Prime Minister Manmohan Singh drew attention to the scope and impact of Maoist extortion when, in December 2004, he wrote to Kannabiran, one of the mediators in the failed peace talks in Andhra Pradesh, that "Extortion demands, in particular, are causing a great deal of unease and thestate government has been compelled to take steps to allay fears of a virtual collapse of law and order."
A deeper scrutiny of the spread of Maoist influence demonstrates that it overlaps with areas that are rich in forest and mineral resources. Further, a comparison of the Maoist-affected districts (estimated to be 165 in 14states in November 2005) and the Forest Survey of India-2003 map indicates that dense forest areas, particularly in thestates of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, provide a natural base for the Maoists. One study in 2005 indicated that, "Different Naxal groups now control 19 per cent of India’s forests."
Not surprisingly, some of the districts worst affected by Maoist violence in differentstates are those that account for a high percentage of forest cover, mineral wealth and, crucially, a substantial tribalpopulation: See Maoist Mayhem
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Across the spectrum, the forestry and mining industries have been the most affected by the Maoist threat, primarily due to their location. However, the degree of Maoist threat to industries varies in differentstates, depending mostly on the nature of industry and its location.
In Jharkhand, for example, an elaborate machinery for ‘levy and tax’ collection has been created. A levy is imposed ongovernment contractors and industrialists, who are required to pay at monthly intervals, while those earning from forest products and mines are charged an unofficial ‘tax’ ranging between two and 20 per cent. Documents seized during special operations in the Garhwa-Palamau areas of what was then Bihar (now in Jharkhand) in January 2000, provided evidence of enormous and organised financial operations in which targets and ‘block budgets’ were defined for each ‘squad’ of the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). One such squad had raised Rs. Seven million in a single year and, for the year 1999, had informed its command that its target was Rs. Ten million. In addition, Local Guerilla Squads (LGS) exercised a monopolistic control over forest produce andgovernment contracts in their areas of dominance, and also received a substantial share of all development funding flowing into these areas.
In a recent revelation, a senior leader of the CPI-Maoist arrested by Jharkhand police from Hazaribagh on December 27, 2005, Tilak Ganju, told his interrogators that about Rs. 30 million had been collected by the Maoists from contractors, traders and industrialists of Bihar and Jharkhand in 2005 alone. A diversity in the extortion mechanism is, thus, visible across the country: areas that have low forest cover, for instance in Bihar, rely heavily on ‘tax’ and ‘levy’ charges on local industrialists and contractors.
Non-conformity to these Maoist demands is often met with attacks and destruction of equipment. Prominent instances of such retaliation include:
May 30, 2003: Naxalites of the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) abducted six persons, including a contractor who had refused to pay ‘levy’, in Narayanbeda village, east Singhbhum district, inJharkhand.
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June 2, 2003: MCC cadres attacked the office of a private company engaged in executing the Sone Canal project, setting ablaze dumpers, vehicles and furniture at Nawadih village in Rohtas District, Bihar. Property worth over Rupees 20 million was destroyed as the company had refused to pay ‘levy’.
January 3, 2005: Maoists burnt a camp office of a West Bengal-based company near Paraiya police station in the Gaya district of Bihar for refusal to pay ‘levy’. The company was engaged in replacing wooden sleepers with aluminum on railway tracks in Gaya-Mugalsarai section.
A 21-page report, prepared for discussion during the meeting of Chief Ministers of the Maoist-affectedstates in New Delhi on September 19, 2005, had mentioned that the Maoists have benefited through the illegal trade in Khair trees (Jharkhand), Tendu leaves (Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh) and sandalwood (MM Hills-Sathyamangalam forests in Karnataka).
