The Neglected Naxalite Arsenal

The massive influx of sophisticated small arms and ammunition into various theatres of violence in India isa serious problem. While cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and insurgencies in the Northeast remainthe focus of the most urgent concern, the areas afflicted by various left-wing extremists groups - orNaxalites - remain relatively neglected. The easy availability of arms and explosives is one of the majorfactors contributing to the survival, consolidation and expansion of these various movements in India.

An escalation in Naxalite violence has been witnessed in the States of Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Maharashtra in recent times. According todata compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, a total of 311 persons, including 57 securityforce (SF) personnel, 133 civilians and 121 Naxalites have already been killed during the current year, tillJuly 15. The year 2002 saw a total of 1,465 incidents and 482 deaths, as compared to 1,208 incidents and 564deaths in the year 2001. Some 40 Naxalite groups are active in India, of which the People's War Group (PWG)and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) constitute the most formidable security challenge.

Even a cursory glance at the trajectory of Naxalite movements in India demonstrates the increasingsophistication of their arsenal. During the initial years of the movement, Naxalite groups used traditionalweapons like lathis (staffs), spears, sickles and other sharp edge weapons and single and double barrelguns, mostly stolen from village landlords and the police arsenal. The groups now have access to the AK seriesof rifles, landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) among others. Groups like the PWG and the MCCalso have dedicated underground arms production units. In addition, snatchings during attacks on the securityforces, a complex network of criminals, arms smugglers, gun dealers and networking with other militant groupsprovide a complex and varied source of arms for the Naxalites.

The looting of weapons from police personnel, civilians and private companies has always been a source ofarms. Thus, on April 15, 2003, Naxalites of the MCC killed eight police personnel and looted six Self LoadingRifles, two other rifles, a revolver and several rounds of ammunition from them after setting off a landminein the forests of the Cherki Valley in the Nawada district of Bihar. On April 14, 2003, MCC cadres attacked aGovernment Railway Police (GRP) post at Chandrapura railway station in the Bokaro district of Jharkhand andlooted 23 rifles and several hundred cartridges. On March 18, 2003, Naxalites of the MCC injured three policepersonnel and looted 15 rifles and 1,000 bullets in an attack on a police post in the Lodhipur village of Gayadistrict in Bihar. 

The Naxalites also loot explosives from private companies. On October 6, 2002, for instance, PWG cadreslooted approximately nine tons of explosives being transported in a truck from Uttar Pradesh's Lalitpur to acopper project in Malajkhand near Laungur Udghati in the Balaghat district of Madhya Pradesh. Most of theexplosives were, however, later recovered by the police. In Andhra Pradesh, Naxalites receive ammunition,explosive materials and arms pilfered from ordnance factories. Empty cartridges, parts of rifles, andexplosives manufactured just six months earlier at an ordnance factory was seized from a Naxalite dump inAugust 2000 in the Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh.

Purchases from arms smugglers and gunrunners - particularly from Bihar - constitute another important sourceof arms. Some of these smugglers also supply weapons to militant groups operating in India's Northeast. OnJuly 2, 2002, security forces arrested a gang of four arms smugglers in Guwahati, capital city of Assam. Thegang was procuring country-made guns from Bihar and selling these to militants based in the Barpeta andNalbari districts of Assam. 

In the last week of April 2003, police in West Bengal busted an inter-State racket in arms smuggling atUttarpara. Two traders involved in smuggling arms from Siwan and Munger districts of Bihar were arrested and acache of arms was recovered. There are over 1,500 illegal arms manufacturing units in Bihar and most of themare located in the Nalanda, Nawada, Gaya and Munger districts. 

The general breakdown of law and order, the proliferation of criminal gangs, the presence of Naxalites andprivate armies of landowners including the Ranvir Sena, the criminalisation of politics, an ill-equippedpolice force and the existence of a collusive network between criminals, extremists, and a section ofpoliticians have all contributed to the massive growth of Bihar's illegal gun industry. Bihar, moreover, hasmany ordnance factories and workers smuggle out blueprints, creating a cottage industry in arms manufacture inmany homes.

The nexus between legal segments of society, including sections of the administration, and Naxalite groupscontinues to flourish. On November 4, 2002, Police in Patiala, Punjab, exposed links between licensed gundealers in Punjab and Haryana and the PWG operating in Bihar. Apart from a huge quantity of arms andammunition, police seized 12 fake arms licenses issued by different authorities, including the Home Secretaryof Bihar and several Deputy Commissioners of Bihar, Assam and Jharkhand. The gang used to procure fake armslicenses from different authorities and then approach gun houses in Punjab and Haryana, and the latterknowingly supplied them with guns against these fake licenses for a heavy amount.

Networking with other insurgent groups has also produced a steady flow of weapons into the Naxalite armory.There have been reports of PWG's links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, and thePWG is also believed to have picked up landmine manufacturing techniques from the LTTE. A Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)terrorist, Azam Ghouri, is also reported to have met some important PWG leaders in the Warangal and Nizamabaddistricts of Andhra Pradesh in September 1999. The supply of arms and explosives to the Naxalite groupsfigured during this meeting.

The Indo-Nepal border areas are also emerging as a route for arms smuggling. In January 2002, the UttarPradesh (UP) Police seized a truck carrying weapons in Maharajganj on the Indo-Nepal border. The arms,procured from Naxalites in eastern Uttar Pradesh, were intended for the Maoist insurgents in Nepal. Reports inMarch 2002 said the Maoists in Nepal had obtained a large number of sophisticated weapons valued at Rupees 55million from the PWG. In April 2002, again, the UP Police seized a huge cache of arms in Siddharthnagar nearthe border. The captured couriers confessed that the arms were being sent to the Maoists and that they hadalready successfully delivered three earlier consignments.

The problem is complicated further by the fact that the porous India-Nepal border has become a hub ofactivities of the Pakistani external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). There areapprehensions that the ISI may catalyze further destabilization in the region by pumping arms into theprojected area of the 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ). Drug trafficking and the circulation of fakecurrency through the border are already in evidence. 

The Andhra Pradesh unit of the PWG has also established a direct link with procurers who bring in arms fromBangladesh-based ISI agents via the riverine Sunderbans route. At least two arms consignments have found theirway to Andhra Pradesh since April 2003. Taking advantage of the road and rail links between East Midnapore andOrissa the consignments traveled to Koraput in Orissa before reaching the Dandakaranya forest belt,from where the cache moved to Adilabad in Andhra Pradesh. Reports also indicate that the PWG had acquiredshoulder-fired weapons that could target vehicles.

There is evidently an urgent need for a continuous monitoring of the arms profile of various Left-wingextremist groups, the identification of sources and networks, coordinated intelligence gathering, and a wellequipped police force in the Naxalite affected areas if this grave security threat is to be contained andneutralized.

Sanjay K Jha is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal