The Perils Of Talking Peace

Alot has been written, and said, of late about fresh hopes for peaceheld out by the United Liberation Front of Asom’s decision to head tothe negotiating table. New Delhi has had to face a lot of pressure fromAssam’s ‘civil society’ to acquiesce to ULFA’s pre-conditions fornegotiations. These include a ceasefire (New Delhi announced one,albeit in the face of grave provocation from the militants, inmid-August), creating a ‘peaceful atmosphere’ (whatever that may mean)for talks and, most important, release of five of the outfit’s topleaders who are in Guwahati jail now. 

These demands, or pre-conditions,may seem innocuous and reasonable. Many would argue there’s no need forNew Delhi to hem and haw on these, especially since the ULFA hasextended the olive branch and lasting peace in the militancy-wrackedstate seems so near now. The union government’s latest insistence on aletter from the ULFA’s top leadership committing itself to direct talksand explicitly stating the time, date and venue for the talks as wellas the names of the persons who would represent the outfit at the talksmay appear to many as unfair and unnecessary on New Delhi’s part. Butthen, is the union government really reluctant to hold talks with theULFA? Is it dragging its feet? Is it putting up fresh pre-conditionsthat amount to shifting the goal posts in a bid to subtly rebuff theULFA’s peace overtures? Is it being unnecessarily suspicious of theULFA’s ‘good intentions’? These are questions that cry out for answers.

Butthen, its not difficult to answer these queries that are being posed byULFA’s advocates in Assam. For, a dispassionate peek into history andneutral examination of the ground realities will provide ready answersto anyone seeking them. The ghost of 1992 will inevitably emerge fromsuch an exercise. ULFA general secretary Anup Chetia and five otherswere granted parole by the then Assam Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia onthe belief (and after solemn assurances from the outfit) that theirrelease would pave the way for the outfit coming to the negotiatingtable. Saikia was left red-faced when Chetia simply took a flight outto Bangladesh. The other five, including the outfit’s then centralpublicity secretary Sunil Nath, showed more sagacity and surrendered,going on to become rich businessmen eventually! To now expect the UnionGovernment to release the five militants -- ULFA vice-chairman PradipGogoi, central publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary, cultural secretaryPranati Deka, political advisor Bhimkanta Buragohain and centralexecutive member Ramu Mech -- without any guarantees and writtenassurances from the outfit would be foolish. 

The ULFA’s insistence ontheir release is based on a technicality: the five, argues ULFAchairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, are members of the outfit’s centralcommittee that has to meet formally and pass a resolution authorizingformal talks with the government of India. And if the five executivecommittee members remain behind bars, how would the committee meet totake this vital decision? Hence, they must be freed and provided safepassage to Bangladesh where the other members of the ULFA’s executivecommittee are holed up. 

Rajkhowa would have the world believe that theULFA is a totally democratic outfit where decisions are broad-based andconsensual! The trio of National Security Advisor M.K.Narayanan,Union Home Secretary V.K.Duggal and Intelligence Bureau DirectorE.S.L.Narasimhan haven’t, to their credit, fallen for this speciousargument; they’ve, instead, suggested that once a written assurance onthe talks is received from the ULFA, the jailed militants would befreed. And they even needn’t travel all the way to Bangladesh to conferwith their compatriots -- the state administration can set up directtelephonic links between Guwahati jail and Dhaka (where the ULFA’s topleadership lives in the lap of luxury) for a conference call betweenthe outfit’s central committee members!

Butthe crux of the whole matter is whether the ULFA can hold a meaningfuldialogue with the Indian government. The central question here is: ‘Isthe ULFA its own master?’ Advocates of the ULFA, and they go by thename of ‘representatives of civil society’, argue that while New Delhihasn’t had or isn’t having problems with talking to or acceptingsimilar demands of the Bodo militants or the NSCN (Isak-Muivah), it isdisplaying a strange reluctance to accommodate the ULFA. That may bethe case, but it is important to ask why that is so. The simple reasonis that there’s a crucial difference between talking to the NSCN(IM)and the ULFA. 

No one can accuse the NSCN(IM) of taking orders fromwithout. The Naga outfit is totally independent of external control.The same cannot be said of the ULFA. The ULFA’s pious denialsnotwithstanding, it is open knowledge that Arabinda Rajkhowa, PareshBarua (the ULFA ‘commander-in-chief’) & Co live in Dhaka at themercy of the Bangladesh government. Bangladesh has offered them refugeand facilitated investment of their ill-gotten millions (throughextortions and other crimes in Assam and other states) in profitableventures like shipping, food processing and other industries inBangladesh. Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces’ Intelligence(DGFI) is the actual master of the ULFA. Rajkhowa, Barua and Co aremere puppets in the hands of the DGFI, which has close links now withPakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). 

Why would theDGFI, and the ISI, want the ULFA to ultimately disband itself (as alogical outcome of the proposed negotiations with New Delhi) and peaceto prevail in Assam? It is in the interests of both the ISI and theDGFI to have trouble brewing in Assam for eternity. That keeps aconsiderable section of India’s armed forces tied down incounter-insurgency operations in Assam (and away from the westernborders with Pakistan) and India would continue to bleed economicallyand otherwise in such a scenario. Pakistan and Bangladesh aren’texactly friends of India that they’d want peace (and, consequently,prosperity) in India. This, though not in so many words, is what Duggalconveyed to People’s Consultative Group mediators Mamoni Raisom Goswamiand Rebati Phukan, at a meeting in New Delhi a few days ago. WhatDuggal left unsaid was that given ULFA’s total dependence for survivalon the DGFI, there’s serious doubt over the ULFA’s true intentions and,even if one were to give the ULFA the benefit of doubt, about theoutfit’s ability to steer a course clear of its masters in Bangladesh(and Pakistan).

Atthe same time, it must also be acknowledged that there’s a very strongconstituency for peace in Assam. This, ostensibly, is something thatthe ULFA cannot totally ignore if it has to maintain its relevance inthe state. And this, argue optimists, alone provides hope that the ULFAleadership would have to keep the aspirations (for peace, developmentand economic progress) of the people of Assam in mind while negotiatingwith New Delhi. But then, is the ULFA relevant among Assam’s massestoday? 

Till a year ago, when all this talk of a New Delhi-ULFA dialoguecommenced at the behest of ULFA’s advocates, people of Assam hadstarted erasing the ULFA from their collective psyche. Fact is, it isonly thanks to a few so-called intellectuals -- writers, journalists,human rights activists, artistes and lawyers of various hues -- basedmostly in Guwahati that the ULFA manages to remain relevant in Assam.This motley group, longing naively for ULFA’s goal of a glorious Asom,provides respectability and crucial social support to the ULFA. Severthis support, and ULFA would be reduced to nothing. Militarily, it has been reduced to hiring amateurs and daily wagers tolob grenades at targets. A concerted offensive by the armed forceswithout any political interference would have brought the outfit to itsknees. By starting all this talk of negotiations, the ULFA’s advocateshave given it a vital lease of life.

Sowhat, perhaps, would be the ULFA’s plan of action? It can’t, or won’tbe allowed to, talk peace seriously. It will only make an elaboratepretense of doing so. And when conditions are ripe for it to walk awayfrom the negotiating table, it will do exactly that. The excuse couldbe an army or police operation it would have itself provoked. Orsomething as vague as New Delhi going back on its promise to create a‘peaceful atmosphere’. And then, the ULFA’s advocates would once againprovide justification for the ‘boys’ reverting to arms and violence.The government of India would be left to face the flak for breakdown oftalks. And this is precisely the elaborate trap New Delhi wants toavoid walking into. Hence, the insistence on many guarantees andconfidence-building measures to pave the way for fruitful talks.