The Nuke Fall Out?

WASHINGTON

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent statement on the US-India civilnuclear deal may have done much to allay the concerns of the political left andright in India, but is unlikely to make an impact on congressional attitudes inWashington. Instead, analysts say, Singh’s comments have put the onus firmlyon President George W. Bush to hold up his end of the bargain and ensure thatthe U.S. Congress adheres to the core principles of the July 18, 2005,agreement.

In a detailed presentation in New Delhi on August 17, Singh assured membersof Parliament that India would not agree to any changes in the landmark deal.The U.S. House of Representatives had overwhelmingly approved the deal lastmonth but had also added clauses that would require annual reporting on the useof nuclear technology and fuel for peaceful purposes.

Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary for nonproliferation at theState Department and currently at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies in Washington, admits Singh’s comments "might energize the U.S.administration to work harder to roll back elements of the House and Senatebills that Indians find objectionable." But, he says, a number of members ofthe U.S. Congress will find both the tone and content of the remarks "a bitworrisome - and an indication that the Bush administration's hopes for closepartnership between India and the U.S. in the future may be overstated."

Others, like Anupam Srivastava, director of the Asia programme at theUniversity of Georgia, contend that while Singh’s statements will "definitelybe a matter of serious debate" in the U.S. Congress, both the Congress and theBush administration realise that these comments were primarily intended tosilence the growing domestic criticism in India.

In his comments, Singh had emphasized - as he did once again today in the LokSabha - that his government won’t accept anything that deviates from the July18 agreement. The ball is now in the Bush administration’s court, says SumitGanguly, Rabindranath Tagore professor of Indian cultures and civilizations atIndiana University. "It is now up to the dexterity of [Undersecretary ofState] R. Nicholas Burns and [Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice to ensureswift passage of the bill without non-germane riders," he says.

Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution in Washington says the Bushadministration will have to work with Congress to "ensure that the finaloutcome does not exceed the range of understanding that the Bush administrationreached with the government of India."

In a lengthy defence of the nuclear deal, Singh assured parliamentariansIndia’s strategic programme is "outside the purview of the agreement."

The Bush administration, determined to mark up a foreign policy success, hasits work cut out. Einhorn says since most members of Congress do not believe thecurrent House and Senate bills are inconsistent with the July 2005 agreement,they are unlikely to be sympathetic to changing elements of the bills insignificant ways.

Like Einhorn, Michael Krepon at the Henry L. Stimson Center has reservationsabout the agreement. He believes the U.S. Congress and the Bush administrationhave been "extraordinarily generous" to India. But, he adds, "I suspectthat even the Bush administration and the Congress will not support India'sdemand for access to reprocessing capabilities and changes in U.S. public law tolift penalties in the event India resumes nuclear testing."

Noting that the language of the House and Senate committee reports as well asthe testimony of the Bush administration are clear on these points, Krepon sayshe’s hard-pressed to identify a single member of the Nuclear Suppliers Groupthat would support these demands. "If New Delhi is serious about conditioningthe deal to these demands, it is in serious jeopardy."

"It looks like the Prime Minister has upped the ante by demanding thelifting of all restraints on nuclear commerce, including reprocessing, as wellas by demanding a free pass on the resumption of nuclear testing," says Krepon.

On the question of nuclear testing, Singh asserted there is no question ofIndia being bound by a law passed by a foreign legislature. Krepon says bothHouses of Congress will include language reaffirming existing U.S. public lawthat calls for penalties in the event of a nuclear test by India. "The PrimeMinister's insistence that ‘there is no question of India being bound by a lawpassed by a foreign legislature’ is true, but is also besides the point, sincemembers of Congress have the power to establish laws governing U.S. nuclearcommerce to foreign nations," he says.

India has made a unilateral undertaking not to test another nuclear weapon.Teresita Schaffer at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies saysIndia’s decision presumably means that in the best judgment of the Indiangovernment, its strategic programme does not require a test. She believes Singh’sstatements will not cost India the nuclear deal, "but it must be clear to thegovernment of India that if in the future it decides, unilaterally, to revokethat undertaking not to test, this will be a major change in the deal the U.S.signed on to and would at that point probably be a deal-breaker for the U.S."

Singh spoke very carefully, being very precise about what he understood theU.S. and Indian commitments to be, says Schaffer. "In general, the U.S. andIndia are trying to make very different points to their respective parliamentsand publics. As a result, every time that one government or the other spellsthings out in detail, it causes problems in the other capital," she says.

On the question of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, Singh toldParliament that, "we will accept only IAEA safeguards on the nuclearfacilities, in a phased manner... only when all nuclear restrictions on Indiahave been lifted."

Ganguly says this is a realistic condition. "Until these restrictions arelifted how can India accept safeguards?" he asks. "That is putting the cartbefore the horse. The sequencing is very important. One does not acceptrestrictions before one is given deliverables."

The legislation approved by the House of Representatives requires thepresident to make a determination that India has concluded an acceptablesafeguards agreement with the IAEA. The waivers required to permit nuclearcooperation with India cannot be issued before the safeguards agreement isconcluded. "But the entry into force of that safeguards agreement, and theactual application of safeguards to additional Indian nuclear facilities, couldtake place at a later date, after those waivers are issued. I don't thinksequencing should be a problem," Einhorn says.

On the Senate bill's provision calling for an annual presidentialcertification that India is in full compliance with its non-proliferation andother commitments, Singh said India opposes this provision because it would havethe effect "to diminish a permanent waiver authority into an annual one."Because this language "would introduce an element of uncertainty regardingfuture cooperation," the Prime Minister stated that this provision, ifmaintained in the final bill, would not be acceptable.

The Senate is expected to vote on the bill when Congress returns from itsrecess in September. If passed, the Senate and House versions of the bill willthen be put together in conference.

While Singh made clear India would not accept the introduction of "extraneousissues" on foreign policy, Krepon says he will be very surprised if theprovision that India support U.S. policy on Iran is removed from the final bill.California Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos, a key architect of the House bill,is determined to ensure India’s support for tough U.S. action against Iran’snuclear programme.

Critics as well as supporters of the agreement, that seeks to overturn threedecades of U.S. policy and provide nuclear technology and fuel to India, agreethat Singh has dealt adroitly with opposition to the deal. "He has overcome anumber of hurdles - clearly the left feels that it would rather have the dealthan have a BJP government in power," Cohen says.

But has the Prime Minister painted himself into a corner by publicly spellingout a rigid stance on the deal?

Srivastava says had Singh not spoken out, he faced the danger that allsupport for the deal in India might evaporate and affect its implementation nomatter what version was approved by the U.S. Congress. He sees in the August 17statement a clear signal from Singh to the Bush administration that India "cannotchange the scope and sequence of the basic agreement, but can support importantU.S. goals and policies outside the framework of this agreement."

Eventually, Singh made clear he won’t accept anything outside the frameworkof the July 18 agreement. "That is a standard I think the eventual legislationwill be able to meet," says Schaffer. Ultimately, she adds, both the U.S. andIndia will have to live with some level of ambiguity.