One of the Baloch nationalist parties has, in fact, challenged the government's claim that military operations have ended. HasilBizenjo, Secretary General of the National Party, told Gulf News that "It is a lie that the military operation has been halted inBalochistan." He said, though a new government has been installed, hundreds of dissidents and political activists still languished in prisons and "torture cells". "The military and paramilitary troops are still active on the mountains, their intelligence networks are still operational and hounding people struggling for their rights," he asserted.Bizenjo, whose party boycotted the 2008 general elections, claimed that not a single political prisoner has been released. "Only those cases of treason have been withdrawn in which thegovernment had not arrested any people," he stated. According to him, "More than 900 people are missing in Dera Bugtidistrict and more than 750 in its neighbouring Kohlu district." Bizenjo insisted that he "did not understand" the reasons behind thegovernment's "false claims", when it has not even ordered withdrawal of troops from places like DeraBugti, Kohlu, Gwadar, Dilbadin and Khuzdar.
The central leader of the Jamhori Watan Party (Brahmdagh Bugti faction), Nawabzada JamilBugti, son of the slain Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, stated, on May 5, 2008, that the arrest and trial of those involved in Balochistan military operations, rehabilitation of internally displaced people and immediate release of thousands of detained Baloch youth are preconditions, if the rulers want to make the reconciliation process result oriented. Refusing to hold talks with Senator BabarAwan, Secretary of the Balochistan Committee set up by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), he contended that negotiations are possible only if a murder case is registered against President Pervez Musharraf for killing his father and other Baloch people, and Security Forces are withdrawn from Dera Bugti and other areas. He expressed the hope that, in the present scenario, no Baloch leader would engage in the reconciliation process, adding that they had a bitter experience of surrendering arms in the 1970s. Addressing a Press Conference inQuetta, he stated military operations were still continuing in Dera Bugti and other parts of theprovince. "We will not surrender our weapons because it is against the Baloch tradition. We remember the fate of Nawab Nauroz Khan Zarakzai and other tribesmen who were brought from the mountains under oath and then hanged by Army ruler Ayub Khan in the 1960s," Jamil Bugti concluded.
Nawabzada Talal Akbar Bugti, another son of Akbar Bugti, has rejected Prime MinisterGillani's offer of negotiations conditional on laying down arms, saying "that the Baloch people will only do so after they have achieved their rights and gained complete autonomy."
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, a veteran leader and chieftain of the Marri tribe has described President Musharraf as a "gangster with an ego," and has also rejected theCBMs.
The proscribed Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has also rejected the government's invitation for a dialogue. We regard thegovernment's offer for talks as its defeat, since previously it was not even ready to recognise the existence of theBLA, BLA spokesman Beebarg Baloch said. The government's claims of holding talks with Baloch insurgents are a "pack of lies" and the new Balochistan Governor, Nawab Zulfiqar AliMagsi, and Chief Minister, Nawab Aslam Raisani, are "fooling themselves" by offering talks, the BLA he said, on April 16, 2008, adding, "Neither has thegovernment contacted us nor are we interested in talks."
Further, Baloch political groups are claiming that the CBMs are mere hogwash since "no cases have yet been withdrawn, no one has yet been released and the names of the members of the Committee on Missing Persons have not yet been announced. The Prime Minister also announced plans to replace 6,000 Army personnel with the Frontier Constabulary, but the Army is there with its full strength."
On the face of it, it seems that the province has relatively calmed down after the assassination, on August 26, 2006, of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the military. The momentum of the Baloch insurgency declined relatively in 2007, as some leaders either fled Pakistan or were neutralized by the state. At least 450 persons, including 226 civilians, 82 soldiers and 142 insurgents, were killed in 772 incidents in 2006. Violence in 2007 was at relatively lower levels, with about 245 persons, including 124 civilians, killed in the year (Institute for Conflict Management data). Balochistan Inspector General of Police SaudGohar, however, said that terrorism and subversive activities increased in the provinceby 19 per cent during 2007. About 186 people were killed and 445 injured in 540 incidents of terrorism and sabotage in 2007. He said that the Police had recovered more than 1,000 weapons and 18 kilograms of explosives during 2007.
