Baker's Cake

My message was optimistic. I expected some good to come out of the tragedy. Ireasoned that the atrocity had exposed the intensity of the hatred for the USthat is spreading throughout the world, and especially the Muslim world. Itwould be logical not only to fight against the mosquitoes, but to drain theswamp. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the breeding grounds ofthe hatred—if not the main one—the US would make a major effort to achievepeace between the two peoples.

That was what cold logic indicated. But this is not what happened. Whathappened was the very opposite.

American policy was not led by cold logic. Instead of drying one swamp, itcreated a second swamp. Instead of pushing the Israelis and Palestinians towardspeace, it invaded Iraq. Not only did the hatred against America not die down, itflared up even higher. I hoped that this danger would override even the oilinterests and the desire to station an American garrison in the center of theMiddle East.

Thus I committed the very mistake that I have warned others against manytimes: to assume that what is logical will actually happen. A rational personshould not ignore the irrational in politics. In other words, it is irrationalto exclude the irrational.

George W. Bush is an irrational person, perhaps the very personification ofirrationality. Instead of drawing the logical conclusion from what had happenedand acting accordingly, he set off in the opposite direction. Since then he hasjust insisted on "staying the course".

Enter James Baker.

I know that this will shock some of my good friends. "Baker?!" theywill cry out, "The consigliere of the Bush family? The man whohelped George W steal the 2000 elections? The Rightist?"

Yes, yes, the very same Baker. I like him for his cold logic, his forthrightand blunt style, his habit of saying what he thinks without embellishment, hiscourage. I prefer this style to the sanctimonious hypocrisy of other leaders,who try to hide their real intentions. I would be happy any time to swap Olmertfor Baker, and throw in Amir Peretz for free.

But that is a matter of taste. More important is the fact that in all thelast 40 years, James Baker was the only leader in America who had the guts tostand up and act against Israel's malignant disease: the settlements. When hewas the Secretary of State, he simply informed the Israeli government that hewould deduct the sums expended on the settlements from the money Israel wasgetting from the US. Threatened and made good on his threat.

Baker thus confronted the "pro-Israeli" lobby in the US, both theJewish and the Christian. Such courage is rare in the United States, as it israre in Israel.

It confirms all the bleak forecasts voiced by many throughout the world—myselfincluded—before Bush & Co. launched the bloody Iraqi adventure. In his dryand incisive style, Baker says that the US cannot win there. In so many words hetells the American public: Let's get out of there, before the last Americansoldier has to scramble into the last helicopter from the roof of the Americanembassy, as happened in Vietnam.

Baker calls for the end of the Bush approach and offers a new and thought-outstrategy of his own. Actually, it is an elegant way of extricating America fromIraq, without it looking like a complete rout. The main proposals: an Americandialogue with Iran and Syria, an international conference, the withdrawal of theAmerican combat brigades, leaving behind only instructors. The committee that heheaded was bi-partisan, composed half and half of Republicans and Democrats.

True, Baker is saying them four years later. In these four years, thousandsof American soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians have died fornothing. But, to use the image again, when a giant ship like the United Statesturns around, it make a very big circle, and it takes a lot of time. We, in thesmall speed-boat called Israel, could do it much quicker—if we had the goodsense to do it.

Baker says simply: In order to stop the war in Iraq and start areconciliation with the Arab world, the US must bring about the end of theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. He does not say explicitly that peace must beimposed on Israel, but that is the obvious implication.

In his own clear words: "The United States will not be able to achieveits goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with theArab-Israeli conflict."

His committee proposes the immediate start of negotiations between Israel and"President Mahmoud Abbas", in order to implement the two-statesolution. The "sustainable negotiations" must address the "keyfinal status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, andthe end of conflict."

The use of the title "President" for Abu Mazen and, even more so,the use of the term "right of return" has alarmed the whole politicalclass in Israel. Even in the Oslo agreement, the section dealing with the"final status" issues mentions only "refugees". Baker, as ishis wont, called the spade a spade.

At the same time, he proposes a stick and carrot approach to achieve peacebetween Israel and Syria. The US needs this peace in order to draw Syria intoits camp. The stick, from the Israeli point of view, would be the return of theGolan Heights. The carrot would be the stationing of American soldiers on theborder, so that Israel's security would be guaranteed by the US. In return, hedemands that Syria stop, inter alia, its aid to Hizbullah.

After Gulf War I, Baker—the same Baker—got all the parties to theconflict to come to an international conference in Madrid. For that purpose, hetwisted the arm of then Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir, whose entire philosophyconsisted of two letters and one exclamation mark: "No!" and whoseslogan was: "The Arabs are the same Arabs, and the sea is the samesea"—alluding to the popular Israeli conviction that the Arabs all wantto throw Israel into the sea.

Baker brought Shamir to Madrid, his arms and legs in irons, and made sure hedid not escape. Shamir was compelled to sit at the table with representatives ofthe Palestinian people, who had never been allowed to attend an internationalconference before. The conference itself had no tangible results, but there isno doubt that it was a vital step in the process that brought about the Osloagreement and, more difficult than anything else, the mutual recognition of theState of Israel and the Palestinian people.

Now Baker is suggesting something similar. He proposes an internationalconference, and cites Madrid as a model. The conclusion is clear.

Since 1967 and the beginning of the occupation, several American Secretariesof State have submitted plans to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All theseplans met the same fate: they were torn up and thrown in the trash.

The same sequence of events has been repeated time after time: In Jerusalem,hysteria sets in. The Foreign Office stands up on its hind legs and swears todefeat the evil design. The media unanimously condemns the wicked plot. TheSecretary of State of the day is pilloried as an anti-Semite. The Israeli lobbyin Washington mobilizes for total war.

For example: the Rogers Plan of Richard Nixon's first Secretary of State,William Rogers. In the early 70s he submitted a detailed peace plan, theprincipal point of which was the withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders, with,at most, "insubstantial alterations".

What happened to the plan?

In face of the onslaught of "the Friends of Israel" in Washington,Nixon buckled under, as have all presidents since Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man ofprinciple who did not need the Jewish votes. No president will quarrel with thegovernment of Israel if he wants to be re-elected, or—like Bush now—to endhis term in office with dignity and pass the presidency to another member of hisparty. Any senator or congressman who takes a stand that the Israeli embassydoes not like, is committing Harakiri, Washington-style.

The fate of the peace plans of successive Secretaries of State confirms, onthe face of it, the thesis of the two professors, John Mearsheimer and StephenWalt, that caused a great stir earlier this year. According to them, wheneverthere is a clash in Washington between the national interests of the UnitedStates and the national interests of Israel, it is the Israeli interests whichwin.

Baker has presented his plan at a time when the US is facing disaster inIraq. President Bush is bankrupt, his party has lost control of Congress and maysoon lose the White House. The neo-conservatives, most of them Jews and all ofthem supporters of the Israeli extreme Right, who were in control of Americanforeign policy, are being removed one by one, and this week yet another, theAmerican ambassador to the United Nations, was kicked out. Therefore, it ispossible that this time the President may listen to expert advice.

But that is in serious doubt. The Democratic Party is subject to the"pro-Israeli" lobby no less than the Republican Party, and perhapseven more. The new congress was indeed elected under the banner of opposition tothe continuation of the war in Iraq, but its members are not jihadi suicidebombers. They depend on the "pro-Israeli" lobby. To paraphrase Shamir:"The plan is the same plan, and the trash bin is the same trash bin."

In Jerusalem, the first reaction to the report was total rejection,expressing a complete confidence in the ability of the lobby to choke it atbirth. "Nothing has changed," Olmert declared. "There is no oneto talk with,"—immediately echoed by the mouth and pen brigade in themedia. "We cannot talk with them as long as the terrorism goes on," afamous expert declared on TV. That's like saying: "One cannot talk aboutending the war as long as the enemy is shooting at our troops."

On the Mearsheimer-Walt thesis I wrote that "the dog is wagging the tailand the tail is wagging the dog." It will be interesting to see which willwag which this time: the dog its tail or the tail its dog.