Throwing Dust In His Own Eyes

Gen.Sunderji, India's former Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was once reported to have told an interlocutor of his, whom he (Gen.Sunderji) suspected of lying as follows: "Tell this to yourself as you are looking at the mirror in the morning while shaving. See whether you believe it yourself. You can throw dust in the eyes of others, but not in your own eyes."

This is what the international community should tell Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who has given a highly fanciful account of himself and his role in the Kargil conflict of 1999 and in various other developments relating to Pakistan in his just released book, In the Line of Fire, in order to project himself to his people and the international community as the greatest General and statesman produced by Pakistan since it was born in 1947.

Since nobody else who knows his true self would project him in this manner, Musharraf has chosen to do so himself as his popularity in Pakistan continues to dwindle steadily. His own former and present colleagues in the Armed Forces would be the first to know the truth and they would be laughing as they read his book, which could have been more appropriately titled "Musharraf on Musharraf— All the Great Things I Did".

Musharraf's colleagues and batch-mates (1964 batch) used to call him Tricky Mush because of his penchant for lie and deception, which, over the years, have become his oft-used strategic weapon and brand identification. He used it during his visit to China at the height of the Kargil conflict when he rang up Mr Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, from his hotel in Beijing and told him: "Sir, the Chinese are complimenting the Pakistan Army for giving a bloody nose to the Indians. They support our military action."

Mr Sharif, who went to Beijing later, was shocked to find that the General had told him a lie. Instead of supporting the Pakistani military action as claimed by Musharraf, the Chinese leaders took up a position similar to that of the US and advised him to respect the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), implying thereby that the Pakistani troops should withdraw from the Indian territory occupied by it by stealth during the winter of 1998-99 by taking advantage of the Indian withdrawal during the winter as per the normal practice since the 1980s. Till Musharraf was appointed the COAS by Mr Sharif in October, 1998, by superseding three other more capable and more intellectually honest Generals, no Pakistani COAS had even thought of committing a breach of faith by taking advantage of India's good-intentioned troop withdrawal during winter to occupy its territory.

Mr Sharif was so shocked that his own COAS had intentionally misled him that he cut short his stay in Beijing, came back to Pakistan, flew to Washington to seek from the then US President Mr Bill Clinton a face-saving formula under the cover of which he could order his troops to stop their military action and withdraw from the Indian territory from which they had not yet been thrown out by the Indian army. Mr Clinton was disinclined to provide a face-saver and insisted on an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. Mr Sharif had to agree, thus sowing the seeds of Musharraf's anger against him, which ultimately led to his overthrow and arrest by Musharraf in October, 1999.

Musharraf again told a lie to the members of his judiciary after taking over power when he asked them to take a fresh oath of loyalty to his regime instead of to the Pakistani Constitution as they had done in the past. He kept the members of the judiciary incommunicado with each other and with the Chief Justice by cutting off their telephone lines to prevent them from consulting each other before deciding whether they should take the new oath. He told each Judge separately that the Chief Justice and others had already taken the oath. Many of the judges took the oath. They later found to their horror that Musharraf had told them a lie in a strategem to make them take the oath.

Another instance of the use of this weapon by Musharraf was noticed during the trial before a special court of Mr Nawaz Sharif on a charge of trying to have an aircraft of the Pakistan International Airlines (PIC) hijacked. Musharraf was returning by that aircraft to Karachi from Colombo, where he had gone on an official visit. The court, on the orders of the General, repeatedly rejected Mr Sharif's request for citing some details of the Kargil conflict in order to explain the origin of his differences with Musharraf.

Suspecting that Mr Sharif, thwarted by the court in his attempts to cite how Musharraf misled him during the conflict, was planning to pass on the details to the media through Mr Iqbal Radh, a very well-known lawyer of Pakistan, who was representing Mr Sharif, Musharraf tried to browbeat the lawyer into silence. On March 10, 2000, this lawyer was assassinated, along with two members of his staff, in his office in Karachi by unidentified killers. The assassins subsequently ransacked the office of the lawyer and allegedly removed papers relating to the defence of Mr Sharif before fleeing the scene.

Musharraf's use of the weapon of lie and deception was again in evidence during the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist in January-February, 2002, in the case relating to A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, who transferred nuclear technology and equipment to Iran, North Korea and Libya, in the resurgence of the Neo Taliban in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistani territory and in his recent agreement with the tribal chiefs of North Waziristan facilitated by the Neo Taliban under which he has suspended all military operations against the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistani territory in North Waziristan.

There are two categories of liars—intelligent and unintelligent. Intelligent liars take care while lying to prevent their being caught lying. Unintelligent liars are liars by instinct and birth, who lie without worrying that they might be caught. Musharraf is an unintelligent liar and he has never been ashamed of being caught out. Of all the lies that Musharraf has uttered since he became the COAS in October, 1998, the most blatant relates to the Kargil conflict.

Musharraf's fictitious account of the Kargil conflict has hardly been supported in the past even by Pakistani analysts except Ms Shireen Mazari, who is believed to have ghost written at least part of his book. She is a shameless admirer of the General. For her, the truth — in any matter— is what the General says. The two are greatly attracted to each other because they admire each other's capability for lie and deception.

I have not read Musharraf's Book of Lies, but have read the account of the Kargil conflict as given by Musharraf in an article of Mr Praveen Swami, the well-known journalist of The Hindu, published by his paper on September 25, 2006. Musharraf's account of the Kargil conflict as paraphrased by Mr Praveen Swami is as follows:

"During the autumn of 1998, he (Musharraf) writes, India began to complain of Pakistani intrusions in the Siachen sector. On investigation, he discovered these attacks were make-belief. As a result, Pakistan's military became increasingly convinced that India was inventing pretexts to go to war. By the end of the year, according to the General, evidence existed that India was on the verge of an attack across the Line of Control.... Pakistan responded by enhancing its defensive positions along the LOC.

Some 100 new Section-strength posts, Gen.Musharraf records, were set up on unoccupied heights that winter in what he extols "as a tactical marvel of military professionalism." However, he claims, none crossed the watersheds along the LOC. By March 1999, as his troops began to reach these positions, the General slowly began to learn of the parallel military task "Pakistani freedom-fighters" had undertaken—the occupation of some 800 sq.kms. of J&K. He claims that it was only on May 7, after fighting broke out, that "he was given a comprehensive briefing of their positions." What followed was, in his view, "a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army. As few as five units in support of freedom-fighter groups were able to compel the Indians to deploy more than four divisions." Despite India's numerical superiority and air support, its armed forces were only able to secure gains, "which I would call insignificant." Despite this overwhelming military success, Gen.Musharraf argues, Prime Minister Sharif crumbled under international pressure and offered a cease-fire."

I am not going to counter Musharraf's fanciful version with the version of Indian military officers and strategic analysts. Instead, I am going to counter this with a version from a respected Pakistani military analyst. In April 2002, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) of the UK published in its journal a detailed analysis of the conflict by Brig. (retd), Shaukat Qadir, the founder and former Vice-President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, who now works as an independent analyst. Brig Qadir wrote:

"Let me state at the outset that while I have considerable knowledge of the course of events (pieced together from private discussions with friends and colleagues in positions of authority, who played a role), I have neither the official Pakistani version nor, quite obviously,any input from the Indian side. There is,therefore, some conjecture in what follows. Only the actual actors will be able to judge the accuracy of this conjecture. That said, this analysis is based on my (not inconsiderable) personal knowledge of: the terrain around Kargil; the character of the principal actors in the Pakistan army; the decision making process in the Pakistan army (in which I served in numerous command and staff assignments); and the collective character of the Pakistan army (on which basis I also judge the Indian army, being essentially no different)."

On the basis of his personal knowledge and enquiries with the Pakistani dramatis personae, Brig. Qadir reconstructed the Kargil conflict as follows:

"Sometime around mid-November 1998, Lt Gen Mahmud, then commanding 10 Corps, sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen (Mohammad) Aziz.When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (GOC),Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan.They sought permission to execute a plan, which had previously been shelved, to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter.The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement.The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations. Knowledge of this plan was to be confined to the four people present, for the time being.

"It is useful to interrupt the sequence of events here, in order to draw a brief pen-picture of each of these four characters, as I know them. Doing so will provide a better understanding of the Pakistani adventure in Kargil, in which these characters played a prime role.

Obviously, these will be incomplete,focusing essentially on the traits relevant to the events at Kargil. Equally obvious is the fact that the assessment of their characters is mine and, only as accurate as my knowledge of them, and my ability to assess another human being.

"Gen Pervez Musharaf: A sharp and intelligent artillery officer, he commanded infantry formations from brigade upwards, and held a large variety of staff and instructional appointments.A bold commander, who takes pride in being decisive, quick to take decisions and, therefore, a good commander of troops and keen to assume responsibility.

"Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed: Again an artillery officer, with a wide variety of experience. He is sharp, intelligent and arrogant. So arrogant, in fact, that towards the end of his career it became overwhelming.A strong, forceful, decisive and highly ambitious individual, he was secular until he 'discovered' the force of Islam late in life.As a consequence,perhaps, he became dangerous in the way that anyone will become if they believe they are 'incapable of doing wrong'.

"Lt Gen Muhammed Aziz: More than anyone else, he has been painted the villain, and the 'fundo' (someone prepared to misinterpret religion in its puritanical form so as to justify acts of violence), which he is not. Deeply religious, but very balanced, he was born Kashmiri, and has served in some of the most rugged reaches of it at various stages of his career. He is strongly patriotic and deeply committed to the cause of Kashmir, but not to the extent that it might jeopardize Pakistan. He is intelligent, sharp, very balanced,progressive and dynamic.

"Major General Javed Hassan: A highly intelligent and well-read officer, he is more of an academic than a commander, and bears that reputation.He, therefore, was the only one with a point to prove.

"While preparations for executing the plan began in November/December1998, the subject was casually broached with Prime Minister Sharif at some point in December. He was presented with the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these (temporarily unoccupied) territories. Sharif, being the type of person he is, accepted the statement at face value.The military leadership had not presented a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, nor had they set out its political aim and how it would be achieved.At this stage the rest of the army was unaware of plans for the operation (as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff [CAS] and the Chief of Naval Staff [CNS] too), and preparations proceeded in secret.

"The operation was, in my view,not intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, until finally they were overlooking the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 130 square kilometres over a front of over 100 kilometers, and a depth ranging between seven to fifteen kilometres.They were occupying 132 posts of various sizes.Whereas the total number of troops occupying these posts never exceeded 1000 (from all ranks), four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the operation.While the occupants were essentially soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), there were some local Mujahideen assisting as labour to carry logistical requirements.

"It was at this stage, in March 1999,that the leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military Operations (MO) Directorate in GHQ was tasked to evolve a strategic operational plan, which would have a military aim to fulfill a political objective. Given the fact that they were developing a plan to justify an operation already underway, the response was no less than brilliant.

Given the total ratio of forces of India and Pakistan, which was about 2.25:1,2 the MO concluded that the initial Indian reaction would be to rush in more troops to IHK (Indian-held Kashmir), further eroding their offensive capabilities against Pakistan.As a consequence, they concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so it would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan.It is for this reason that I maintain the view, which is held by no other analyst (to my knowledge) of this episode, that war, let alone nuclear war,was never a possibility.Pakistani Generals sought permission to execute a plan to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector,vacated by the Indians every winter.The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement.

"The political aim underpinning the operation was 'to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir'. However, the military aim that preceded the political aim was 'to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness'.

"The operational plan envisaged India amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil,resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas.By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas,threatening the Indian lines ofcommunication at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them.This would create an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table.While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded,theoretically the plan was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant.

"The only flaw was that it had not catered for the 'environment'. Quite clearly, it was an aberration to the environment, and the international reaction soon left little doubt of that.Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the Prime Minister in April, in the presence of the other services. Since the CNS was on a visit abroad, the navy's reaction was voiced cautiously, but the CAS was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all-out war. He also voiced the view that in the event of war, the air force would not be able to provide the support that the army might seek.

"By the third week of May, the Indian leadership began to have some idea of the extent of the penetration.They tempered their initial boastful claims of ousting the intruders in a matter of days, to weeks, then to months, and finally they expressed a hope that they might be able to evict them before the onset of winter, but were not sure of achieving even that. Meantime, in Pakistan, the decision had been taken to deny that the intrusion had been perpetrated by military troops, and instead put the blame on the Mujahideen.

"In the period up to the third week of May, the Indian army made numerous unsuccessful forays into the region and suffered heavy losses.At about this time, the Indians decided to escalate the war vertically, by using airpower.They also decided to bring in their 400 odd 'Bofors guns'.In fact, only about 170 were introduced, but these were destined to play a decisive role.