Voices From Prison

Prisoners have ample time. They have an opportunity to learn, to think, toorganize seminars, to concentrate full-time on the problems of their people, toexchange views, to work out solutions.

In order to prevent an explosion, the Israeli prison authorities allow theseprisoners a large measure of communal life and self-government. This is a wisepolicy. In practice, the prisons resemble camps for prisoners of war. Clashesbetween the prisoners and the prison authorities are comparatively rare.

One of the results is that, in prison, the inmateslearn Hebrew. They watch Israeli TV, listen to Israeli radio, become acquaintedwith the Israeli way of life. They do not become Zionists, by any means, butcome to know Israeli reality and even to appreciate some of its components.Israeli democracy, for example. "What we liked most," an ex-prisoneronce told me, "was to see the Knesset debates on TV. When we saw Knessetmembers shouting at the Prime Minister and cursing members of the government, wereally got excited. Where do you have such a thing in the Arab world?"

This found its expression when Yasser Arafat and his people came back toPalestine. The ongoing controversy between the returnees from Tunisia and the"people from within" was not only a result of a generation gap, butalso of a difference of outlook. Arafat and his people had never lived in ademocratic country. When they thought about the future Palestinian state, theyhad before their eyes the systems of Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon. Theywere surprised when the young people, led by the ex-prisoners, pointed towardsthe Israeli model.

Not by accident, almost all my Palestinian friends are ex-prisoners, peoplewho have spent a long time in prison, sometimes 10 and even 20 years. I alwayswonder at the absence of bitterness in their mind. Most of them believe thatpeace with Israel is possible and necessary. Therefore, while many of them werecritical of Arafat's way of governing, they wholeheartedly supported his peacepolicy.

By the way, the outlook of the ex-prisoners reflects somewhat positively onthe prison authorities. Many of the prisoners had undergone torture in theinterrogation stage, when they were held by the Shin-Bet, but after they reachedprison, their treatment there has not left many mental scars.

All this comes as an introduction to the central eventof this week: the agreement achieved in prison between the representatives ofall the Palestinian factions.

This is a document of very great importance for the Palestinians, bothbecause of the identity of its authors and its content.

At this time, many leaders of the various Palestinian factions are in prison,from Marwan Barghouti, the leader of Fatah in the West Bank, to SheikAbd-al-Khaliq al-Natshe, a Hamas leader. With them there are the leaders ofIslamic Jihad, the Popular Front and the Democratic Front. They spend their timethere in a permanent discussion, while keeping constant contact with the leadersof their organizations outside and the activists inside. God knows how they doit.

When the leaders of the prisoners speak with one voice, what they say carriesa greater moral weight than the statements of any Palestinian institution,including the presidency, the parliament and the government.

This is the background, against which this fascinatingdocument should be examined.

In general, it follows the policy of Yasser Arafat: the Two-State solution, aPalestinian state in all the territory occupied in 1967 with East Jerusalem asits capital, the release of all Palestinian prisoners. This means, of course,the recognition of Israel in practice.

For the Israeli public, the most problematical part concerns, as usual, therefugee problem. No Palestinian leader can give up the Right of Return, and thisdocument, too, raises this demand. But in practice, the Palestinians acknowledgethe fact that this problem can be solved only in agreement with Israel. Thatmeans that return to Israel must necessarily be limited in numbers, and thegreater part of the solution lies in a return to the Palestinian state andpayment of compensation. There is a difference between the recognition of theRight of Return in principle, as a basic human right, and the exercise of thisright in the real world.

An important part of the document concerns putting the Palestinian house inorder. The body that is supposed to represent the whole Palestinian people,inside and outside the country, is the PLO. That is also the body that hassigned all the agreements with Israel. But the PLO is now far from reflectingthe domestic Palestinian political reality. Hamas, which came into being at thebeginning of the first intifada, is not represented at all. The same goes forIslamic Jihad. The document demands that both be represented in the PLO - areasonable and wise demand. It also calls for new elections to theall-Palestinian parliament - the Palestinian National Council, and for aNational Unity Government.

The prison agreement can help Hamas to cope with thenew reality - and that is, probably, one of the main motives of its authors.

The sweeping victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections wasa surprise not only for Israel and the world, but also for Hamas itself. Themovement was completely unprepared for assuming the responsibilities of power.The new situation creates a severe contradiction between the ideology of Hamasand the requirements of a governing party. As Ariel Sharon said: "What yousee from here you don't see from there."

This contradiction finds its expression in the declarations of differentleaders of Hamas. This is not duplicity, but rather an expression of differentreactions to a new reality. The point of view of Khaled Mashaal in Damascus isnecessarily quite different from the point of view of Ismail Haniyeh, the newPrime Minister in Gaza. Political and military leaders also often see thingsdifferently.

That is a natural confusion, and probably more time will pass before aconsensus is achieved and a joint position defined. No wonder, therefore, thatleaders are voicing opinions that contradict each other. One is seen on IsraeliTV declaring with much pathos that "we demand not only Jerusalem, but alsoHaifa, Besan and Tiberias", while another asserts that the movement"will not recognize Israel until it returns to the 1967 borders" - a"no" that implies a "yes".

The prison agreement is designed to help in creating the new consensus, whichshould enable Hamas to conduct a policy based on a compromise between theideology and theology of the movement and the requirements of the Palestinianpeople.

The possible line: the PLO, led by Mahmoud Abbas, will conduct negotiationswith Israel and present the agreement (if there be one) for ratification by aPalestinian referendum. Hamas will undertake in advance to accept the result. Atthe same time, Hamas will declare a Hudna (armistice) for many years, allowingan end to violence from both sides.

That is possible. The question is whether the Israeligovernment wants it. At the moment, it does not look like it.

It openly calls for the defining of the "permanent borders" ofIsrael unilaterally, with the annexation of large areas of territory. Such apolicy necessitates a situation of "no partner". This means that thegovernment will reject anything that might create a credible partner, one whowould also be accepted by the world.

During the show trial of Marwan Barghouti, we - my colleagues and I - stoodoutside the hall, carrying posters that said: "Send Barghouti to thenegotiation table and not to prison!" But the appearance of this documentsuggests that sending him to prison was perhaps the biggest favor the Israeligovernment could have done him and the Palestinian people.