Tying Itself In Knots

Rushing into important decisions affecting nationalsecurity without a careful examination of their implications and subsequentlytying itself in knots while seeking to provide ex post facto justification forthe decisions, when they prove controversial, have been among the definingcharacteristics of the present government in New Delhi.

One saw an example of it in respect of the Indo-US nuclear deal of July,2005. We are presently seeing another example of it in respect of the setting-upof a joint count-terrorism mechanism with Pakistan "to considercounter-terrorism measures, including through regular and timely sharing ofinformation". Shri Shivshankar Menon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, and Mr.Riaz Mohammad Khan, his Pakistani counterpart, who met at New Delhi on November14 and 15, 2006, have announced the formal setting-up of this mechanism.

A careful reading of the various statements, which had emanated from the government—atthe political as well as bureaucratic levels— on this subject since the summitmeeting of our Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, with Gen. Pervez Musharraf atHavana in September, 2006, and the press briefing given by Shri Menon onNovember 15, 2006, after his talks with his Pakistani counterpart give cause forgreat concern on three counts.

The first concern relates to terrorism in Jammu andKashmir. Ever since 1989, different governments in Pakistan have been making adistinction between J&K and the rest of India. While they were prepared toconcede that there were acts of terrorism in the Indian territory outsideJ&K, they were not prepared to concede that there was terrorism in J&K.They have been projecting what was happening in J&K as a freedom struggle. Gen. Musharraf has been the most vocal on this point and it was his refusal torecognise what was happening in J&K as terrorism, which led to thebreak-down of his Agra summit with Shri. A.B. Vajpayee, the then Indian PrimeMinister, in 2001.

Till 1995, even the international community tended to agree with Pakistan onthis issue and was not prepared to categorise the acts of violence in J&K asamounting to terrorism. It was only after the kidnapping of some Westerntourists in Kashmir by the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) (subsequently re-named theHarkat-ul-Mujahideen) under the name of Al Faran in 1995, which led to a changein the attitude of the international community. They were increasingly moreresponsive to Indian arguments that what was happening in J&K was largelyjihadi terrorism by the Pakistani jihadi organisations.

This led to some beneficial results for India—designation of the HUA by theUS as a foreign terrorist organisation in October, 1997, similar designation ofthe Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) by the US in December,2001, the action taken through the UN Security Council under Resolution No.1373to freeze their bank accounts, pressure on Pakistan to close down  theanti-India  terrorist infrastructure in its territory etc.

At a time when, as a result of the public diplomacy systematically mounted byus, the international community has started agreeing with us that what ishappening in J&K is also terrorism by Pakistani organisations, we havefailed to specify in the statement that the joint mechanism would cover all actsof terrorism wherever they take place. Pakistan would now contend that themechanism is meant to deal with only terrorism and not what it projects as thefreedom-struggle in J&K.

The second concern arises from the fact that neitherthe political leadership nor the Foreign Secretary has explained to the Indianpublic the need for this mechanism when there are already two mechanisms inplace, which are not working satisfactorily due to Pakistan's non-co-operation.The first mechanism is under the umbrella of the International PoliceOrganisation (INTERPOL). India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) andPakistan's Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) are the designated nodal points.They interact with each other through the INTERPOL in cases requiring mutuallegal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of cases. Such requestsfor mutual legal assistance could be in respect of arrests and handing-over ofsuspects, searches of buildings, local enquiries etc. All our past requests toPakistan relating to Dawood Ibrahim, the hijackers etc figuring in the list of20 terrorists, wanted for trial in India, but living in Pakistan, were throughthis mechanism.

The INTERPOL co-ordinated mechanism can only deal with specific, registeredoffences. Issues such as action against terrorist organisations andinfrastructure in Pakistani territory do not come within the charter of theINTERPOL and hence could not be taken up through this mechanism. This matter wasgot examined by Rajiv Gandhi after he became the Prime Minister in 1984 and itwas decided to set up a second counter-terrorism mechanism to be headed by theHome/Interior  Secretaries of the two countries to handle  India'scomplaints relating to terrorist organisations and infrastructure in Pakistaniterritory. Rajiv and Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the then Pakistani Prime Minister,decided to keep this mechanism as flexible as possible.

They decided to designate the Home/Interior Secretaries as the heads of thetwo teams and to leave it to them to decide the composition of their respectiveteam. In addition to the Home Secretary, the Indian team used to have officersfrom the Intelligence Bureau,  the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW),the Directorate-General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), when needed, the BorderSecurity Force and the CBI.

This mechanism was not bound by the constraints of interactions through theINTERPOL. We were, therefore, able to take up the question of action inspecific, registered cases as well as of action against the terroristorganisations and infrastructure based in Pakistani territory.

