The law of diminishing returns has set in in the relationship between the US andPakistan and one could already discern incipient signs of Americandisenchantment with Pakistan in general and its President General PervezMusharraf in particular.
These signs of disenchantment became noticeable to the people of Pakistan andeven to outside observers during President George Bush's 24-hour visit toIslamabad on March 3-4, 2006. The lack of warmth during his interactions withthe Pakistani leaders in general and Musharraf in particular stood in sharpcontrast with the warmth displayed by him during his interactions with everyone,big and small, he met in New Delhi and Hyderabad.
His admiration for India, its democracy, its civil society and its people, whichhe expressed frequently, stood in similar contrast with his noticeably proformaremarks in Islamabad. His words of praise in India were spontaneous and camefrom his heart. His restrained words of praise in Pakistan were uttered out ofpoliteness by a guest to a host. Nothing more.
The change in Mr. Bush's demeanour was very striking and took his Pakistanihosts by surprise. The bonhomie, which he had displayed towards Musharraf atCamp David two years ago, was no longer there. The Bush, whom Musharrafencountered in Islamabad, was disturbingly different from the Bush he had metearlier in New York, Washington and Camp David.
Even before embarking on his tour of South Asia, Mr. Bush had many warm words ofpraise for Musharraf in the media interviews given and statements made by him atWashington. He even referred to Musharraf as his buddy.
What happened between his departure from Washington and his arrival inIslamabad, which led to this change in attitude? Reliable sources in Pakistanand Afghanistan attribute this to the briefings on the ground situation inAfghanistan, which he had received in Kabul on March 1, 2006, from PresidentHamid Karzai and his officers as well as from his own military officers.
Since the beginning of this year, Afghan Army and intelligence officers had beenopenly criticising Pakistan for helping the Taliban to stage a come-back inAfghanistan, for giving sanctuaries to its Amir, Mulla Mohammad Omar, and otherleaders and cadres in Pakistani territory and for providing them with trainingand arms assistance. They were also pointing out that the majority of thesuicide bombers, who had participated in operations in Afghanistan since themiddle of last year, were Pakistani nationals. They were also claiming thattrained and jihad-hardened members of Al Qaeda were being sent by Abu Musab al-Zarqawifrom Iraq into Afghanistan through Pakistani territory to help the Taliban.
Afghan intelligence officials were also saying that whereas the jihaditerrorists observed total communication silence while they were in Afghanterritory, they resumed communications with each other and with theirheadquarters once they retreated into Pakistan. This, according to them,reflected their confidence that no action would be taken against them inPakistan even if their communications were intercepted.
During a visit to Pakistan before the visit of Mr. Bush, President Hamid Karzaihad brought these reports to the notice of Musharraf. He had also handed over tohim a summary of these reports prepared by his intelligence officers and a list ofthe Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistani territory as prepared by his intelligence.
After Karzai returned to Kabul, the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Officedismissed these reports as unreliable and out of date. In interviews to theBBC and other Western TV channels, Musharraf made sarcastic references to thesereports as inaccurate and unreliable. He also alleged that Mr. Karzai was tryingto cover up the incompetence of his intelligence agencies and security forces byblaming Pakistan.
Musharraf's sarcastic references were reported to have angered Mr. Karzai andhis officers, who gave Mr. Bush a detailed briefing on the Pakistani involvementwith the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants operating in Afghan territory fromPakistan. Mr. Karzai and his Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdulla Abdulla, reportedlyaccused Gen. Musharraf of insincerity and told Mr. Bush that so long as thePakistani involvement continued, the ground situation would not improve inAfghanistan.
The Afghan briefings were totally corroborated by American field officers inAfghanistan during their separate briefings for Mr. Bush. It is said that Mr.Bush was taken by surprise and disturbed by the details of the Pakistaniinvolvement mentioned to him during his briefings in Kabul. Before his departurefrom Kabul for New Delhi, he had told the media that Mr. Karzai had mentioned tohim about the activities of the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Pakistani territoryand that he would be taking this up with Gen. Musharraf.
This set off some concern in Islamabad, which immediately initiated somecorrective action. Last year, the Pakistani Army had made all Taliban leadersand cadres, who were based in the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan, shiftto the Waziristan area of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ofPakistan, where the remnants of Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan (IMU), the Jundullah (Army of Allah) and other components of theInternational Islamic Front (IIF) were already based.
It concluded an informal cease-fire with them. It agreed to suspend itsoperations against them in return for their assurance that they would confinetheir operations to the Afghan territory. Following this agreement, many of thePakistani troops deployed on counter-terrorism duties in Waziristan, includingthe helicopters given by the US, were moved to Balochistan to start a militaryoffensive against the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which has been fightingfor the independence of Balochistan.
After coming to know of the statement made by Mr. Bush in Kabul, Gen. Musharrafordered a resumption of the counter-terrorism operations in North Waziristan.The operations were resumed and over 40 persons -- mainly Chechens, Uzbeksand some locals--were killed on February 28. The Taliban, Al Qaeda and the IIFretaliated against it. The Taliban captured the telephone exchanges in NorthWaziristan and cut off all communications with the rest of Pakistan. It alsoattacked posts of the Pakistani Security Forces in the area. The fighting isstill going on with over 100 fatal casualties suffered by both sides.
In view of the continuing activities of the BLA in Balochistan, the PakistanArmy has not yet been able to move back to Waziristan all the troops, whichit had shifted to Balochistan. The Pakistani security forces are facing greatdifficulty in repulsing the attacks of the Taliban, the Al Qaeda and the IIF.
In the meanwhile, the Jundullah, which had suspended its operations in Karachiin return for the suspension of the Pakistani Army operations in Waziristan,resumed them on March 2, 2006, by staging a suicide explosion against a car ofthe US Consulate there in which three officers of the Consulate, including thehead of the physical security set-up of the Consulate, were going to work. Theexplosion killed the head of the physical security set-up.
This shook up the American officers responsible for the protection ofMr. Bush, who were then in New Delhi. It is said that even Musharraf was shakenup and worried over the security of Mr. Bush in Islamabad. He reportedly toldhis officers that they should accept whatever suggestions were made by theirAmerican counterparts for strengthening the physical security of Mr. Bush,without making it a prestige issue.
In New Delhi, the American officials reviewed the situation in the light of theexplosion in Karachi and decided that Mr. Bush should go ahead with his visit.At the same time, they ordered a number of additional security measures. Mr.Bush's plane arrived and took off from the Chaklala airport of the Pakistan AirForce at night in total darkness with all its lights switched off. Pakistan wastold that it would not be necessary for Musharraf or Prime Minister Shaukat Azizto come to the airport to receive or see off Mr. Bush since the Americanofficials were afraid that their movement to the airport in their securityconvoys could alert the terrorists. Mr. Bush stayed in the US Ambassador's houseinstead of in a local hotel, which had been reserved for him and his party. Hewas taken by the US Air Force in one of its helicopters to the Ambassador'shouse and back as well to the place of his meeting with Musharraf and back. Theair cover over Islamabad was provided by planes and helicopters of the US AirForce based in Afghanistan with officers of the Pakistan Air Force sitting inthem to assist the US crew and the Pakistan Air Force was asked to ground allits planes and helicopters till the visit of Mr. Bush was over. Officers of theUS Secret Service took over all the responsibility for the close proximityprotection of Mr. Bush and their Pakistani counterparts were not kept in thepicture.
These developments and the additional security measures necessitated by theKarachi explosion reportedly made Mr. Bush and his advisers realise how fragileis the situation in Pakistan and how unsatisfactory has been Gen. Musharraf'smuch-vaunted counter-terrorism operations.
Another development, which took place even as Mr. Bush was in South Asia,contributed to the onset of the disenchantment. Since 9/11, Musharraf hasrepeatedly reiterated his determination to close down the jihadi madrasas inPakistan, expel all foreign jihadis studying there and to modernise thecurriculum in the madrasas not associated with the jihadi terroristorganisations. He has not implemented any of these commitments under some excuseor the other despite receipt of liberal grants from the US and other Westerncountries for modernising the education system.
The US and the UK again took this up strongly with him after the Londonexplosions of July last year. He reiterated his promise to close down all jihadimadrasas and expel the over 1400 foreign students studying there--the majorityof them from Southern Thailand followed by jihadis from South Africa--byDecember 31, 2005. This was not done. The madrasas continued to flout hisinstructions without any action being taken against them.
Just before the visit of Mr. Bush, the Pakistani Interior Ministry decided tokeep in abeyance the orders expelling the foreign jihadis on the ground that ata time when violent demonstrations were taking place all over the country overthe Danish cartoons, the expulsion of the foreign jihadis could further provokethe religious elements.
The seriousness with which Mr. Bush viewed the situation and his sternrebuke to Gen. Musharraf became evident in his remarks at the pressconference in Islamabad jointly addressed by him and the General on March 4,2006. Mr. Bush said part of his mission was to determine whether Musharraf "is as committed as he has been in the past to bringing these terrorists tojustice --and he is." He added: "He understands the stakes, heunderstands the responsibility and he understands the need to make sure ourstrategy is able to defeat the enemy."
Well-informed Pakistani sources say that for the first time Mr. Bush and hisadvisers have started nursing misgivings about the sincerity of the General andhis willingness or ability to help the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Has Musharraf outlived his utility for the US as a frontline ally in the waragainst terrorism? That is the question which must be troubling the minds of Mr.Bush and his advisers as they fly back to Washington.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, and, presently, Director, the Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