In August, 2000, the Commissioner (Land Records) and Chief Conservator of Forests (Land Management) of the then undivided Madhya Pradesh had admitted that the Naxalites had forcibly occupied 20,000 hectares of forest area in Bastar Division (now in Chhattisgarh) and appointed their own ‘rangers’ and ‘deputy rangers’. Similarly, Balaghat in Madhya Pradesh, despite having among the richest deposits of Manganese and Molybdenum, has very few industries. Police officials cite the presence of three or four Maoist Dalams (squads) in the district as one of the primary reasons. Towards the Maharashtra-Andhra Pradesh border, police officials in Gadchiroli say they have evidence that the District had been coughing up nearly Rs. 140 million every year from the trade in tendu leaves and bamboo produce. Way back in December 2000, Maharashtra’s Principal Secretary (Home) M.R. Patil, while deposing before the Estimates Committee of thestate Legislature, had warned that forest contractors, tendu leaf traders and local businessmen in the Naxalite-affected areas of Maharashtra were being forced to fund Naxalites in thestate out of fear.
In Andhra Pradesh, Intelligence sources, in the year 2000, had indicated that roughly Rs 400-500 million was extorted by the erstwhile People's War Group (PWG) alone, each year. The Advocates’ Committee on Naxalite Terrorism in Andhra Pradesh (appointed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by its order dated April 4, 1997) had noted, "the extremist groups are collecting crores (tens of millions) of rupees from all types of traders, contractors or any other persons engaged in any economic activity. They are also imposing levy on the farmers. Collection of money is so easy that many unemployed local rowdies are finding it an easy way of making money." The Maoists have continued with extortion as one of their chief means of sustenance, even during times of ‘peace’. Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, on May 21, 2005stated, "A rough estimate made by the Department was, in the first five or six months we gave them an opportunity to talk and police action was suspended, a rough estimate is that about Rs. 50-60 crore (Rs.500-600 million) has been collected by them and they did produce good weapons."
Further, displacement of populace, especially tribals, due to setting up of new industries, has been viewed by the Maoists as an ideal issue to bolster their ranks. In their December 14, 2005,statement, spokesman Azad mentions that MoUs have been signed by different stategovernments with the Jindals, Tatas, Posco, Essar-Ruia and Reliance in the past one year, ‘forcibly displacing people’. "We aim to turn this fear into a Red tornado by converting lakhs (hundreds of thousands) of sympathizers into action-oriented squads of the Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army. The MNC incursion has already brought thousands into our ranks," he added. Although, this pronouncement may sound vainglorious, it contains elements of a real threat and reflects the Maoists’ broad strategic orientation.
The mobilization of tribals around a range of grievances, both real and invented, is central to the Maoists’ strategy. A case in point is the January 2, 2006, death of 11 tribals in Orissa’s industrial hub, Kalinganagar in Jajpur district. The tribals, who were complaining of inadequate compensation packages, were protesting against Tata Steel’s proposed plant in the area, when the police fired at them. Even as reports point towards growing Maoist presence in the area, Union Home Secretary V.K. Duggal warned that "the Naxalite leaders would try to exploit the situation by trying to propagate that thestate was ruthless and not worried about their welfare and we are worried about it." In response to the incident, the CPI-Maoist Central Committee appealed "to people of all walks of life to condemn the ongoing repression on the tribals of Kalinganagar and support all struggles of the adivasis." It added that "the committee would extend support to the struggles in Andhra Pradesh among various other regions."
Although the Maoist spectre is largely concentrated in the rural areas, their presence and operational activity has been noticed in the mofussil towns and other semi-urban concentrations. This is clearly in line with the strategy of a protracted ‘People’s War’ and the principle of ‘surrounding cities from the countryside’. As the ‘People’s War’ spreads fromforest areas towards the urban expanse, the structure of ‘revolutionary taxation’ and reprisals for non-compliance can be expected to follow. Despite periodic declarations on moving their war into urban areas, however, this eventuality is still a somewhat distant prospect, and one that can still be averted by effectivestate action – which, unfortunately, still remains substantially lacking.
Saji Cherian is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
