The Red Spreads

NEPAL ROUNDUP
The Red Spreads
With the Maoists rebels announcing the end of their four-month unilateral ceasefire andvowing to "go on the offensive" against the royal army, the situation in Nepalindicates that peace is in no grave danger of breaking out in the foreseeablefuture. Updates

SAJI CHERIAN


[Maoist chief Prachanda, announced the end of truce which had started on September 3last, on January 2 by releasing a statement that said: "The royal army is surrounding our people's liberation army, which is in defensive positions, to carry out ground as well as air attacks on us. Therefore, we are compelled to go on the offensive not only for the sake of peace and democracy but for sake of selfdefence". The following roundup of the year was written before theannouncement of the end of the ceasefire - Ed] 

The year 2005 had been a roller-coaster ride for Nepal, with unexpected and gut-wrenching twists and turns for each of the three majorplayers in the conflict – the King, the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-Maoist)and the political parties. After over nine years of the Maoist insurgency, theride suddenly became much bumpier after February 1, 2005, when King Gyanendra declared an Emergency anddismissed Prime Minister Sher BahadurDeuba’s government on the tenuous grounds of thelatter’s failure to secure a dialogue with the Maoists, as well as the PrimeMinister’s apparent inability to organize elections. Although the King did notban political parties, space for political activity was severely restricted.Tough emergency measures obstructed not just the political parties but alsocivil society, including the media and development agencies.

With the Maoists dismissing anyidea about peace talks and rejecting the King’s regime as a “medieval feudalautocracy”, Kathmandu’s strategy reliedincreasingly on heavy-handed repressionto ‘restore order’ in the country, barricading the capital and puttingsenior political party leaders under house arrest.

The King was on weak ground tosecure his first objective of ‘restoring order’ in the country. With anestimated strength of just 80,000 soldiers in the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA),17,000 personnel in the Armed Police Force (APF) and a poorly equipped PoliceForce comprising 47,000 men, the King simply lacked the numbers to contain aninsurgency of the magnitude of the Maoist movement, in a population of nearly 27million people, with every one of the country’s 75 districts currentlyafflicted. 

The Maoists have an estimatedstrength of between 8,000 to 10,000 well-armed and trained ‘regulars’, anadditional 25,000 (on conservative estimates) ‘militia’ armed withrelatively primitive weapons such as pipe guns and crude bombs, backed by asubstantial number of ‘sympathisers’, officiallyestimated at about 200,000 in 2003, who can, under certain circumstances, be mobilised– voluntarily or coercively – for violent action. The current strength of144,000 men in all state forces cannot even provide a fraction of a minimallyacceptable counter-insurgency Force ratio, which would have to exceed at least1:10, and would approach a desirable (though far from optimal) level at1:20. 

The ratio was further skewed infavour of the Maoists with the withdrawal ofsignificant numbers of troops from the countryside to Kathmandu, for the protection and management of the capital. Also, a significantproportion of troops and officers were tied down in a wide range of civilian andstatic duties, including ‘editing’ newspapers at Kathmandu, and administering vital installations and services in the Districtheadquarters.

The 47,000-strong civil Policeprovided little comfort within this context. With just 110 of the country’s1,135 police stations still operational, this ill-equipped and demoralized Forceremains huddled in District headquarters, divesting Kathmandu of what could have been its most significant source of field intelligence. Insuch a situation, the King’s operational strategy to counter Maoists showed nosigns of any divergence from those followed by the government he dismissed. Thisoperational strategy has primarily relied on defensive warfare, with troopsoverwhelmingly guarding their own bases, rather than engaging in aggressivecounter-terrorism operations.

In theinitial days following the emergency proclamation, though, asemblance of a military offensive was visible, when the RNA launched operationsin selected areas in the Far West Districts of Baitadi,Achham and Dailekh, andin the Eastern Region Districts of Sankhuwasabha andMorang. However, these offensives were quicklydissipated, with the Maoists increasingly gaining the initiative. From Aprilonwards, the insurgents launched major attacks in their stronghold areas.

On April 7, troops repulsed a major Maoist attack targeting an RNA base at Khara in the Rukum District, killing at least 166 insurgents. Three RNA personnel were also killed. Although the Maoists suffered heavy losses in the battle in Khara, this was unsurprising since the RNA had strengthened its defences, after the Maoists had overrun several of their bases in 2001 and 2002. The Khara operation provided crucial lessons for the Maoists as was highlighted by their chief Prachanda himself when he commented on April 12, 2005, “the two-day Khara campaign has provided valuable experiences and lessons and will help in taking the war to a new level.”

April 13: 60 Maoists were killed during clashes following an attack on a security patrol at Dalphing in the Rukum district.

April 19: 22 Maoist insurgents and three soldiers were killed during clashes at Rankot and Ramja in the Rolpa District.

May 15: At least 50 Maoists and two soldiers were killed during a clash at Jarayatar in the Sindhuli District. The clash occurred when security personnel were pursuing the insurgents who were returning to their hideouts after staging attack at three security bases in the eastern District of Siraha, where they killed four Armymen.

June 7: 14 security personnel, one civilian and six Maoists were killed in a clash when hundreds of heavily armed Maoists attacked a security patrol at Masuriya jungle in Kailali District.

June 25: 12 soldiers and six Maoists were killed during a Maoist attack on an Army patrol team at Khandaha in the Arghakhanchi District.

July 3: 12 insurgents were killed and two police personnel sustained injuries in a Maoist attack on Diktel, headquarters of the Khotang District.

August 7: The RNA recovered at least 40 bodies of its soldiers killed in a Maoist raid on the Pili Army base camp in Kalikot District. The Maoists also conceded the death of 26 cadres in the attack.

Complementing its defensiveposture, the RNA has also encouraged the formation of village level militias tofight the Maoists. These ‘vigilante’ groups have targeted Maoists and their sympathisers,often leading to bloodshed, as was the case on August 14, when villagers at Matiniyain the Banke District killed five Maoist insurgents,including three women cadres. Such incidents of violence were also reported fromthe Districts of Dhading, Makwanpur,Nuwakot and Kapilvastu.The Minister for Information and Communication, TankaDhakal, had announced that the government wouldimplement development packages in those areas where the people take“courageous retaliatory action” against the Maoists. However, suchencouragement projected a regime relying on unsound tactics, the results ofwhich have often proven disastrous. As one commentator noted,

Thoughportrayed as a spontaneous uprising by common villagers against Maoists, villagevigilante groups in Kapilvastu District have wroughtcarnage that can only invite Maoist retribution. A field study by a group ofhuman rights organisations found that at least 42villagers have died there, 31 of them killed by the vigilantes on suspicion ofbeing Maoist sympathizers. What has gone underreported is that most of thesekillings, which occurred in the last half of February, have taken anethnic/communal colour, as most of the victims aresaid to belong to hill tribes, who had settled in the fertile Teraiplains over the last few years.

Nevertheless, on July 28, theKing asserted there had been “considerable improvement… in the internal lawand order situation of Nepal.” However, even after the ‘Royal appointment’ of five regional, 14 zonaland 75 district chairmen to oversee local administration, the state mechanismremained largely defunct as most of these appointees failed to take charge orresigned from their offices under Maoist death threats. Over three fourth of theVillage Development Committee (VDC) offices damaged in the conflict have notbeen renovated and developmental works remain suspended in rural areas.

* Institute for Conflict Management data

However, a comparison of the January to August data for theyears 2001 to 2005 reveals that the violence in year 2005 was headed towards alarger figure, till the Maoist ceasefire intervened in September. Further, a2005-monthly breakdown of fatalities reveals that the violence reached itszenith in April and May.

The Maoist response to February 1 ‘takeover’ was typicaland swift. ‘Chairman’, Pushpa KamalDahal aka ‘Prachanda’,announced a succession of general strikes, ‘wheel-jam’ agitations, shutdownsand blockades at the local and regional level. A ‘general strike’ wasannounced for three days between February 3 and 5, a 13-day blockade fromFebruary 13-26, countrywide ‘massmobilization and military resistance’ between March 14 and April 1 followed bya countrywide general shutdown from April 2. The success of these shutdowns andblockades were guaranteed, as the insurgents overwhelmingly dominated the threemajor highways of the country – Mahendra, Prithviand Tribhuvan – and had the capacity to lock downthe economy virtually at will, though Kathmandu wasable to keep at least a single principal supply line open along the TribhuvanHighway, under heavy military escort, to support a trickle of essential suppliesto the capital.

Some differences within thesenior Maoist ranks came to the fore during the first half of the year, when‘disciplinary action’ was initiated against senior ideologue Dr. BaburamBhattarai and his wife HisilaYami. However, the differences were not sufficientto split or significantly weaken the outfit, and the leaders were later‘reinstated’.

All Maoist offensives came to ahalt, on September 3, when Prachanda, issued a PressStatement declaring a three-month truce, under which the Maoists would notundertake any ‘offensive activities’, but would “remain in a position ofactive defense and resist if there is an offensive from the side of the enemy(the government)”. The Maoist chief also warned that, if the governmentintensified its military offensive or expanded Army bases by interpreting theMaoist move as ‘weakness’, the ceasefire could be ended ‘at any point’.

The Maoist strategy thatprompted the ceasefire announcement was multifaceted. The announcement was afirst – and extremely successful – step towards the polarization ofpolitical forces in Nepal, with the King increasingly pitted against all others. This polarization hasresulted in large-scale political demonstrations in Kathmandu and other places, with police resorting frequently to baton charges andtear-gassing to disperse crowds. The culmination of this strategy was theNovember 22 ‘Twelve-point Understanding’ reached between the Communist Partyof Nepal (Maoist) and seven Parliamentary parties, of which one key point wasthe “end of autocratic monarchy”, followed by “election to the ConstituentAssembly as a process of establishing total democracy” – positions long heldby the Maoists, but that were, till fairly recently, anathema to the politicalparties. 

Further, for the purpose of achieving ‘total democracy’, theunderstanding envisaged keeping “the Maoist armed forces and the Royal Armyunder the supervision of the United Nations” or any other reliableinternational institution during the process of election to the ConstituentAssembly. These positions demonstrated a significant consolidation of the Maoistposition, as the political parties diluted their stance on the Monarchy as an‘essential pillar’ of Nepali politics and the demand for a ‘republic’has now moved from the radical Maoist camp squarely into the democraticmainstream. With this understanding, consequently, the Maoist were able todramatically alter the conflict dynamics in Nepal, which, prior to the‘takeover’ was three-cornered, with the Maoists, the King and the politicalparties, each commanding a considerable pole of influence. After the‘Twelve-point Understanding’, however, this was transformed into atwo-dimensional tussle between the King at one end, and the Maoist-dominatedcoalition with political parties at the other.

The unilateral truce, moreover,has allowed the Maoists to concentrate on overgroundmobilization and political activity, while at the same time continuing with aprocess of quiet military refurbishment. A report released by the Kathmandu-basedInformal Sector Service Center (INSEC), titled "Three Months of Ceasefire– An Assessment of Human Rights Situation during the Unilateral Ceasefire byCPN (Maoist) in Nepal", noted that 75 persons were killed by both the stateand Maoists during the three month period of the cease-fire, between September 3and December 2 – 62 persons killed by security forces, and 13 by the Maoists.The report noted further that, though number of killings from the Maoists’side had decreased, there had been a rise in incidents of abduction. The Maoistsabducted 8,777 people, mostly students and teachers, during the period, thereport stated, adding that the studies of at least 30,000 students had beenaffected, as the Maoists continued to target schools in remote areas.

Following the ‘King’scoup’, foreign countries and international aid agencies expressed strongdisappointment and suspended crucial financial and military aid to Nepal. On March 17, the British government suspended part of the aid it had pledgedto the Nepal Police, Prison Services and the Prime Minister's Office. A total of£ 2.4 million had been committed under these programmes,but £ 1.3 million remained unspent and was cancelled. On February 25, the WorldBank informed the Nepal government that it was suspending its US$ 70 millionbudgetary support for the current fiscal year, on the grounds that “extremelyslow implementation of agreed reform measures” had ‘compelled” it to takesuch a decision. On July 20, condemning the ‘Royal takeover’, Norway cut the planned financial assistance to Nepal for 2006 by 10 per cent and terminated an agreement on support for the MelamchiWater Supply Project. The USA, India and the United Kingdom, Kathmandu’s principal military backers, suspended armssupplies to Nepal.

With the suspension of armssupplies from traditional sources like India, and with depleting ammunition stocks, the King has assiduously tried to woo China, with some success. In a bid to win over Beijing, just prior to the Royal takeover, Nepal shut down the Kathmandu office of the Dalai Lama’s Representative in Nepal as well as the Tibetan Refugee Welfare office in the capital. The King’scourtship was eventually rewarded when China supplied 4.2 million rounds of 7.62 mm rifle ammunition, 80,000 high-explosivegrenades and 12,000 AK-series rifles to Nepal, in November 2005. The flirtation with China and Pakistan had intensified inOctober, when RNA chief, General Pyar Jung Thapa,visited Beijing, where he is understood to have closed a deal for certain weaponsystems; on another trip to Pakistan in December, he was reportedly offered‘comprehensive training capsules’ for RNA soldiers. On December 20, Thapaalso hosted a four-member Chinese military delegation at Kathmandu.

To appease the international community, the King, in amessage to the nation on October 12, directed the Election Commission to holdparliamentary elections to the House of Representatives by mid-April 2007. Healso urged the international community to cooperate actively in the conduct ofthe parliamentary polls, in a free and fair manner, adding that the ‘misguidedlot’ (Maoists) were free to join the political mainstream by ending violence.The King’s announcement implied that he was no longer rigid about ruling thecountry for three years, as earlier announced in his ‘takeover’ speech.However, few would give much credence to the possibility of elections by theApril 2007 deadline, in the absence of a radical and improbable settlement withthe Maoists.

As a prelude to theparliamentary elections, the Election Commission (EC) stated on October 9 thatelections in all 58 municipalities would take place on February 8, 2006 – the first municipal election since 1997. However, the Maoists have warnedof “people’s actions” against both candidates and officials. Worse, at ahigh-level meeting held in Nepalgunj on December 22,in which Home Minister Kamal Thapaand the RNA Chiefs of the Mid- and Far-Western Divisional Headquarters, andChief District Officers (CDOs) of 10 districts inthese regions participated, came to the conclusion that it would not be possibleto conduct municipal polls with the present level of security forces.

The people of Nepal evidently remain suspended between the devil and the deep sea, and the year2005 has further crystallized the notion that both war and peace are nowconditions imposed by Maoists, demonstrating fairly clearly where the initiativeand control is located in the present conflict.

[And with the end of theunilateral ceasefire announced yesterday, all hopes for peace have beenshattered for the foreseeable future - updates]

Saji Cherian is Research Associate, Institute for ConflictManagement. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal