Who'll Bridge The Gap?

Raj Thackeray's men attacking people from UP and Bihar in Mumbai haspropelled a debate across India. Much of the debate has focused on how Mumbai's'cosmopolitan' character is being destroyed by some riff-raffs for narrowpolitical gains. It is often made out to be a plain and simple battle between'chauvinists' and 'cosmopolitans'. 

But if some more questions are allowed to come on board in this debate,instead of just arguing from stiff and polarised positions, perhaps we'll getcloser to understanding what sparks such incidents and also the times we livein. Or else, there is the danger of the debate too getting as reactionary as theact itself. Central to the many questions that need to be added to the debateare issues related to identity and economic globalisation.

One needs to first recognise that incidents such as those in Mumbai havetaken place with some regularity across India and abroad in the recent past. Alinguistic or regional community has often been attacked by offering astridently economic argument. The accusation? Stealing livelihoods. It is notdissimilar to what one witnessed in the US when business outsourcing to Indiawas being debated. Even in a country like the US, where individualism reigns, asense of community was forged to protest jobs going to Bangalore. 

The French expressed fears of loosing jobs in Arcelor under the stewardshipof an Indian. When Dalits as a socially-deprived community demand reservation inthe private sector, it appears to be an extension of the same sentiment. One isfamiliar with what happened to Biharis in Assam. And a few weeks ago inBangalore, a Kannada outfit launched a virulent campaign against the SouthWestern Railway for apparently accommodating more Biharis in the recruitment of'D' group employees. Biharis are just the flavour of the season. They could bereplaced either by Bengalis, Bangaldeshis, Malayalis, Kannadigas, Punjabis orTamils.

I will not sit in judgement over the arguments that different nationalist,social or linguistic groups make, but would like to assert that 'chauvinism',regardless of its motivations, has increasingly learnt to draw its succour fromeconomics. Issues of linguistic, historical, literary or regional pride or, forthat matter, the rhetoric of self-respect, has in some ways made way for moreimmediate arguments of economic pressure. 

Earlier, economics was only one of the items on the agenda and it was moreimportant to create icons clearly from outside the realm of economics (exampleChhatrapathi Shivaji) and shield them from insult. Now, there is a subtle shiftin the 'chauvinistic' movement--corporate icons are turned into villains (N RNarayana Murthy or Lakshmi Mittal in France) and are insulted. To shield and toinsult are extremely significant symbolic acts.

Economics getting foregrounded in all movements understood as 'chauvinistic'is mostly because of our sudden embrace of an open market society. Borders weremade irrelevant, communication was revolutionised and migration became the orderof the day. This has numbed our social and cultural responses. 

If changes are gradual, then responses are also gradual. But how does asociety respond to a shocking alteration in its milieu? There should have beenan effort to communicate the changes, and to make them less shocking andendurable, but in the absence of such an effort 'chauvinism' turns violent andmisdirected. 

There are two distinct realities--the cultural reality and the economicreality. The gap between the two is widening. It is perhaps safe to assume thatthere is peace if there is some alignment between the two realities. If the gapis not corrected, people like Raj Thackeray make it their profession to harnessit. 

At this juncture, it is important to stop being indifferent to the growinggap. We urgently need cultural leaders and public intellectuals as much as weaspire for entrepreneurs and corporate leaders to explain the whole thing. Eachlocal culture has to negotiate independently with the emerging world around it.What resistances and alignments it will create will depend on the historicalexposure of the culture. There will be more and more violence of this nature ina country like India, which is a loosely knit federation of cultures andlanguages, if this gap is not engaged. The gap may not be resolved, but theprimary need is to engage.

Our identities as Kannadigas, Marathis, Tamils, Telugus, Bengalis, Assameseetc. were built over centuries and got sharpened after India was divided intolinguistic states post-1947. On the one hand, we constitutionally protect thesedistinct identities and on the other we want to impatiently brush them under thecarpet to keep a 'cosmopolitan' facade. Would we have faced a problem had Indiabeen divided into small economic zones instead of linguistic territories ishypothetical. But we need to identify the paradox here.

Being cosmopolitan is a cherished goal for all cultures, but the cosmopolitanwe know today is a snooty English-speaking ally of global economics. It is anexclusive club. We have to urgently expand its meaning. Local cultures andlanguages, meaning everything other than English, are often perceived as'parochial' and 'provincial,' but the irony is that most of these languages havemature traditions which are well over a thousand years and have a vibrantcosmopolitan stream within them. Cultural leaders have to dip into these streamsto constantly explain the gap and keep violence off the streets.