According to the Institute for Conflict Management database, in year 2008 (till May 9) approximately 78 persons had been killed and 242 others wounded in 188 incidents of insurgency-related violence inBalochistan. There have been approximately 126 bomb blasts in 2008 (till May 9) in which more than 43 persons died and 215 others wounded. Through 2007, at least 332 people died and 457 were injured in more than 125 bomb blasts.
Whatever the actual figures may be, it is evident that insurgency continues to simmer, and there has been a steady stream of bomb and rocket attacks on gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, and communications infrastructure, as well as on military establishments andgovernment facilities. The rebels are still capable of carrying out acts of sabotage on a daily basis across theprovince and a political solution to the insurgency is nowhere in sight. Acts of violence are, importantly, not restricted to a fewdistricts, but are occurring practically across the province, including the provincial capitalQuetta. Currently, all 27 districts of Balochistan are affected either by a sub-nationalist tribal insurgency or, separately, by Islamist extremism. Most of the violence in Balochistan is, however, 'nationalist' and there is no co-operation between Islamist militants in pockets in the North and the Baloch nationalist insurgents. The shadow of Afghanistan continues to hover overBalochistan, with (mostly Pashtoon) Islamist militants concentrated in the north of theprovince, who are orchestrating violence on both sides of the Afghan border in their areas of domination. There are regular reports of the presence of al Qaeda-Taliban operatives in NorthBalochistan.
The federal and provincial governments undoubtedly face a challenging task. Chief among the policy dilemmas is whether to abandon the military track altogether or pursue a combination of both military and political initiatives. While a dialogue with the rebels is imperative for the coalitiongovernment in Islamabad and military operations alone cannot bring peace to the province, it is also the case that there has been a clear disconnect in the past between Islamabad and the insurgents regarding a peace process. Considering the intense animosity-- enormously deepened by the military excesses of the recent past -- between Islamabad and theBalochis, it will take much more than a partial troop withdrawal and unreciprocated CBMs to reverse course in theprovince and engage politically with the insurgents.
Underlying the entire conflict is a crisis of faith. Islamabad has never trusted theBaloch. And the Baloch find little reason in their history to trust Islamabad. Worse, recent developments in theprovince have immensely intensified Baloch apprehensions. Protests against the federal government's acquisition of vast tracts of land for mega military ventures, such as the Gwadar Port and City project, already feed the insurgency, and the Pakistan AirForce's (PAF) recent plan to take over 70,000 acres of land has caused further furor inBalochistan. The PAF is reportedly attempting to acquire 70,000 acres of land along the Coastal Highway in the Lasbeladistrict to establish its new weapons' testing and firing range. The previous Provincialgovernment had reportedly allotted the land to the Defence Ministry at an insignificant price of PKR 600 an acre. The Ministry, according to Dawn, had already paid approximately PKR 50 million and asked the provincialgovernment to eject local people from their ancestral lands. While the locals have refused to vacate the areas, contending that they had been living on these lands since centuries, sources said the "firing range would also adversely affect theRs. 250 million National Hingol Wildlife project launched by the World Bank." Criticising the action of the previousgovernment, Speaker of the Balochistan Assembly, Aslam Bhootani, who was elected from the area, contended that the land had been allotted to the Defence Ministry at too low a price and without consulting the local people, who were its real owners.
While there is immense pressure on the government to unveil a peace process in all the conflict zones across Pakistan, for the insurgents inBalochistan, a change in dispensation in Islamabad does not denote any modification of the underlying sources and character of their insurgency. The newregime's initiatives are, consequently, not expected to change the dynamics of the conflict inBalochistan.
A wide range of entrenched discriminatory practices underlie this dynamic. Robert Wirsing writes in Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan (Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008), that "when it came to jobs, for instance, the gasindustry's well-paid managers and technicians were almost invariably drawn from outsideBalochistan; local Baloch, inevitably viewed with some suspicion, were mainly employed in low-end jobs as daylaborers.... An obvious remedy for the shortage of technically skilled Baloch qualified for employment in the gas industry-- government funding of technical training institutions in Balochistan -- was never seriously considered until recently."
Another significant issue that Islamabad, the insurgents and other stakeholders will have to engage with is how to alter the current fiscal arrangement, which is evidently inconsistent with the concept of provincial ownership of natural resources. As Wirsing notes, further,