At 8 am, September 10, India's ambassador to Israel, Ramindar Jassal, here in Delhi for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India, rang up his colleagues in South Block. He had a spot of bad news: Sharon was cutting short his visit. The reason: two back-to-back bomb attacks in Israel had killed 14 and injured 100. Sharon, obviously, wanted to return to his country to mull over his next step, including a decision to expel Palestine leader Yasser Arafat.
Three hours later, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was on the phone to Sharon, offering his sympathies for the families of those killed in the blasts. The call echoed the changing times, and the remarkable extent to which India's foreign policy has been transformed. Remember, till now on each and every United Nations resolution on the Palestinian issue, India has voted against Israel—and even initiated some. But after the latest blasts, not only did Vajpayee offer his sympathies, he assured Sharon that India's relations with Israel would only grow. In response, Sharon promised to personally take charge of the same on the other end.
Already, in just 11 years of normalisation of Indo-Israel ties, India has overtaken Turkey as Israel's biggest arms market. This stupendous growth is now expected to be replicated in other fields. "Following the visit, ties will be upgraded and given more content," promised a highly-placed Israeli source, palpably pleased at the "warm, very warm" welcome the Israelis received in New Delhi. "It was impossible not to see it," gushed a senior Israeli guest.
For starters, now the target for bilateral trade has been pegged at $2 billion "in a few years". Currently, trade between the two countries is valued at a little more than $1 billion. But the trade data is skewed: diamonds account for nearly 65 per cent of the total trade amount. Since India (Gujarat) is the only place other than Antwerp where diamonds are cut and polished, Israeli diamond merchants, rather than the Israeli government, have boosted the trade. As P.R. Kumaraswamy, who teaches Israeli politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, points out, "This diamond trade actually benefits only a handful of Indian families based in Ramat Gan, a suburb of Tel Aviv. Since they had migrated to Israel in the late 1970s, much before Indo-Israel ties were normalised, it is misleading to cite the diamond-driven trade as a sign of improvement of bilateral relations."
Such exaggeration is there even in strategic relations. Israel says it conducts strategic dialogue with only the US, Russia and India. Yet even here the divergences are fundamental. Take Iran. During last week's discussion between Israel and India, sources say Sharon raised questions about the deepening relationship between New Delhi and Teheran. It was a tacit reference to the document Vajpayee had signed during Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's visit earlier this year. The document had laid out a roadmap for establishing a strategic relationship between India and Iran, the country Israel considers as "the epicentre of terrorism". India shudders at this. For New Delhi, Islamabad is the epicentre of terrorism.
Israeli officials openly articulated to the Indian media their views on Iran last week (widely reported), which left Indian officials privately aghast. In contrast, senior Israeli officials privately claimed ignorance about Pakistan's role in terrorism. This stance was perhaps intentional. There has been a rash of reports in the Pakistani media that normalisation of ties between Pakistan and Israel is imminent. Israeli officials, obviously, did not want to undermine this possibility through intemperate remarks. So, the question now is, in case Pakistan does normalise ties with Israel, would Tel Aviv resist the temptation of selling arms (its principal foreign exchange earner) to Islamabad?
The menace of terrorism too was discussed.Israeli sources clarified that although a decision had been taken to enhance cooperation and "data exchange" on terrorism, it did not mean "Israeli units and Indian units are going to fight together in this area (India) or in our area (Israel)".
In his interactions with the Indian side, sources say Sharon noted the trend of New Delhi not initiating anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations. But he wanted more: India should stop voting against Israel on UN resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian issue. "Reciprocity is the basis of relations," Sharon reportedly emphasised.
Indian officials admit that this has been Israel's "constant crib". Yet they complain too that Tel Aviv has not appreciated New Delhi's attempts to moderate nam's anti-Israel resolutions in Durban and elsewhere. One senior official stressed, "You can't have a conditional relationship. India would continue to vote broadly along nam lines."
Interestingly, Sharon also raised the issue of trilateral cooperation involving India, Israel and the US. This concept was initially proposed by national security advisor Brajesh Mishra in an address to the American Jewish Congress in May. Trilateral cooperation assumes significance, say Israeli sources, because some of the defence equipment that India wants from Israel (like the Phalcon, Arrow missile and Patriot-3 missile) have some US components or have been part-financed by that country. As a senior Israeli source explained it: "When you do something with the US, you commit yourself not to sell it to a third party for two reasons. One, to keep the technology secret. Second, and more importantly, it's a business issue."
India has evinced interest in the Arrow and Patriot-3 missile systems. But have pleaded the case that only after getting technical specifications can it determine whether it's suitable for India's defence requirements. New Delhi has asked Tel Aviv for details. But the US is yet to give the green signal to Israel, citing MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) restrictions. The Phalcon negotiations, though, have got clearance from US and Russia. Phalcon is an airborne early warning radar system with Israeli and US technology which can be mounted on a Russian IL-76 aircraft.