It is perhaps a sign of the extraordinary desperation that has gripped policy-making on Jammu and Kashmir(J&K) that the blossoming of every single rose is heralded as evidence that summer has arrived. Theunremitting violence that has followed Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's August visit to Srinagar hasshown yet again that roses can be easily cut down, or can simply wither away in the relentless heat of thereal world. Amidst the usual hand-wringing provoked by the violence, however, few have asked the real questionthat needs to be addressed: just why has peace-making proved so difficult a business in Jammu and Kashmir?
One answer, perhaps, is that peace making is often founded on false premises and half-truth. Much of theearly-summer peace initiative was based on the assumption that Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's 'HealingTouch' agenda had succeeded in starting to build a working civil-society consensus against violence. 'HealingTouch' optimists claimed there had been a 'marked reduction' in violence since the People's Democratic Party (PDP)-ledalliance had come to power. This was variously attributed to Sayeed's programme of prisoner releases, hiscampaigns against corruption, and the realisation among secessionist organisations that they could find aplace within mainstream political practice and discourse.
In fact, the figures show, there was no really meaningful decline in violence. If one considers thetotal numbers of killings as an index, the events of this winter closely mirror those of 2001 and 2002,slacking off in the winter and then escalating as spring and summer set in. There was, in fact, a far largerdrop in killings in the summer of 2002, compared with 2001, than anything the 'Healing Touch' achieved. Thiscould, perhaps, be attributed to the impact of Operation Parakram, the massive military mobilisation set inplace after Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorists stormed India's Parliament building in December 2001. OperationParakram, it could be argued, established a threshold level for violence, sustained since by a variety offactors, ranging from United States of America pressure on Pakistan, and a realisation in that country'smilitary establishment of the potential costs of a near-war situation.
A second myth is that political life in Jammu and Kashmir has started to normalise. In fact, politicaldiscourse there remains distinctly abnormal. Consider, for example, the giant billboard outsideSrinagar airport, welcoming any tourists who might arrive. Set against the backdrop of Kashmir in autumn, thebillboard bears the visages of Prime Minister Vajpayee and Chief Minister Sayeed. Nowhere else in the countrywould a Congress-supported Chief Minister be so eager to advertise his warm relationship with the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP). Nor, of course, would the BJP be keen to share space with the leader of the partycommitted to releasing terrorists from jail, and to dialogue with Islamist secessionist groups like theHizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM).
Sadly for both these politicians - the twin poles of the peace process initiated in March - things aren'tquite going according to plan. For one, there are few tourists to see the billboard. Hotels and houseboatsemptied after a string of bombings and suicide-squad attacks executed to mark the Prime Minister's visit toSrinagar. Underlying this is a larger political problematic. "Our doors are open", the PrimeMinister said in Srinagar, "to all those, who reject militancy and extreme positions and wish to play aconstructive role in taking Jammu and Kashmir forward on the high road of peace and rapid development."This was of a piece with his past position, notably articulated during the Ramzan ceasefire of 2000-2001, whenthe Union Government sought to engage elements within the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin politically.
For secessionist groups, armed or purely political, this position is simply inadequate. For one, the AllParties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) head, Maulvi Abbas Ansari, has repeatedly rejected dialogue with the UnionGovernment's official mediator on Jammu and Kashmir, N.N. Vohra. The APHC leaders believe their legitimacywould be undermined unless New Delhi negotiates with them at the highest political level, acknowledging thesecessionists as representatives of a de-facto nation. With general elections on the horizon, the BJPsimply cannot afford to make such a large concession. Indeed, it is profoundly unlikely that anypolitical dispensation in New Delhi could do so in the foreseeable future.
Matters are further compromised by the running battle within the Hurriyat Conference. On September 7, Syed AliShah Geelani leader of a faction within the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has emerged as the Hurriyat's arch-foe,called for a parallel meeting of the Hurriyat's General Council to chalk out the organisation's course ofaction. The next day, 12 members of the 23-member General Council elected a four-member body chaired by MuslimLeague leader Massarat Alam, a long-standing Geelani supporter recently released from jail by the PDPGovernment, as a parallel Hurriyat Executive. Centrists and Islamists are thus divided down the middle, and abitter leadership feud is underway.
