Truce On Track

Yet another separatist militant group in India's Northeast has joined the truce train, raising hopes of anend to another insurrection in the turbulent region. On July 23, 2004, the Indian Government and the outlawedAchik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) signed a ceasefire agreement in New Delhi, paving the way forcessation of the cat-and-mouse battles between its cadres and the security forces in the Garo Hills area ofMeghalaya State, bordering Assam and Bangladesh. The two sides are to utilize the period of truce to talkpeace and evolve an acceptable solution to the issues raised by the ANVC.

The tripartite ceasefire deal was signed by ANVC 'General Secretary' Wanding K. Marak, who had led theseven-member rebel delegation, and 'Joint Secretary' Janggam Momin. On behalf of the Meghalaya Government,State Chief Secretary P.J. Bazely and Director General of Police L. Sailo signed the agreement, while A.K.Rastogi, Secretary, Border Management in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Rajiv Agarwal, Joint Secretary(Northeast) in the MHA, represented the Central Government. The following are the highlights of the agreement:

• The ceasefire deal is for a period of six months, and renewable thereafter.
  
  
• Both the ANVC and the security forces would stop operations against each other.
  
  
• ANVC has agreed to stop violence and unlawful activities like extortion, killing, abduction andintimidation and not to carry weapons in public.
  
  
• The ANVC cadres would be housed in two designated camps along with their arms, and their movement would beregulated by the security forces. They have to move out with police guards, at least one of whom would be fromthe Meghalaya Police.
  
  
• A joint monitoring group headed by the Joint Secretary (Northeast) in the MHA has been formed to oversee theimplementation of the ceasefire deal. The Group would have representatives from the Meghalaya Government, theANVC and different federal security agencies.

After signing the deal, ANVC 'General Secretary' Marak commented to the media that his group has 'fullfaith in the country's Constitution' and that he was 'expecting a fruitful dialogue process'. This must havebeen comforting news for the authorities dealing with this armed band. Ever since its formation in December1995, the ANVC has been engaged in a hit-and-run campaign to push for its demand for an 'Achik Land'comprising the two Garo Hills districts in Meghalaya, and a large chunk of Kamrup and Goalpara district inadjoining Assam. Reports suggest that the ANVC had indulged in some 137 violent incidents since its formation.

Intelligence estimates put the number of ANVC cadres at 250. But, it is not really the numbers, but its strong linkages with other dreaded rebel groups in India's Northeast, and its trans-border reach and activities that had been worrying the authorities. Initially, it was believed that the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM) had propped up the ANVC. Later, however, the ANVC snapped links with the NSCN-IM as well as with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and got closer to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Intelligence sources suggest that both the ULFA and the ANVC needed each other. While the ULFA needed the ANVC's help to provide shelter to its cadres in the strategic Garo Hills region which give them access to Bangladesh, the ANVC needed the Assam outfit's assistance in procuring weapons, receiving training and getting funds.

Despite being a comparatively minor insurgent group with a low strike potential, much like the other rebelgroup in Meghalaya, the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), the ANVC had created torrid times forthe Government with the string of killings and abductions that it had carried out. The group had targetedtraders, school teachers, and Government officials, and had kidnapped, among others, an Assistant Director ofthe Intelligence Bureau, and a Customs officer, besides extorting money from traders and exporters in thearea. Significantly, intelligence sources had also accused the ANVC of earning substantial amounts of money bycirculating fake currency 'at the behest of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence.'

The signing of the ceasefire agreement is not an overnight development. In February 2003, then Union Ministerof State for Home I.D. Swamy had stated that peace efforts were underway with the ANVC. Later, in April 2003,reports indicated that the ANVC had held exploratory talks with Indian Government emissaries at Bangkok. TheMeghalaya Government stepped in with Chief Minister D.D. Lapang offering truce to the ANVC in September 2003.For long, however, the ANVC refused to admit that it was on its way to sign a truce with the Government. Infact, in September 2003, days after Chief Minister Lapang's ceasefire offer, the ANVC took the decision not toattend a peace meeting called by the Church under the banner of the Garo Baptist Convention.

It is not clear why the ANVC leaders, after signing the truce deal on July 23, 2004, stated that no politicalleader was involved in the negotiation process. In fact, the role of politicians was manifest, if the actionsof the Meghalaya Government are to be taken as any indication. At one stage, Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)leader and former Lok Sabha Speaker, P.A. Sangma, who represents the Tura Lok Sabha seat from Meghalaya's GaroHills in Parliament, was supposed to have been assigned the task by the predecessor Atal Behari VajpayeeGovernment in New Delhi, to talk peace with the ANVC. Chief Minister Lapang had even accused Sangma of'conniving with' the ANVC to retain his seat, a charge that Sangma had laughed off. The Meghalaya Police hadalso arrested State Minister Adolf Lu Hitler Marak on charges of links with the ANVC. Linkages betweenmainstream legislative politics and underground insurgent politics are not uncommon in Northeast India, thoughthat is a long and different.

For the present, the ceasefire deal with the ANVC is expected to help counter-insurgency agencies in theregion by denying dreaded groups like the ULFA the Garo Hills bridge, which gave them access into and fromBangladesh. It was the ANVC that had acted as a facilitator in this region, helping ULFA activists withshelter and safe passage to bases across in Bangladesh. The ULFA had begun to use the Garo Hills-Bangladeshcorridor more frequently after the Royal Government in Bhutan forced the group to close some of its camps in2002-2003, before the Royal Bhutan Army launched its military assault in December 2003. On a more simplisticnote, New Delhi has won over yet another insurgent group in the volatile frontier, and needs now to capitalizeon the truce to work out a lasting solution for a wider peace in the region.

Wasbir Hussain is Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, TheSentinel, Guwahati. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal