Tiger Terror

Many successful acts of suicide terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam (LTTE) in the past, including the assassinations of Rajiv Gandhi, formerIndian Prime Minister, in 1991 and of Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993were made possible by weak physical security and poor access control by thesecurity agencies of the state responsible for their protection.

The successful assassination by the LTTE of Major General Parami Kulatunge,Deputy Chief of the Army and Commander of the Security Forces Headquarters-Wanni(SFHQ-W), at Pannipitiya, 15 kms south-east of  Colombo, on June 26, 2006,can also be attributed to poor access control. He was reportedly proceeding tohis office in a security convoy when a lone suicide bomber on a motor-cycle,coming apparently from behind, caught up with the convoy, drove parallel to it,reached up to the car of the Major-General and dashed against it whiledetonating the improvised explosive device (IED) simultaneously.

Even the LTTE's earlier attempt to kill Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, theCommander of the Sri Lankan Army, in April, 2006, was attributable to pooraccess control. A woman suicide bomber managed to penetrate into the premises ofthe complex housing the Army headquarters and blew herself up as he was leavingthe office in his car. He was seriously injured, but survived.

While the LTTE, in keeping with its usual practice, has not claimedresponsibility  for its unsuccessful attempt of April and its successfulact of June 26, 2006, there need not be any doubt that it was responsible forboth acts of terrorism, which demonstrate its ability to collect preciseintelligence about the movements of its targeted victims and operate undetectedeven in and around Colombo.

A perusal of the detailed bio-data of the killed Major-General asdisseminated by a web site considered the mouth-piece of the LTTE indicates theprobable reasons why the LTTE targeted him.  Among the indicators availablein the website report, following figure prominently about him:

• An expert in intelligence and special operations.
• Advocated "extra-judicial measures" against the civilian population and the supporters of the Tamil Eelam cause.
• Key figure in promoting co-operation between the Army and the Tamil groups opposed to the LTTE.
• A hardliner and a close associate of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka.

The assassination of Maj Gen Kulatunge is widely perceivedas the LTTE's retaliation  for the recent assassinations of two top rankingLTTE military commanders, Lt Col Ramanan of Batticaloa and Lt Col Mahindi ofMannar, for which the LTTE has blamed the Sri Lanka Army.  Before hisposting to Batticaloa, Lt. Col. Ramanan was in the intelligence set-up of theLTTE.  He had reportedly been entrusted by Prabhakaran, the leader of theLTTE, with the responsibility for neutralising Col. Karuna, who had desertedfrom the LTTE along with some of his followers in March, 2004, in protestagainst the discriminatory policies of Prabhakaran towards the Tamils of theEastern Province.

The murderous attack on Kulatunge came shortly  after a conciliatoryinterview given by President Mahinda Rajapakse to the Editor of a Tamil daily Uthayanin which he expressed his readiness to hold direct talks with the LTTE forfinding a political solution instead of through the intermediary of Norway, thepresent facilitator, and to stop the activities of the group led by Karunaagainst the LTTE, if the LTTE would prove its good faith by refraining from allacts of violence for 15 days, which could strengthen his hand. Mr Rajapakse was also reported to have remarked that he found himself caught between his armyand the LTTE, hinting thereby that some of the recent operations of themilitary, which resulted in civilian casualties, did not have his approval. TheLTTE apparently did not believe his statement and rejected his offer.

The conciliatory offer of Mr Rajapakse came shortly after the visit to NewDelhi by Mr Mangala Samaraweera, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, for talks withthe Indian leaders. However, there is no evidence to suggest that theconciliatory offer was the outcome of the discussions of his Foreign Minister inNew Delhi.

