Warnings For The Future

Under a successful operation code-named Sarp Vinash (Snake Eradication), the Indian Army has smoked out alarge number of terrorists belonging to different Pakistani jihadi organisations, which are members of Osamabin Laden's International Islamic Front, from a secret launching base in the Hill Kaka area of Surankote inJammu & Kashmir (J&K).

Details of the operation have not been officially announced, but media reports suggest that this launchingbase has been functioning undetected at least for the last four years and that many terrorist operations, notonly in J&K but also in other parts of India, were being co-ordinated and controlled from there.

An article on the operation by ParveenSwami was carried on these pages on June 2, 2003. Meanwhile, the Indian Express has reported onJune 3, 2003, as follows:

"Operation Sarp Vinash has unearthed documents that show the Military Intelligence and IntelligenceBureau failed to sense the scale of activities in Hill Kaka for about four years.....The place---which thefield intelligence units of both the IB and the Army thought was a mere transit point for terrorists---turnedout to be a full-fledged command and control centre for almost all tanzeems (terrorist outfits) in J&K. There were 250-350 terrorists living there at any given time, making it one of the biggest hide-outs south ofPir Panjal."

The discoveries made so far during this operation bring to mind the undetected intrusions of the PakistanArmy into the Kargil Heights in the beginning of 1999, which ultimately led to a military conflict between theIndian and Pakistani armies.

Recently, there have been statements by the office-bearers of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) of NawazSharif, who was the Prime Minister in 1999, as to what really happened in 1999. According to them, Gen. PervezMusharraf, as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), took  Nawaz Sharif's clearance for helping theterrorists to occupy the heights and set up hide-outs there; instead, he sent regular Army units to do so.

They claimed that Nawaz was totally surprised when he later came to know that instead of using theterrorists, Musharraf had used the Army for this purpose and that this started the differences between thetwo.

Even during the Kargil war, some British correspondents based in New Delhi, on the basis of briefings fromtheir High Commission, had reported that terrorists of Osama bin Laden had been used by Musharraf tofacilitate the occupation of the Kargil heights. 

Before the intrusion, the Pakistan Government and Army were under intense pressure from the US to help itin the eradication of the camps of pro-bin Laden terrorist groups from the Afghan territory. There was reasonto suspect that Musharraf obtained the clearance of Nawaz for shifting these terrorists from Afghanistan tothe Kashmiri territory and that Nawaz gave the clearance, but the involvement of the Pakistan Army in theoccupation of the heights surprised and unnerved him.

The technical intelligence (TECHINT) units of our intelligence agencies failed to detect the presence of alarge number of intruders in our territory either through aerial surveillance or through direction-finding(DF) of their communication set-up. While such intruders could escape detection through aerial surveillance byadopting appropriate concealment techniques, it would be difficult for them to escape detection through DF oftheir communication network, if we have a good DF capability.

Communication monitoring units play two roles. First, they intercept the communications of the adversary,which provide useful preventive intelligence.  Second, through DF, they establish the co-ordinates of theplace from where such communications are emanating.  Even if the agencies are not able to break the codeof the intercepted communications, effective use of a good DF capability should enable them to determine wherefrom such communications are originating.  This would facilitate raids by the security forces.

Inadequate DF capability and ineffective use of even the existing capability have generally been the weakpoints  of our intelligence agencies. This was seen before the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. The LTTE assassination team had taken up position in Chennai and was in wireless communication with the LTTEheadquarters. According to reported testimony before the Jain Commission, which had enquired into theassassination, one of the intelligence agencies had intercepted some coded communications suspected to be ofthe LTTE, which could not be broken in time.  No attempt would appear to have been made to establish,through DF, where from in Chennai these W/T communications were going to the LTTE headquarters. It was thesubsequent effective use of DF, which enabled the agencies to track down the killers, after the assassination,in a hide-out near Bangalore where they committed suicide before they could be arrested.

During the  events preceding the Kargil conflict also, inadequate DF capability prevented the agenciesfrom detecting the intrusions  into our territory.  The details of Operation Sarp Vinash show thatour DF capability continues to be as inadequate as ever, even four years after Kargil.  It is mostprobably this, combined with inadequate patrolling of the areas susceptible to such intrusions, which haveenabled the terrorists to set up such a large secret launching base in our territory without being detected.The improvement of this capability needs urgent attention, if it is not already engaging the attention of ourauthorities.

Operation Sarp Vinash also contains a warning for the future.  Since Musharraf took over as the COASin October,1998, there have been indications that shifting the Afghan-based terrorists owing allegiance to binLaden to inaccessible Indian territory  and letting them loose in J&K has been one of his pet ideas. In his calculation, this would have two advantages.  First, this would enable him evade US pressure foraction against them.  Second, this would add to the difficulties of the Indian security forces.

We should be alert to the possibility that he and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) might help thedregs of these terrorist organisations to set up similar launching hide-outs in others parts of J&K. Afterthis, he could claim to the Americans that he had wound up all terrorist camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK)and put an end to cross-border infiltration.

My TheTerrorists In Our Midst  (dated January 4, 2002)  also has some bearing on this subject.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, ObserverResearch Foundation, Chennai Chapter)