here [unclear,’til then?] And, but on the other hand, but because, you know, we’ve run outof money because it’s all been spent with only 15 days left. On the other handwe have out of other aid programs that won’t need any [unclear] because thatwould cause problems for where they came from. But we have been able to acquire$20 million that we will, we will find immediately available. And then inaddition to that, on the July, on July 1st, we will be able to apply $50million, so which will give you a total of $70 million to relieve them, the aidproblem. We’d give you more, but that’s, that’s as much as we can find.You see, we have to take from various other commitments that have been made. Soyou get $20 million between now and the first of July, $50 million more on thefirst of July or just as soon as the fiscal year begins.
Keating: Yes.
Nixon: And that your Government can count on. Is that correct, roughly speaking,or is the 20—?
Kissinger: The difference is that we had to piece together the $20 million, Mr.President, out of other programs.
Nixon: Right. The point is we’ll find the $20 million. You can count on it.The $50 million—
Kissinger: That’s right.
Sisco: We’ve got that.
Kissinger: Including the lowest parts of your supplemental appropriations
Nixon: Right. And we’ve got to look down towards that, but on the other hand,I’m aware of the fact that this will take care of how many? Six millionpeople. For how long? Not long. It’ll help. On the other hand, I realize thatthat does not get at the long-range problem. The long-range problem is how do westop this inflow of people? How—maybe you’d start having them turn around,start outflowing them. That’s what we’re getting at. I think you, you first,you brought it to my attention when you met me. The Prime Minister and you heardthis conversation with our Ambassador, Ambassador Keating. All brought it to myattention and I’m convinced of the seriousness of the problem. I will, I willtry to find the methods that I think will be effective. I think it will protect[unclear] can’t do that. [unclear] effective. There may be other ways for thisto be effective. But I think we have to, I think it must not be in a way thatappears that we’re, that what has happened here is that the United States isinserting itself into basically an internal situation in an open way. That is wehave to—we can be most effective by persuading the parties involved to come toa decision of theirs rather than one that’s imposed upon them. That’s atleast my [unclear, instinct?] telling the individual players and so forth.That’s the way I see it at this time. And we will—the results will tell uswhether we’re right or not. And also after trying that method for a whilewe’ll have to see the situation, but in the meantime, I think, and to theextent that we can, to keep as cool as possible, in terms of charges andcounter-charges and all that sort of thing. We’ll—You can count on ourfinancial assistance to the extent that we are able. And this—we will findthis money. [unclear] Second, you will have the, on other side which is far more[unclear, important?] the governmental side. Let us, if you will, let us do thatin our way, in the way we think will be more effective. That’s the way I wouldlike to do it. You’re, do you approve or do you think there’s a better wayto do it?
Singh:We greatly appreciate your sentiment and [unclear] in coming to aconcrete conclusion in a short time. [unclear] This is an internationalresponsibility. [unclear] We appreciate it, yes. [unclear]. You yourselfmentioned it. [unclear] The question, one, how to stop it, and how to createconditions [unclear].
Nixon: This is the fundamental question now.
Singh:This is the fundamental question. [unclear]
Nixon: I know. I am aware of that. I am aware of the, I am aware of the factthat the funds, while essential, [deal] with a temporary problem do nothandle—I am not suggesting at all, or have any illusions, that if we found$700 million to put into this thing that would simply buy the problem away. Theproblem is going to go away only as the deeper causes are resolved. And I amaware of that. How we get at those deeper causes is a very sensitive problem asyou well know, and the Foreign Minister has to be highly sensitive to how peoplefeel and approach us and so forth. And how other governments may feel aboutthis, how they react. One way the public pressure, another way the private,shall we say persuasion. I have always believed in the latter myself as the mosteffective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well.
Singh:That we are agreed. Perhaps the whole problem can be divided into twoparts. There are some aspects, which could [unclear]. France has agreed to makea statement to that effect. [unclear] in Moscow. And also the necessity of theirreturning. I agree that that’s a question to how [unclear]. We know what isactually happening. [unclear]
Nixon: We will then proceed on that basis . I don’t think anything, however,certainly at this point, would be served by any indication of the United Statesputting public pressure on Pakistan. That I know would be wrong if we want toaccomplish our goal. On the other hand, something might be, something might verywell be accomplished in other directions. I am aware of that. I would like totry it this way. We will, you can be sure that we’re as totally concernedabout it as we can be, not being there. Incidentally, how much did the Germansprovide? How much are they providing?
Singh:The German money, I honestly—
Nixon: How about the French?
Sisco: I looked at a figure today, Mr. President, I think the Germans aresomewhere around two million, and the French are something a little less thanthat.
Nixon: That’s not enough.
Sisco: That’s not enough.
Nixon: All right, that’s not enough. The French and Germans have just as greatan interest as we have. Here they are making all sorts of big statements anddoing very little. Now, you head over to the French and Germans and theircolleagues formally, that clear? The same with the low countries that talk bigand don’t help much. I have no sympathy for them. [unclear] made a statementwhen he was here. The Germans can afford—if we can afford $70 million, theGermans can afford 10, easy—or 15.
Kissinger: We’ve already given 17.5.
Nixon: That’s right. We’ll, we’ve put in 100 so the Germans should put in25. That’s the way it ought to be. Because you know, we don’t believe inthis office of talking big and doing little.