Where The Buck Stops

Despite West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee's attempt totrivialise the Nandigram debacle as a mere "administrative and politicallapse", this issue is not simply going to disappear. The recovery of theburnt remains of several bodies from shallow graves by the roadside nearNandigram are a reminder to the nation of the gravity of the excesses andincompetence that have marked the state's response to what should have been afairly manageable challenge for the district administration. Nandigram is, infact, symptomatic of a much wider collapse of administrative abilities andcompetence, and it is useful to note that the capacities for governance of theCPI(M), which has ruled West Bengal for three decades now, appear to haveabruptly disintegrated in the face of the very first challenge of significanceto confront the Left Front regime.

Stung by the crisis in Nandigram, compounded by the violent demonstrationsorchestrated principally by Islamist organisations in the state (combining thisissue with protests against Taslima Nasreen's 'blasphemies' against Islam),which forced the deployment of the Army in Kolkata, the Marxist leadership hasannounced that it will raise a 'youth army' to confront dissident groups inNandigram and to re-establish its writ in the state. Earlier, instead of relyingon the state police, and while actively obstructing the central forces deployedin the area to restore a modicum of order, the Marxists had chosen to use armedparty cadre to 'recapture' Nandigram, engaging in extreme violence, murder and,if reports are to be believed, rape as well.

The CPI(M) is not a unique case. Confronted by the challenge of the Maoistsin Chhattisgarh, the state government sought to piggy-back on some popularresentment against the extremists to engineer the Salva Judum, arming ordinarytribals to directly confront the much better organised, trained and armedMaoists. The principal instrumentalities of state power, meanwhile, shirkedtheir responsibilities to impose the law of the land and to restore order andthe security of private life and property in widening areas dominated by Maoistextremists.

These are, of course, the more visible and large-scale examples of the degreeto which India's thin veneer of democracy is actually underpinned by unashamedpolitical thuggeries that use every means possible to seize and hold power.That, precisely, is why so many criminals and Mafiosi are able to secure partytickets in every Parliamentary and Assembly election -- not to mention thelesser electoral processes of local bodies -- and why so many of the mostunsavoury characters sit in India's highest elected chambers.

And that is why all the present bunkum about 'police reforms' will leadnowhere. state governments have, in fact, by and large and over the decades,actively undermined police organisations and the All India Services, includingthe Indian Police Service. The Supreme Court's orders on police reforms have, infact, been used by many of the states to draft legislation that is even moreantediluvian and regressive than the much-abused (but almost never implemented)'colonial' Indian Police Act of 1861.

The reality is, India's political parties -- without exception -- havedemonstrated no faith in, or commitment to, the rule of law, and have activelyand persistently employed criminal force to distort electoral processes andoutcomes, and are now increasingly relying on this source of 'power' to'resolve' various administrative challenges confronting the state machinery.Instead of telling the District Collectors and the Superintendents of Police toimplement the law and maintain order in their jurisdictions, political partiesin power feel it more expedient to call on the local thug to stamp out any'troubles' the administration is experiencing -- and particularly any politicalopposition that may come into play.

If this process continues -- as indeed, it must be expected to, in the utterabsence of any willingness on the part of even a single political formation tochallenge or reverse it -- it cannot be long before private armies become thenorm across much of the country. These already dominate vast areas of the poorlygoverned parts of India -- and that is a very large part of the country. Withorganised efforts by mainstream parties to use 'informal' and party organs toengage in violent mobilisation, and the public advocacy of extra-legal measuresby high elected officials such as West Bengal's Chief Minister and other seniorCPI(M) apparatchiks, these proclivities will become further entrenched and makeinroads into urban centres and state capitals as well. In many areas, people arealready reluctant to take their complaints and grievances to the police,preferring to rely on kangaroo courts run by political thuggeries, Mafiosi and'revolutionary' groups such as the Maoists. There is, everywhere, evidence of arising anarchy, and an erosion of administrative capacities to a point where governmenthas become irrelevant to the lives of a large proportion of the population, orwhere the agencies of government are visible only as an obstruction, a burden,or as active oppressors.

The political executive can extract, from its administrativeinstrumentalities, as much as its own competence and vision allows. In Assam, inPunjab, and in Gujarat, under the worst of circumstances, but in periods where aclear political mandate was available, I was able to extract a hundred per centand more from the state police forces. But in other areas and at other times,the same forces have appeared infirm, corrupt and incompetent. Certainly, in mypersonal experience in Chhattisgarh, the state police performed at a smallfraction of its potential, and the blame must lie squarely where theConstitution of India vests the greatest power and responsibility -- the state'spolitical executive and elected leadership. The 'administrative and politicallapses' that Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee would like to dismiss as an aberrationin Nandigram are, in fact, a chronic malady of the political executive in almostall states today -- though this may be noticed only from time to time, whenthings go out of hand in atrocities, excesses, public disorder and massviolence.

K.P.S.Gill is former director-general of police, Punjab.He is also Publisher, SAIR and President, Institute for Conflict Management. This article was first published in The Pioneer