The action of the LTTE in rejecting the conciliatory offer and assassinatingthe Major-General needs to be strongly condemned by India and other members ofthe international community. A careful examination of the recent actions andstatements of the LTTE indicates certain tactical and strategic objectives ofthe LTTE. Among the tactical objectives are the neutralisation of the Karunagroup, which is coming in the way of the LTTE re-establishing its politicalprimacy in the Eastern Province;   the continuation of  Norway asthe facilitator of the peace process; and the re-organisation of the Sri LankaMonitoring Mission in order to exclude the three EU members in the mission. TheLTTE regards the role of the EU members as having become untenable because oftheir going along with the recent decision of the EU to include the LTTE in theEU's list of terrorist organisations.

The evident strategic objectives of the LTTE are to seek an ultimate solutionto the Tamil problem, which would concede something more than a conventionalfederal solution by letting the LTTE retain its armed forces and intelligenceset-up in any political solution without merging them with those of the federal government; and, in the interregnum, before a  political solution is reached, to seekthe legitimisation of what it asserts as its control over the territorial watersoff the Northern and Eastern Provinces and to have the Sri Lanka Navy excludedfrom there.

The LTTE looks upon itself not just as a conventional non-State actor, but asa non-state actor which already has established many attributes of a state suchas an army, a police, a judiciary and a tax-collection machinery  toenforce its control over the land occupied by it, a navy to enforce its controlover its territorial waters and an air force to enforce its control over its airspace. Whether the LTTE has really an Air Force or not is still a matter ofspeculation, but its army and navy are ground realities.

Till the time of writing of this article (8 AM on June 27), Mr Rajpakse hadnot ordered any retaliatory attacks against the LTTE similar to the air strikeson LTTE-controlled territory, which he had ordered after the April attempt tokill the Army Commander. Retaliatory attacks by the government would bejustified under the doctrine of active defence, but could be counter-productiveunless the government is able to strengthen its physical security in such amanner as to be able to deny spectacular successes to the LTTE if it retaliatesagain.

For the present, the LTTE seems  content to continue with its presentpolicy of retaining the cease-fire and the role of Norway as facilitator onpaper, while maintaining its acts of terrorism against selected targets and theoperations of its navy. There are no indictors as yet of the likelihood oflarge-scale ground operations by the LTTE's army despite the recent (June 4)intimidatory statements of Col. Soosai, the chief of the LTTE's Navy, in whichhe had spoken of the possibility of a co-ordinated offensive in many areassimultaneously and of the capability of its Navy to strike at the Sri Lanka Navyeven in the waters off southern Sri Lanka. He was reported to have said: "Itwill be a blitzkrieg, a sudden and swift simultaneous attack to redeem ourentire Tamil homeland in the North and East. We would not adopt the earliermethod of fighting to redeem it inch by inch."

The present ground reality of no victories on the ground and no progresstowards the table works to the detriment of the government. Even whilecontinuing with its attempts to persuade the LTTE to return to the table, the governmenthas to, through appropriate proactive measures, prevent the ground from givingway under its feet. The LTTE is hoping for a battle fatigue among the StateArmed Forces even before a fresh battle is fought. The government should notallow this to happen.

During his visit to New Delhi, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister was reportedto have stated that the recent air strikes of the government were directed atdestroying the air capability of the LTTE such as the airstrip reportedlyconstructed by it. Its planes and helicopter gunships were also recentlyreported to have acted against the LTTE's navy off the Mannar coast. These aregood, well-calibrated actions. Actions like these could be continued despite thewarnings of the LTTE to hit back if there are fresh air strikes.

The most important thing is for the government to keep a tight control overits armed forces to prevent disproportionate use of force and targeting ofcivilians.

It is in the common interest of India and Sri Lanka to weaken and ultimatelydestroy the maritime and air capabilities of the LTTE.  The maritimecapability includes its navy and its commercial shipping fleet. There is a needfor an Indo-Sri Lankan Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism, which shouldfocus on destroying through appropriate methods the maritime and aircapabilities of the LTTE. Dealing with the LTTE's ground capability is the taskof the Sri Lanka Army. India should not get involved in it.