Yet Another 'Surprise'

When a terrorist organisation uses a modus operandi (MO) for the first time,one cannot blame those responsible for physical security or for being taken bysurprise.

When the terrorists use the same MO again and again and manage to take thephysical security agencies by 'surprise' on each occasion, one has reason tofeel concerned over the state of our physical security set-up.

On May 21, 2006, a jihadi terrorist, reportedly in police uniform, managed toenter the venue of a public meeting by Congress party in Srinagar. The terroristwas reportedly carrying a hand-held weapon and threw hand-grenades and openedfire killing two policemen and five civilians. The Congress rally was to markthe 15th anniversary of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber ofthe Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Every year, the anniversary of theday is observed all over the country as Anti-Terrorism Day. The terrorist wasultimately killed by the security forces, but not before he had carried out hissuicidal mission. Another terrorist, reportedly not in uniform, was also killedin an adjoining ground.

[May 21 is also significant for J&K as Moulvi Mohammed Farooq, father ofMirwaiz Umer Farooq, was assassinated on the same day in 1990, and then, in2001, Abdul Ghani Lone, chairman of People's Conference, was shot dead at therally to commemorate the Moulvi's death at Idgah in Srinagar]

The objective of the terrorist was clearly to intimidate the local populationby killing innocent civilians indiscriminately. He could have achieved this morespectacularly with an improvised explosive device. He did not do so. Instead, hechose to kill with a hand-held weapon.

Why? Apparently because he had judged--correctly as it turned out--that itwould be easier for him to infiltrate into the meeting venue with a hand-heldweapon by wearing the police uniform than as a civilian carrying a concealedexplosive device.

Since 2001, the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and other jihadi terroristorganisations have been repeatedly using this MO for infiltrating into venues ofpublic meetings and even the establishments of the security forces. Since 2001,there have been a number such incidents of jihadi terrorists, wearing theuniform of the security forces, entering the venue of a public meeting or thecampus of a security forces unit and opening fire indiscriminately withhand-held weapons and throwing hand-grenades!

After an incident involving the infiltration of terrorists wearing uniform, Ihad written as follows on August 7, 2002, in an article ISI:Internal Security Issue :

"After the Kaluchak incident of May, 2002, the government of India effectively drew the attention of the world to the role of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the attack on innocent civilians inside the residential lines of a security forces unit. That was an important aspect of the incident. There was another equally important aspect relating to the apparent ease with which the terrorists had penetrated the residential lines. Such residential lines of the security forces are the most heavily guarded, with perimeter fencing, if not wall, perimeter patrolling, armed sentries at the entrance etc. Despite all this, it seemed that the terrorists wearing uniform managed to gain access without being checked. They were not carrying hidden weapons such as improvised explosive devices or hand-grenades attached to their body. They were reportedly carrying outwardly visible, hand-held weapons such as an AK-47. And yet, no alarm bells rang in the minds of the security guards till the terrorists had gained access and opened fire. It is so unfortunate and so troubling that not many questions have been raised either in the Parliament or in the media or in public or in the various www fora about the state of our physical security infrastructure. There has not been a single comprehensive post-mortem on this issue, of which the public is aware. In every discussion fora, it is ISI, ISI, ISI and ISI. Yes, the ISI needs to be combated and crushed. It is the external villain. But, there is an equally worrisome internal villain--our own inadequacies and deficiencies."

The incident of May 21, 2006, shows that this serious deficiency remainsunattended to. The incident took place three days after a conference held nearDelhi, which was attended by representatives of political organisations inPakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including Gilgit and Baltistan, who are opposedto the use of terrorism by Pakistan to achieve its objective in Jammu &Kashmir. It took place one day before the third anniversary of the assumption ofoffice by Dr. Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister. It took place three daysbefore the visit of our Prime Minister to Srinagar for his second round tableconference with representatives of different Kashmiri organisations on theirgrievances.

The jihadi terrorists are opposed to this round table. The pro-Pakistanextremist leaders in J&K are opposed to it too. Pakistan is uncomfortableover it lest India find a political solution to the grievances of thoseKashmiris who have taken to arms without the involvement of Pakistan whichprojects itself as the guardian angel of the interests of the Kashmiris.

It was widely feared that the terrorists might attempt to disrupt the roundtable by organising a terrorist strike. One would have expected a strengtheningof physical security measures, with special attention to the often-used MO ofpenetrating the physical security set-up by wearing the uniform of securitypersonnel. Apparently, this was not done. A terrorist succeeded by using onceagain the same MO which the terrorists have been using since 2001. It needs tobe mentioned that according to one eye-witness account quoted in the media, onepoliceman of the J&K Police did suspect that this individual was not agenuine policeman and raised an alarm, but it was too late by then.

We have delayed for too long a comprehensive review of our physical securitydrill taking into account the changing and unchanging MO of the terrorists. Thisreview should be undertaken at least now.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.