Though Pakistan did not co-operate under either of these mechanisms, theyhave continued functioning—-regularly in respect of the INTERPOL andsporadically in respect of the one headed by the Home/Interior Secretaries.

What was the need for this third mechanism? Will it improve matters or willit enable Pakistan to escape accountability for sponsoring terrorism againstIndia? What will happen to the mechanisms set up earlier? We have not hadanswers to these questions either from the political leadership or the ForeignSecretary.

Action in specific cases through the INTERPOL mechanism has  certainlegal implications for Pakistan. Every time we make a request to Pakistanthrough the INTERPOL mechanism for action against terrorists and it does not actagainst them, it commits a violation of the INTERPOL charter and ofinternational conventions such as the International Civil Aviation Convention inrespect of inaction against hijackers. Instances of Pakistani inaction ornon-co-operation are documented in the INTERPOL. We can use them in our publicdiplomacy against Pakistan. But, there will be no legal implications to Pakistanfor its inaction under the new mechanism.

The third concern, which is even more serious than theother two, relates to our suspension of our public diplomacy against Pakistan onthe issue of its sponsorship of terrorism against India. When a State sponsorsterrorism against another State for achieving a strategic objective, it does soin a deniable manner. In the history of terrorism, there has been only instancewhere a State had officially admitted its sponsorship of terrorism againstanother State and paid a penalty for it.  That was Libya in respect of theinvolvement of two of its intelligence officers in the blowing-up of a Pan Amaircraft off Lockerbie in Ireland in 1988 and in the blowing up of a Frenchaircraft over Africa. In the face of relentless pressure from the US and France,the Libyan government admitted its involvement, arrested and handed over itsintelligence officers for trial by an international tribunal and paid hugecompensation amounts to the relatives of the passengers killed.

No other State Sponsor of terrorism has ever admitted its use of terrorismfor achieving a strategic objective against another State—however strong theevidence. It would be naive to expect that Pakistan would do a mea culpa. Theevidence, which we collect regarding the involvement of the State of Pakistan,is not for sharing it with the government of Pakistan, which would reject it,but for using it with the international community in order to make it exercisepressure on Pakistan to stop using terrorism.

Whatever seeming concessions Pakistan has made so far—suchas banning the LET and other organisations, placing some of the terroristleaders under house arrest, sacking Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, formerDirector-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 1993 etc— werenot as a result of our bilaterally taking up the issue with Pakistan, but due tothe pressure exercised on it by the US and other Western countries on the basisof the evidence collected by us and shared with them.

Public diplomacy has another important role— educating our own publicopinion and creating in them an awareness of Pakistan's role and modus operandi—so that they remain alert and co-operate with the counter-terrorism agencies incountering the activities of the ISI in our territory. It also serves thepurpose of reassuring the public that the government is alive to itsresponsibilities relating to countering the role of the ISI.

The Tony Blair government maintains good relations with Pakistan. This,however, did not prevent the chief of the MI-5, its internal security service,from stating in public recently that many of the terrorist plots against the UKpresently under investigation by the MI-5 originated from Pakistan. When theFrench recently removed a number of Muslim employees from sensitive posts in theCharles de Gaulla airport in Paris, they did not hesitate to mention in publicthat this was because they were visiting Pakistan frequently. When the Canadiansunearthed a pro-Al Qaeda terrorist group in their territory recently, they didnot hesitate to highlight in public the links of this group with terroristorganisations in Pakistan.

These are not instances of needless finger-pointing. These are necessarymeasures to alert their public and the international community about thelinkages of the terrorists with Pakistan.  Public diplomacy has to be inpublic.  It cannot be done secretly through back channels or throughmechanisms such as the one being set up.

One has valid reasons to feel increasingly disturbed by the kind ofstatements and remarks on counter-terrorism coming from our Foreign Secretary. TheHindu of November 16, 2006, has quoted the Foreign Secretary as telling themedia as follows: "With the formation of the anti-terror mechanism, hehoped the two countries would refrain from trading allegations in public. Thatis not a good way of getting things done."

I can understand—but not approve— such remarks coming from an official ofanother country sermonising to India and Pakistan, but not from the ForeignSecretary of India.

Diplomatic support is an important component of counter-terrorism, whenterrorism emanates from another country and is sponsored by another country.Indian counter-terrorism agencies have reasons to be grateful to the ForeignSecretaries of the past for the kind of backing and encouragement they got fromthem. They have now reasons to feel concerned. So too the Indian public, therelatives of those killed by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and the survivingvictims.

(B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)