On top of it all, the Hurriyat centrists are increasingly finding themselves in confrontation with armedIslamist groups. Prior to Vajpayee's visit, the Hurriyat sought to avoid calling for a shutdown of shops andbusinesses, a ritual practice when major Indian leaders visit Srinagar. Geelani, however, issued a call, andwas followed in quick time by the Islamabad-based council of fourteen terrorist groups, the Muttahida (United)Jehad Council (MJC). The MJC attacked the Hurriyat centrists for having gone soft on New Delhi, a positionthat was also adopted by the LeT and JeM. The Hurriyat was then forced to issue a call for a general strike.Hemmed in by pressure from armed groups and Islamists, then, the Hurriyat centrists are as unable as New Delhito make major concessions.
It is profoundly unlikely that any short-term means can be found to break the logjam. The United States ofAmerica is mired down in Iraq, and South Asian concerns have largely disappeared from its foregroundconsciousness. The situation is unlikely to change until President George Bush is either re-elected, or asuccessor takes his place with four years in hand. In the meanwhile, all players in J&K have an interestin using the time available to strengthen their positions. The available data suggests Pakistan, will continuesinging the same tune it did until 2001, albeit at a slightly lowered pitch. Violence, sadly, will continue tobe the principal medium of political discourse in J&K for some time to come.
What, then, might New Delhi's policy establishment do? It could, for one, reject a third myth: thatpeace-making and war-making stand in binary opposition. New Delhi bureaucrats often treat security issues assomething sundered from the political process, rather than as an organic part of the search for solutions.Unless the security establishment can find creative means to make both ordinary people and theirrepresentatives secure, it is unlikely that a meaningful move towards peace can even begin.
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The killings of one-time terrorists turned pro-India militia leaders, Mohammad Yusuf Parrey and Javed AhmadShah, has signalled to potential fence-crossers that India is unable to look after its own. In turn, thede-escalation of aggressive counter-terrorist operations as part of the 'Healing Touch' programme has allowedterrorist groups to reassert their influence in rural Kashmir. Recruitment of local cadre has, by allaccounts, picked up, notwithstanding the construction of a broad peace consensus.
Politicians - the recent resignation of Jammu and Kashmir Agriculture Minister Abdul Aziz Zargar is a case inpoint - have learned the obvious lesson from this situation. On the face of it, Zargar has committed no crime- or at least none not common to many residents of rural J&K. Chand Usman Khan - a terrorist accused inthe Akshardham attack in Gujarat on September 24, 2002 - confessed that meetings to plan the outrage were heldin Zargar's village home in the Anantnag district. The Minister had, however, left his residence in responseto terrorism twelve years ago. There is no allegation that Zargar knew of either the meetings or theirsubstance; but it is also true that he seems to have done nothing to ask the police or army to liberate hisvillage from terrorist control. Zargar, like much of the ruling PDP, benefited significantly from terroristsupport in last year's elections. His rival from the Noorabad constituency, Sakina Itoo, was repeatedlytargeted by terrorists during the election campaign; Zargar was not. Terrorists through southern Kashmir toldvoters to support the PDP, and National (NC) Conference candidates suffered as a result.
The malaise is not restricted to the PDP. A Pakistani terrorist recently arrested in Poonch, Naim Khan, toldhis interrogators that a local NC legislator had paid protection money to his organisation, theLashkar-e-Toiba. Hurriyat centrists - witness the case of assassinated leader Abdul Gani Lone - have alsodiscovered the cost of bucking the jehadi fiat. Politicians, quite naturally, have learned that it isbest to make their peace with those who wield the guns, rather than to strive for a genuine peace thatexcludes these elements. This is the core of the peace paradox in Jammu and Kashmir - a problem whose solutionis the precondition to a successful peace process.
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Praveen Swami is Special Correspondent, Frontline. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.
