The Writing On The Barrel Of The Gun

In Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), bullets don't just bear death: they are alsoa medium of political communication.

In November 2002, just after Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed took office,two grenades went off outside his home on the outskirts of Srinagar. Thegrenades were not intended to kill, but to forcefully remind the new ChiefMinister of the need to honour his party's promises of dialogue with Islamistgroups and a scaling back of offensive counter-terrorism operations.

Sayeed refused, at the time, to leave his home for more secure quarters. In agrand gesture, he even brought down security barriers on Gupkar Road, home tothe residence of his predecessor Farooq Abdullah as well as top functionaries ofthe Border Security Force, Intelligence Bureau and the Research and AnalysisWing. The opening of Gupkar Road, along with Sayeed's media-hyped visits todowntown Srinagar, was a visible symbol of the new 'healing touch' agenda.

Over the next months, however, the real-world limitations of the 'healing touch'became evident. Although there were some prisoner releases, their scale wasnowhere near adequate to satisfy the Islamist Right, which had backed hisPeople's Democratic Party (PDP). Unabated violence and pressure from the PDP'scoalition partners also ensured that no generalised cutback in counter-terroristoperations could be realised.

Sayeed began spending increasing amounts of time outside Srinagar and, when hewas present there, often chose to spend the night at the Dachigam wildlifesanctuary. This wasn't, of course, the consequence of a new interest in nature,but of blunt warnings from intelligence and police officials of the likelihoodof an assassination attempt. The J&K Government also began constructing anew fortified residence for the Chief Minister on Mohammad Ali Road, which heoccupied last month after vacating his family residence.

It is important, then, to consider the political meaning of the murderousOctober 17, 2003, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) attack on the new officialresidence especially prepared to shield Sayeed from such dangers. As J&KGovernment spokesperson Kul Bhushan Jandial has pointed out, the Chief Ministerwas not at home when the attack took place. In this sense, he was obviously notits target. Yet, it is profoundly unlikely that the terrorists who executed theattack would not have taken care to monitor the Chief Minister's movements -something they could have done simply by walking up and down the pavement on thebusy public road that runs along his house.

It is at least possible that the attack was not intended to kill but, just as inNovember 2002, to send a signal. Top PDP functionaries have held meetings withsenior figures of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in recent months. One suchmeeting, held in late August near Pahalgam, involved the HM's central Kashmir'commander', Abdul Rashid Pir. The meetings followed complaints by the HM, whichnot-so-tacitly backed the PDP's election campaign last year, that the rulingparty had failed to deliver on its end of their deal. While the unpopularSpecial Operations Group (SOG) had been disbanded by the PDP, operations by theArmy, paramilitaries and police continued apace. 205 terrorists were killed lastmonth, a record level of success.

Soon after the Pahalgam meeting, Pir left for Pakistan, and the HM ended anundeclared truce that had commenced after the elections. On September 6, 2003,the Hizb targeted an Army convoy passing by the Parimpora Fruit Market onSrinagar's outskirts, following this attack up with a succession of similaroffensive operations. Although the PDP had been calling for the inclusion of theHizb in a political dialogue on the future of J&K, the terroristorganisation was making clear that it wanted more than mere polemical support.

Sayeed has, in the past, responded to Islamist concerns by using the limitedleverage available to him. Earlier this month, for example, he called on theUnion Government to replace its official interlocutor on J&K, N.N. Vohra,with someone more acceptable to the secessionists. His daughter, the PDP's starcampaigner Mehbooba Mufti, has not once congratulated the security forces forsuccesses against terrorism, and remained silent even after the elimination ofthe terrorist who organised the assault on Parliament House, Shahbaz Khan aliasGhazi Baba. PDP legislators and functionaries, any security official in J&Kwill testify, routinely call up demanding the quick release of arrestedsuspects.

None of this, terrorist groups are starting to realise, actually adds up tomuch. Caught in a coalition whose constituents cannot or will not be seen asbeing soft on terror, Sayeed's room for manoeuvre is extremely limited. Thenear-tragic attack on the Chief Minister's residence, it seems probable, wasintended to provide additional incentive for Sayeed to deliver on his party'spromises, whatever the consequences. Like other Chief Ministers in similarsituations of crisis, Sayeed has two choices: he buckles in, or fights back. Thedecision he makes will shape the course of events in J&K in coming years.

Just as important, the assassination attempt should provoke introspection amongpolicy makers in both New Delhi and Washington.

The United States has been content to cajole Pakistan's militaryestablishment to keep violence in J&K at levels that will not provoke afull-blown crisis. Although violence is, indeed, at levels marginally lower thanin 2001, the assassination attempt shows that terrorism simply cannot becalibrated to avoid potentially crisis-inducing events.

The Government of India, in turn, needs to work out just how it might respondto major acts of terrorism - or might find itself floundering as it did inDecember 2001, after the attack on Parliament House in New Delhi.

Praveen Swami is Special Correspondent, FrontlineCourtesy: the SouthAsia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal