Walking On Eggshells In Tehran

WASHINGTON

Much of the world breathed a sigh of relief when Iran and threeEuropean Union countries recently agreed on a course to resolve the boilingcrisis over Iran's nuclear activities. With Iran agreeing to suspend thoseactivities as long as progress is made in structuring a longer-term cooperativerelationship with Europe, the nuclear issue shifted to the backburner. But therelief was cut short by the US claim of new evidence that Iran is violating itscommitment not to pursue nuclear weapons.

To be sure, US Secretary of State Colin Powell's suggestion that Iran mightbe adapting a missile system to carry a nuclear warhead has grave implications.If true, these allegations, paired with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)evidence of Iran's illicit acquisition of nuclear material and technology, wouldprove that Iran is violating its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitment todevelop nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. The Iranian nuclearissue would then almost have to be sent to the UN Security Council forenforcement action – a move that would expose rifts among the major powers, aswell as the international system's relative fecklessness in dealing with thethreat to international peace and security posed by proliferation.

But as long as the Powell allegation remains unsubstantiated, the dealbetween the three European nations (Germany, France, and the UK) should remainthe center of international attention. The true challenge, then, is to persuadeIran to set aside its nuclear weapons ambition and build a constructiverelationship with Europe amidst so much distrust. Understanding the nature ofthis distrust, which emanates from all sides and is likely to persist for manyyears, is crucial to improving the relationship-construction project.

First, the European three do not trust Iran's claims that it does not seeknuclear weapons. Nor do they believe that the enigmatic and faction-riddenIranian leadership has irrevocably decided not to pursue the technical andmaterial option to build nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the European trio do not trust that a Bush administrationguided by Vice President Cheney and Undersecretary of State John Bolton willrefrain from sabotaging a negotiated settlement with an "evil" Iraniangovernment. European leaders bristle that while Washington lacks realisticmilitary options to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure or change itsgovernment, the administration still refuses to deal with the crucial officialsin Tehran who must make the decisions to abandon acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Iranian leaders, meanwhile, do not trust each other, the Europeans, or theAmericans. Individuals and factions in the leadership are jockeying for positionin the lead-up to 2005 presidential elections. Some favor Iran's integrationinto the mainstream global political economy, while others, includingconservative trading groups linked to religious leaders' foundations, feareconomic openness and competition. The nuclear issue is intrinsically important,but it also has become the political football of Iranian politics. Whoever ismaking decisions on this issue now in Tehran is acting tactically, watching eachminute of the game before deciding on next steps. No fundamental strategic goalhas been decided.

Iranians also worry that the United States could hinder delivery of benefitspromised by the Europeans and would still seek regime change notwithstanding theEU position. Without explicit US endorsement, Iran will not implement a finaldeal negotiated by the Europeans. However, national pride and political temeritywill prevent Iranian officials from explicitly calling for this endorsement;Washington and the Europeans must initiate it.

US officials, obviously, do not trust Iranian leaders to abandon nuclearweapons acquisition efforts. Washington has little confidence in the IAEA'sresolve or capacity to dig to the bottom of Iranian nuclear activities anduncompromisingly investigate all leads. Key US leaders believe that Iran willcontinue to seek the bomb, either by bending nonproliferation rules or otherclandestine means.

Further, Washington does not trust the Europeans to be tough enough to insiston a final position that keeps Iran from producing highly enriched uranium andseparated plutonium. Key US officials lambaste the European failure to recognizethat threats of political isolation, economic sanction, and possible use offorce are necessary to compel Iran to make the right strategic decision.

Vice President Cheney, Undersecretary of State Bolton, and other powerfuladministration players still believe in the revolutionary approach to nuclearcounterproliferation, as first applied in Iraq. They believe that nuclearweapons per se are not the proliferation problem: The major obstacles are the"bad guys" who possess those weapons. Thus, the US strategy is toremove bad guys – the "axis of evil" – and their weapons, whilepreserving the nuclear-arms-bearing rights of the good guys. Unfortunately, theadministration fails to address how its own military posture in the region –as well as Israeli and Pakistani nuclear-weapons capabilities – affect Iranianinterests.

This selective, moralistic, and militant US posture exacerbates Iraniannationalism, elevating both Iranian insecurity and defiance. It also underminesthe cooperation of the Europeans, the IAEA Board of Governors, and the UNSecurity Council in order to isolate and pressure Iran. Rather than isolatingIran, the Bush Administration has isolated itself … barring, of course, therevelation of a smoking gun that so compellingly proves Iran's nuclear weaponintentions, that the rest of the world cannot avoid taking the tougherenforcement line favored by Washington.

Ironically, the United States, though a non-party to negotiations, candetermine their pace. If Washington explicitly backed the terms of the November15 deal and conveyed its willingness to deal with whoever leads the Iraniangovernment, the whole process of testing and proving the viability of the dealwould be accelerated. Even as it tries to solve problems with the currentleadership in Tehran the US should continue to express its support of Iranianswho want elected representatives, rather than the unelected religious leaders,to gain all relevant levers of power in Iran.

Iraq has emerged as an additional complicating factor. Iran's deepestsecurity interest in nuclear weapons originated with the 1980-88 war initiatedby Iraq. Now, the US presence in Iraq threatens Iran, and, ironically, alsogives Iran potential leverage over Washington. Iran can make the lives of USpersonnel in Iraq much more difficult if it feels the need to further deter a USintervention in Iran. Conversely, the stability of Iraq and Iran, and thelong-term interests of the United States depend on effecting a security systemfor the Gulf region. To this end, the US must participate constructively in abroader regional security dialogue with Iran on the future of Iraq and PersianGulf security.

Ultimately, the broad stakes involved in this complicated set of issues maywarrant UN Security Council endorsement of any deal finally negotiated. Iranwill worry that the United States will try to undermine Russia's or otherstates' provisions of nuclear reactor fuel to Iran, or will impose secondarysanctions on Europeans trading with Iran. The United States, the EU, and otherswill worry that Iran will renege on the deal and count on friends in theSecurity Council to block punishment. All of this suggests that any deal finallynegotiated between the three European nations and Iran should be recorded,commended, and, in effect, backed by a positive UN Security Council resolution.This would raise the incentives of all parties to fulfill its terms.

George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment ofInternational Peace, and co-author of Universal Compliance: A Strategy forNuclear Security. This article appeared in YaleGlobalOnline, a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission.Copyright © 2004 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization