The Next Dalai Lama

It is not easy for any modern secularist country to deal with a faith-based institution that is far older than itself and refuses to be domesticated. Imagine a state that is professedly communist; tolerates religious beliefs for ordinary citizens, but not for the members of the dominant ruling party; and has within its territory a deeply religious ethno-nationalist people who find most of their traditional leaders in exile accused of separatism. Yes, that state is the People's Republic of China; the people concerned are Tibetans; and the institution is that of the Dalai Lama.

What makes life difficult for the rulers in China is the fact that the Dalai Lama is more than a political and religious leader of Tibetan people; he is also a globally recognised personality known for his universalist values. The 14th Dalai Lama is a figure like no other, he is also a person who has shown himself to be remarkable.

As a figure, the Dalai Lama represents a centuries-old institution and is an embodiment of Avalokitesvara, a bodhisatva of compassion, and is the spirit of Tibetan nation. A bodhisatva is an enlightened being who stays back on earth to help people. As a person, the present Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, has proven his leadership by taking Tibet out of its geographical location in the heart of Asia to unlikely places across the globe. Not only has he helped create a flourishing exile community in India, Nepal, Switzerland, and the United States — but through his ability to combine a universalist message of compassion, interfaith dialogue, and advocacy of the Tibetan cause, he has single-handedly given Tibetans an international visibility.

The politics of his international popularity, some of it no doubt animated by Sinophobia in the west, are a matter of debate, but not even the hawkish ideologues in Beijing can deny the fact that the Dalai Lama remains a formidable presence in the hearts and minds of most Tibetans living inside China. The Dalai Lama has lived in exile since 1959, and while he claims to want only "genuine autonomy" for Tibetans within China, the Communist government accuses him of harbouring desires for 'disguised independence' and separatism.

As the Dalai Lama gets older there is no sign of compromise between him and Beijing, prompting speculation about the future of the institution. The Dalai Lama adds to the confusion by giving conflicting indications and emphasising it is up to Tibetan people to decide. But who speaks in the name of this "Tibetan people"? China, whose control over Tibet is recognised by all other states in the world? Or the Dalai Lama-led exile government in the Indian town of Dharamsala, which is widely respected by many Tibetans as the continuation of the traditional Tibetan state?

A highly probable scenario for the 15th Dalai Lama is that there will be two of them: one boy recognised inside China with Beijing's blessings, another somewhere in exile. Lest someone thinks this is far-fetched, there are already two contending Panchen Lamas (next only to the Dalai Lama in importance), both inside China: one publicly feted, another not seen since his disappearance in 1995. There are two Karmapas, the head of the Kagyu sect, both in exile now. But having two Dalai Lamas, both under intense international public scrutiny, will be uncharted territory. The world might be spiritually richer with more tulkus ("living Buddhas"), but it will be the end of all hopes for reconciliation between China and its Tibetan population.

In 2007 China enacted a law that asserted the Chinese government as the final authority in the recognition process of tulkus. Exiles saw it as another onslaught on the much-cherished Tibetan Buddhism by the Chinese government, and foreign commentators were struck by the paradoxical scenario of a communist party claiming authority over an otherworldly matter. 

However, China's attempts are not exceptional. Most secular states have laws in place to regulate faith-based institutions. For instance, Bhutan a small Himalayan kingdom, passed a resolution in 2005 that clarified the government's authority over reincarnations found inside the country's territory. Given that Tibet is recognised internationally as being under Chinese sovereignty and it is a common practice for secular states to assert their primacy over religious institutions, the crucial issue therefore is not the principle behind government interference, but the nature of it.

Beijing's ambiguous role 

Does Beijing mean to facilitate the material and spiritual wellbeing of Tibetans and create a genuinely harmonious society? Or is the intervention to domesticate, and even subvert, the most cherished specificity of Tibetan Buddhism — the reincarnate lamas? If the latter, that is the driving force for the hardliners in the Communist party, is it aware that these actions will generate more friction between Tibetans and the government, and end any hope for reconciliation? China says that it wants to better manage Tibetan religious freedom provided in the constitution; but its critics reject this claim as a distortion of traditional religion and a cynical ploy to take control over the next Dalai Lama.

Reincarnate lamas, that is trulkus or "living buddhas", are embodied institutions believed to be higher realised beings, who control their rebirths and are integral to Tibetan Buddhist culture. Once a reincarnate lama passes away, his soul is said to transfer itself to another body, usually that of a young boy. After a painstaking search governed by indications given by the previous body, rituals, cosmic signs, dreams and material factors, the new reincarnation is found and confirmed. The search party, as well as those who confirm the final selection, is often itself composed of reincarnate lamas and expected to have a close association with the embodied institution.

When senior reincarnate lamas such as the Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama, with political status within the traditional Tibetan state, are involved, the procedures for search, identification, verification and confirmation get more complicated. But the basic principle remains the same — indications from the previous embodiment, cosmic signs that can be perceived by close associates, and final enthronement in the seat with involvement of religious and lay officials.

In this scenario, can there be any legitimacy behind "China's Dalai Lama", should the hardliners go ahead with finding one after the demise of the present Dalai Lama in exile? The simple answer is no. This is not because China is a communist state or that there is no historical precedent of Chinese imperial courts or local chieftains exercising some authority over the final selection and enthronement. If the present Dalai Lama gives indications of his rebirth inside China, Beijing will have legitimacy for its choice. Contrary to what many exiles and their western supporters argue, the Chinese state's claim to have final authority over the selection of senior reincarnate lamas is not without precedent. What is new and exceptional is the total control and micromanagement of the process.

What is wrong with the "China's 15th Dalai Lama" ?

First, the basic principle behind reincarnate lamas is that the rebirth occurs to continue the work of the previous embodiment. If the 14th Dalai Lama is a "splittist", the accusation made by the government, and keeps repeating that he will not take rebirth inside China, what power does the Chinese government possess to transform the separatist soul into a patriotic soul while it transmits from one body to another? What magic wand does China have to modify the soul, override all the indications the previous embodiment had given, and make it enter a baby boy of the state's choice ? It is like saying to the enlightened being: "Sorry Mr Avalokitesvara, but contrary to your wishes and desires, the Communist party of China orders you to be born in a place of its choice. You have no option. But don't worry, we assure you a life of comfort and power so long as you are patriotic to the motherland." This farcical scenario is laughable had it not become a serious possibility.

Second, how can the Chinese government cobble up a search party for the 15th Dalai Lama? The team will need blessings from senior lamas in the Gelug sect (the dominant "Yellow" sect that ruled Tibet for the last few centuries) — but all of them, except the Panchen Lama, are in exile. Surely, to ensure "China's Dalai Lama", the government will have to include only "reliable" and "patriotic" lamas in the process. But this automatically implies that the search team will have members who are opposed to what the 14th Dalai Lama said and did in exile. How can China expect its Tibetan minorities, let alone the exiles, to have any respect for this?

Does this imply that China should have no role in the 15th Dalai Lama should the 14th pass away in exile?

Not necessarily. China could reach out to the exile Tibetans, offer to support the search team in all ways possible, remind the team that the most stable outcome for all will be to get the Chinese government's stamp of approval, and the new baby Dalai Lama to visit his homeland. By reaching out and offering a friendly hand, China could change the name of the game. On the other hand, by letting its policy remain hostage to hardliners, it will destroy hope for future reconciliation with its own minorities.

Currently the only avenue for negotiations is one between Beijing and the Dalai Lama over his personal status. Once the present leader dies, and we have a "China's Dalai Lama" and an "exiles' Dalai Lama", all hope for a compromise will evaporate. Once China invests in its own Dalai Lama, it will become a prisoner of its own approach. No longer able to negotiate or talk to exile Tibetans, it will face the impossible task of selling its own choice to the Tibetans, Chinese and the rest of the world. A new source of tension and instability will be created in the Tibetan plateau. Maybe only then will the Chinese leaders develop nostalgia for the 14th Dalai Lama, and the hope for stability and reconciliation that only he provides.

Dibyesh Anand is an Associate Professor at London's Westminster University and the author of Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination