The Price of Complacency: Unfortunately, neither the coalition government in New Delhi nor the shaky Farooq Abdullah regime in Srinagar had moved with dexterity or dispatch to consolidate the hard-won counter-insurgency gains. Worse still, some complacency had crept into the intelligence agencies and the defence ministry in the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests of 1998. Many had come to believe that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons and India’s clear-cut conventional superiority would dampen Pakistan’s willingness to provoke a conventional conflict through a breach of the LoC. At a political level, the "spirit of Lahore" had also contributed to a lowering of the guard. Sadly, few, if any, individuals in the government seemed aware of the workings of the concept of a "stability/instability paradox" developed by eminent American strategist, Glenn Snyder, in the 1950s.Stated simply, the principle holds that while nuclear weapons can provide stability at strategic levels, they can also create more permissive conditions for low-level conventional conflict. Consequently, as long as Pakistani decision-makers saw the risks of crossing the LoC as both controllable and calculable, they would be tempted to carry out such an incursion.