They Call It Peace

The near decade-long ceasefire with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the six year old ceasefire with the rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) continue to hold in Nagaland, in an environment of endemic fratricidal clashes, pervasive extortion and rapid consolidation of the insurgent sway over every segment of society andgovernment. New Delhi's response, surprisingly, remains stubbornly conventional, failing to question the rationale behind the countless rounds of peace talks, a move that undermined political processes in thestate, and ceding to the insurgent group a position of dominance in the state, even as fratricidal violence, extortion and intimidation remain entrenched in the day to day lives of the people. 

For a state under a 'ceasefire' with both the principal insurgent groups, Nagaland still registers higher levels of insurgent violence than many of thestates with an 'active' insurgency, and the situation appears to be progressively worsening over the years. According to theunion ministry of home affairs (MHA), insurgency-related fatalities have increased from 97 in 2004 to 99 in 2005, to a further 147 in 2006. Incidents of insurgent violence have registered an increase from 186 to 192 between 2004 and 2005, and sharply to 309 in 2006. Institute for Conflict Management's open source documentation of insurgency-related fatalities totalled 56 in 2007, till April20

Virtually the entire volume of fatalities are concerned with the network of intimidation and the turf wars between IM and Khaplang factions, with the Security Forces (SFs) obvious and mute spectators, accounting for very few of the violent engagements or fatalities. In 2007, for instance, of the total of 56 fatalities, 43 (77 per cent) have been insurgent cadres, and the remaining 13, civilians. Insurgents accounted for 57 per cent of the total fatalities in 2004, 71 per cent in 2005 and 79 percent in 2006. Only three SF personnel have been killed in Nagaland since 2004. 

Of the 56 fatalities thus far in 2007, 43 have occurred in a total of 24 factional clashes. The toll includes 22 NSCN-IM cadres, 18 NSCN-K cadres and three militants from the Naga National Council (NNC). Clashes have occurred in seven of Nagaland's 11 Districts: Mon, Mokokchung, Zunheboto, Phek, Peren, Kohima andDimapur. 

The war of attrition continues with scant regard for the ceasefire ground rules, which stipulate that the insurgents stay in designated camps, bans their movements in uniform and with arms and prohibits extortion. TheNSCN-IM's writ runs supreme in most parts of thestate, though the NSCN-K remains dominant in the Districts of Mokokchung and Dimapur. WhileNSCN-IM's well-oiled 'finance department' engages in wide-spread 'tax-collection' activities, its'home department' virtually runs the administration in thestate. Its 'crime suppression department' ensures control of its areas of dominance, administering a selective'justice' over various 'offenders'. Cadres move unhindered in the townships and country-side, enforcing the insurgent group's diktats. Intelligence reports indicate that the cadre strength of the NSCN-IM has increased from 800 to about 2,500 since the July 1997 ceasefire announcement. 

Internecine clashes have remained the principal instrument of seeking or defending dominance for the two groups in various parts of thestate. For the NSCN-K, which is yet to start a dialogue process with the governmentof India (GoI) since its April 2001 ceasefire agreement, violent engagements with its rival also help send periodic reminders to New Delhi that any'deal' with the IM faction would have no permanent positive impact on the Naga conflict. Fratricidal engagements also serve as opportunities to inflict costs on each other, upsetting the cadre strength and wearing down stores of weapons and ammunition. The lack of progress inNSCN-IM's protracted dialogue with the GoI, currently in its 10th year, has only provided added incentive to both factions to continue with their'war games'. 

Unconstrained insurgent activities have resulted in the occasional civilian backlash. On April 22, 2007, subsequent to the abduction and torture of three Sumi tribesmen by NSCN-IM cadres, a large mob of about 5,000 people attacked the Wungram Colony, home to several of theNSCN-IM's leaders in Dimapur, destroying 47 houses and several vehicles. The houses ofNSCN-IM's 'steering committee member', Rh. Raising, tatars ('parliamentarians') Samson Jajo, Nithungla and Kamlang, and three leaders of the group's armed wing-- Hangshi, Ramkating and Markson -- were gutted in the incident. Over 300 civilians belonging to the Tangkhul tribe, from whichNSCN-IM's top leadership, including its 'general secretary' Thuingaleng Muivah, is sourced, were displaced from thecolony and have since taken shelter at the nearby police station at Chumukedima and the group's camp in Hebron, near Dimapur town.

Such occasional, desperate and rarely fruitful mass interventions notwithstanding, insurgent factions in thestate continue to hold sway across wide areas of the state, and engage in continuous efforts to extend their areas of dominance. The Chief Minister, Neiphiu Rio, is on record claiming that such clashes are a part of the'political problem' 'between India and Nagaland', thus indicating that these would continue as long as the'conflict over Nagalim (greater Nagaland)' is not resolved. The Chief Minister's refrain closely echoes theNSCN-IM's position that the factional violence is due to the GoI's failure to restrict the movement of NSCN-K cadres. The GoI, on the other hand, insists that the clashes between the insurgent outfits are a law and order problem. About 10 months ago, on June 20, 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told a seven-member Congress Party team from Nagaland at New Delhi, that the conflict between the insurgent Naga factions was a 'law and order problem' which thestate's home department has to solve on its own, instead of blaming Delhi. 

The Nagaland Police, however, has not been involved in any significant cases challenging the dominance of the insurgents, while the Central Para-military Forces (CPMFs) have failed to take effective steps against the flagrant and rampant violations of the ceasefire ground rules. 

Myanmar, with which India shares a 1,640 kilometre-long unfenced border, remains vital to the capabilities of the Naga outfits, especially the NSCN-K. The group's'general headquarters' is located in the Sagaing Division of Myanmar, bordering three Indianstates: Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. On April 27, 2007, official sources in New Delhi said that Myanmar has promised to step up military action against all Indian insurgent groups operating from its territory. However, assurances made by the 18-member Army delegation led by Brigadier General Tin Maung Ohn can, at best, be termed as routine and insignificant, and are not expected to have any decisive impact on the potential of the insurgent groups. Sporadic military offensives in the Sagaing division by the Myanmarese Army have taken place since the mid-1980s, but have only temporarily displaced the various insurgent groups from Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. Once the Myanmarese Army personnel have vacated the areas, the groups have simply gone back to reclaim their facilities. Moreover, a fairly cosy relationship exists between lower-rung Myanmarese military personnel and the insurgents, and the latter are often warned in advance of imminent raids, allowing them to minimise damage. 

Little change is anticipated in the situation in Nagaland in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, with elections to thestate Legislative Assembly due in 2008, insurgent violence can be expected to grow and expand into newer areas. With both thestate and the union government frozen in their commitment to a policy of inaction, the civilian population in thestate will continue to bear the brunt of insurgent lawlessness. 

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.