The Real Nuke Threat

Most of the writings and debates on possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD)threats arising from Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi organisations havebeen focussing on the possible danger as a result of the terrorists getting holdof Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Pakistanis themselves have been dismissingtalk of such a danger as unwarranted and asserting that the physical security oftheir nuclear arsenal is so tight that no terrorist can get hold of it. TheAmericans too--at least outwardly--give the impression of being satisfied withthe physical security measures taken by Pakistan.

The writings and debates are too narrowly focussed on the physical securityof Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and on the danger of Al Qaeda benefiting from theexpertise of sympathetic Pakistani nuclear scientists--serving and retired.While this aspect should be of equal concern to the US and India, there areother aspects, which should be of greater concern to India and other regionalcountries such as Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) thanto the US and the rest of the Western world.

The danger of the terrorists getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal willarise only if the terrorists capture power in Pakistan after defeating the Army.Despite the recent deterioration in the situation in the North-West FrontierProvince (NWFP) as a result of the increase in the activities of the PakistaniTaliban, the danger of their defeating the Army and capturing power seems low atpresent. The Taliban has a capability for making the entire Pashtun tribal beltin the North-West Frontier Province and in the Federally-Administered TribalAreas (FATA) ungovernable and totally under its Wahabi influence and politicalwrit. An embryonic Islamic Caliphate in the Pashtun belt on both sides of thePakistan-Afghanistan border is a worrisome possibility. It also has thecapability for organising spectacular acts of suicide and non-suicide terrorismin the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan, including in Islamabad, Rawalpindi,Karachi and Lahore, as it has already demonstrated on many occasions.

But it does not have the capability to defeat the Pakistan Army in the non-Pashtunareas and capture power in Islamabad. The Pakistan Army is not like the AfghanArmy, which on its own cannot resist the Taliban Army. The Afghan Army of the1990s, consisting largely of the Mujahideen trained to fight against the Soviettroops in the 1980s, could not resist the capture of Kabul by the Taliban inSeptember,1996. The post-9/11 Afghan National Army (ANA) would not be able toresist on its own a Taliban advance into Kabul should the NATO forces bewithdrawn from Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Army is different. It is strong, well-trained, well-equipped andwell-motivated. It might have closed its eyes to the depredations of the Talibanin the Pashtun belt as it had done in the past to the depredations of varioustribal extremist groups in the areas adjoining the Afghan border so long as theydid not threaten the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and wereprepared to assist the Army against India, when necessary as in 1947-48 and1965. Ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947, no government in Pakistanhas had effective political and military control over the Federally-AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA). Successive Pakistani governments chose to avoid aconfrontation with the tribal extremists in the FATA.

If the Pakistan Army today does not show the same concern as the rest of theworld over the Taliban running amok in the FATA and in the Malakand division ofthe NWFP, it should not be a matter for surprise. If, from time to time, itmakes a pretence of acting against the Taliban it is more out of concern overthe alarming reactions in the West than due to fears over any danger of theiroverrunning Pakistan.

If the Pakistani Taliban tries to overrun the rest of Pakistan and to capturepower in Islamabad as its Afghan counterpart did in Kabul in 1996 and is tryingto do so again now, the Pakistan Army will ruthlessly crush it. In view of thisI would rate as low at present the danger of the Taliban, with or without thehelp of Al Qaeda, capturing power in Islamabad and taking control of Pakistan'snuclear arsenal.

I would divide Pakistan's nuclear capability into three groups and grade thelikely threats to them from the Taliban and other jihadi groups as follows:

(a) The Nuclear arsenal consisting of its stockpile of nuclearweapons: Their physical security is very tight with American inputs intostrengthening it and with US monitoring of the state of physical security.Threat low unless and until the Taliban captures power in Islamabad.

(b) Sensitive nuclear establishments such as the Kahuta uraniumenrichment plant and the Khusab plutonium facility. Their physical security isequally tight, but there are no American inputs and monitoring. Threat low tomedium.

(c) Other nuclear establishments such as the Chashma nuclear powerstation constructed with Chinese assistance and the one at Karachi and thevarious sites in the NWFP and Balochistan where nuclear waste is stored: Theirphysical security has not received much attention either from the Pakistanisthemselves or from the Americans. Moreover, since the Chinese are associatedwith some of them, they would not like the US to have any role in their physicalsecurity. Threat medium to high.

The greatest danger in my view is the Taliban and other jihadi groupsattacking one of these less guarded facilities falling in the third group. Theyhave the capability to target them in order to create panic in the Pakistanipopulation and demonstrate their prowess in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan.

India and other regional countries should have strong reasons to be worriedover this possibility because the environmental and health hazards arising froma terrorist attack on these facilities would affect not only Pakistan, but alsoits neighbours. A terrorist-caused Chernobyl is a danger of greater possibilitythan the terrorists capturing the nuclear arsenal.

It is in India's interest to nudge the US into taking more interest in thephysical security of these establishments in order to prevent such an event. Thepresent counter-terrorism co-operation between India and the US is more tacticalthan strategic in the form of exchange of intelligence regarding plans for aterrorist strike and extension of mutual legal assistance in the investigationof terrorist attacks as in the case of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November26, 2008. The only strategic co-operation is in respect of cyber and maritimesecurity. To one's knowledge, there is very little interaction of a substantialnature relating to WMD security as a result of developments in Pakistan.

The Barack Obama Administration and whatever government comes to power in NewDelhi after the present elections should realise that the security and welfareof their people are closely tied to developments in Pakistan. There is a needfor more intense and sustained interactions on this subject between thepolitical leaderships and the professional experts of the two countries than hasbeen the case at present. Among the various steps that could be considered arethe setting-up of a hotline between the political establishments and theintelligence chiefs of the two countries and a joint monitoring group to monitorclosely the developments in Pakistan.

At present, India's focus has been on making the US co-operate against theactivities of the anti-India terrorist groups and their infrastructure inPakistani territory. This should continue, but this should not be the onlysubject of co-operation between the two countries. It is necessary to expand itto cover likely threats to Pakistan's nuclear establishments. We should notallow the development of such wider interactions to be inhibited by complexesarising from past unpleasant experiences with the US.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical studies,Chennai