The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the terrorist-cum-insurgentorganisation of Sri Lanka, is sulking. It is a wounded tiger, which has receivedone injury after another since March, 2004:
a. The March, 2004, revolt: by a section of its cadres and supportersin the Eastern Province led by Karuna, its expert on conventional warfare, inprotest against what they projected as the domination of the organisation by theTamils from the Northern Province headed by Prabhakaran, its leader;
b. The Tsunami of December, 2004, which caused considerable equipmentdamage, which could not be quantified so far;
c. The ban by Canada: imposed by the newly-elected conservative governmentin Canada on April 10, 2006, which would come in the way of covert fundcollection by pro-LTTE Tamils and its front organisations in Canada forclandestine remittance to the LTTE;
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d. Fears in Australia: by the Sri Lankan Tamil community of thepossibility of similar action against fund collection in Australia by itsauthorities, which has led to a suspension of the fund collection by some ofthem in order to get an expert opinion that their fund collection--ostensiblyfor tsunami relief and rehabilitation--does not contravene any law; and
e. Fears of losing support from Norway: Indications that havingalready lost the empathy of many member-countries of the European Union (EU), itmay also lose the empathy of Norway, the facilitator of the peace process, whichis showing increasing signs of facilitation-fatigue due to the inability of theSri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), co-ordinated by it, to persuade the SriLankan Government and the LTTE to stop the spate of reprisal andcounter-reprisal killings. An orgy of reprisal killings by the government andthe LTTE has become the defining characteristic of the ground situation in theNorthern and Eastern Provinces ever since Mr Mahinda Rajapakse took overas the President of Sri Lanka last November, went back on the commitments madeby his predecessors to work for a federal solution and unleashed a campaign ofcovert attacks on the sympathisers and supporters of the LTTE throughparamilitary surrogates such as the renegades headed by Karuna.
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In his anger and jealousy directed against Prabhakaran, Karuna has not foughtshy of letting himself be seen as the objective ally of the Rajapakse Governmentin its efforts to crush the LTTE and wriggle out of the past commitments to meetthe political aspirations of the Tamils.
The injuries suffered by the LTTE are, however, not life threatening. Thepost-9/11 action against fund collection and remittances by organisationssympathetic to Al Qaeda under the UN Security Council Resolution No.1373 did notweaken Al Qaeda and its International Islamic Front (IIF) and come in the way oftheir world-wide operations. It could not prevent the dozens of jihadi terroriststrikes, which have taken place in different parts of the world since 9/11. Itcould not prevent the successes of the terrorists in Iraq. Nor could it preventthe resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
So long as the morale, determination and motivation of a terrorist organisationare intact, it would find ways of carrying out acts of terrorism, even if facedwith fund difficulties. Moreover, the contributions made by the Sri Lankan Tamildiaspora is not the only source of funds for the LTTE. The earnings from itscommercial shipping fleet, against which no action has been taken by theinternational community, and the narcotics trade, which is again flourishing inthe Afghanistan-Pakistan region, are even more important sources of funds.
There are only two ways of denting the morale, determination and motivation of aterrorist organisation--by repeatedly denying it success on the ground, whichthe Sri Lankan security forces are not yet in a position to do; and by drying upits source of new recruits by creating a wedge between the leadership and thecommunity through appropriate political gestures, which the Rajapakse governmenthas shown itself to be incapable of doing.
The policies of the government still seem to be influenced by its judgement--rightor wrong--that the LTTE has been weakened considerably and that this is the timeto drive a hard bargain. "Don't give in--the LTTE is no longer in aposition to resume its insurgency." That is the underlying theme of much ofthe analyses coming out of sources considered close to Mr Rajapakse.
The LTTE has still much bite left in it as seen by the rapidity and deadlyeffectiveness with which it has hit back against the Sri Lankan Police, Army andNavy after each incident of reprisal killing by the government in which theirhand is suspected. The Sri Lankan Navy is still no match to the LTTE's Navydespite unverified and unverifiable reports of damages caused to the LTTE's Navyby the tsunami. The Sri Lankan intelligence set-up is still no match to theLTTE's as seen from the timing and precision of the LTTE's counter-reprisalattacks, which speak volumes of its unimpaired intelligence collectioncapability with regard to the government in respect of human as well astechnical intelligence. Its command and control has recovered from the set-backcaused by Karuna's desertion.
At the same time, it has to be underlined that the LTTE today is not as strongas it was pre- March,2004. It has not been able to retrieve totally thepolitical ground lost by it in the Eastern Province after the revolt of Karunaand his supporters. The success of the anti-LTTE terrorist strikes in theEastern Province, which are attributed by the LTTE itself to the Karuna faction,speak of significant pockets of local support for him. The alienation betweenthe Eastern and Northern Tamils, which caused his desertion, shows no signs ofhealing.
The successes scored by the Karuna faction and the inability of the LTTE toidentify the location of the command and control of the faction and mount adecapitation attack against it show that the LTTE's intelligence collectioncapability--though as strong as ever against the government--is weak when itcomes to the Karuna faction. Many Eastern Tamils may not support Karuna, butthey are not prepared to betray him to the Northern leadership.
After the spectacular assassination of Laxman Kadirgamar, the then ForeignMinister, last year, the LTTE has not been able to mount any other spectacularstrike in Colombo. Most of its post-November, 2005, terrorist strikes have beenconfined to the Northern and Eastern provinces. Is it due to operationalweaknesses on the ground in Colombo or due to fears of further turninginternational opinion against it by operating in Colombo? It would be difficultto answer this question at present for want of adequate information on thissubject.
The Rajapakse Government has been following a three-pronged policy:
1. Show a continuing willingness for a dialogue with the LTTE--whetherfor strengthening the cease-fire, which has been suffering almost daily breachesby both sides or for finding a political solution to the aspirations of theTamils;
2. Get the LTTE increasingly isolated in the international community;
3. Keep the LTTE bleeding in the Northern and Eastern Provinces throughdeniable covert actions. These covert actions have been increasingly deadly.Talk while killing and kill while talking - that is the defining characteristicof Mr Rajpakse's policy.
Mr Rajpakse has been trying to use the Muslim card in the EasternProvince in order to use the Tamil-speaking Muslims against the Tamil-speakingHindus and Christians, who constitute the almost total bulk of the LTTE cadresand supporters. His reported decision to raise a Muslim regiment in the army isfraught with dangers.
The Tamil-speaking Muslims of Sri Lanka, like the Indian Muslims, have till nowkept themselves away from pan-Islamic radicalism of the kind propagated by AlQaeda and the IIF. However, even before Mr Rajpakse came to power, therewere indications of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) trying to extend itspresence to the Eastern Province by recruiting members from the Sri LankanMuslims working in the Gulf. There are at least a dozen Tamil-speaking Muslimsfrom Sri Lanka studying in the Pakistani madrasas controlled by the LET.
By trying to create and use a Muslim card against the LTTE, Mr Rajpakse runs therisk of contributing to a pan-Islamic radicalisation of the Tamil Muslimcommunity. It is only a question of time before the Muslim anger against theLTTE, sought to be kindled by him, turns into anger against the civil society asa whole and the government. Mr Rajpakse is playing with pan-Islamic jihadifire.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.
