Another round of 'dialogue' between the government of India (GoI) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland—Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), ended at Amsterdam on October 19, 2006, with little evidence of substantive progress, but with the usual rhetoric. Thegovernment made a routine expression of 'satisfaction' with the purportedly 'substantive progress' in talks and the NSCN-IM said that there was little gain in view of the'stubbornness' on the part of thegovernment. Recent processes of dialogue, mostly held with the single purpose of extending the ceasefire between the two sides, have veered round a formula of special federal relationship between Nagalim (greater Nagaland) and theunion government. While the NSCN-IM views its proposal, prepared under the unofficial auspices of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), being the ideal formula to resolve the long-standing conflict, its terms remain a significant obstacle to an agreement with thegovernment. The proposal is based on a requirement to merge the so-called Naga-inhabited areas of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh with present-day Nagaland, and is laced with the danger of antagonising threestates in order to please just one.
Nine years after the NSCN-IM and five years after its rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K), entered into separate ceasefire agreements with the GoI, peace remains a chimera in Nagaland. The never-ending rounds of peace parleys between GoI representatives and the NSCN leadership notwithstanding, there is little sign of abatement in the regime of violence and intimidation that continues to wreak havoc in thestate.
Insurgent violence in Nagaland has persisted despite protracted 'peace processes', though SF operations against the insurgents have ceased, barring occasional arrests of militants of either faction. However, internecine clashes among the IM and K factions, and targeted attacks against their'sympathisers' continue to keep thestate on the boil, even as extortion is pervasive. As many as 82 fatalities have been reported in 2006 (till November 21) despite the'peace', of which 88 per cent comprised insurgents, most of them killed in factional clashes. As many as 39 such clashes have been reported from seven of Nagaland's 11districts till November 21, with Zunheboto accounting for one third of these. The rest of the clashes occurred in the geographically contiguous districts of Kohima, Dimapur, Peren, Phek, Tuensang and Mon. With thestate government doing little beyond appealing to both factions to end violence, the small townships and villages of Nagaland have been turned into battle zones by the two outfits. The October clashes in thedistrict headquarters at Zunheboto epitomise the lawlessness that envelops the statetoday.
On October 26 and 27, about 160 cadres of NSCN-IM and 100 cadres of the NSCN-K engaged in fierce clashes at Amiphoto Colony of Zunheboto, home to three functionaries of the NSCN-K –general secretary Kitovi Zhimomi, his brother-in-law and NSCN-K kilonser (minister) Kughalu Mulatonu and'brigadier' Niki Sumi. The militants used rocket launchers, mortars, AK-47s, AK-56s and sniper rifles in a war-like campaign that continued from 9 am till 6.30 pm on both days. There was even a warning of'dire consequences' from the NSCN-IM against any potential intervention by the SFs. Thedistrict police simply put up barricades to prevent the entry of non-combatants into the'war zone' and the administration, along with three companies of the Assam Rifles and two of the India Reserve Battalion watched on in silence. Among the numerous houses damaged was that of K. Hollohon, parliamentary secretary and advisor to the Chief Minister. The intensity of the clashes forced 4,000 people in the town to desert their residences and move to safer locations.
The incapacity of the state government was clearly evident in the statement of thestate home minister on October 28. In an appeal, Thenucho asked the militants to vacate populated areas and confine themselves to designated camps—something that is mandated by the 'ground rules' of the ceasefire agreement with thegovernment. Normalcy, however, returned only after irate residents of the town, under the banner of the Sumi Hoho, Sumi Totimi Hoho, Sumi Kukami Hoho (the Hoho is the supreme tribal council) — damaged the gate of Deputy CommissionerC.K. Nihekhu's residence, broke police barricades and marched to the scene of the gun battle in two batches raising slogans. After much persuasion, the IM faction agreed to provide safe passage to the Khaplang cadres, who were escorted by the civilians to the nearby Shotomi village. The NSCN-IM also subsequently left the Amiphoto Colony on the condition that no faction would be allowed to remain in the town. As Home Minister Thenucho's cavalcade, including another Minister Tokheho and two parliamentary secretaries, rolled into Zunheboto on October 29 to assess the damage caused by the clashes, hundreds of irate residents prevented the Minister from entering the locality. It was only after about half an hour of'detention' that Thenucho was allowed to proceed.
Such occasional, desperate and rarely fruitful popular interventions for peace notwithstanding, both the militant factions continue with their exercises to extend their areas of dominance, and there is little hope that such clashes would cease in future. The Chief Minister, Neiphiu Rio, is on record claiming that such clashes are a part of the'political problem' between India and Nagaland, thus indicating that these would continue as long as the'conflict over Nagalim' is not resolved. The GOI, however, insists that the clashes between the militant outfits are a law and order problem. On June 20, 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told a seven-member Congress team from Nagaland that called on him in New Delhi that the conflict between the militant Naga factions was a 'law and order problem' which thestate's home department has to solve on its own, instead of blaming Delhi. The Chief Minister's refrain, however, closely echoes theNSCN-IM's position that the factional violence is due to the GoI's failure to restrict the movement of NSCN-K cadres.
The clashes, however, are more correctly seen in the context of the systematic campaign by the NSCN-IM to browbeat its opposition into submission. There is a sympathetic Nagaland People's Front(NPF) government headed by Nephiu Rio in power after the 2002 ouster of the 'unfriendly' Congressgovernment headed by S.C. Jamir. In addition, the NSCN-IM has been able to secure complete compliance from the'active' community-based organisations such as the Naga Hoho, the Naga Mothers Association (NMA), the Naga Students Federation (NSF) and the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR). The rest of the opposition in thestate has been systematically targeted either to force compliance or face 'elimination'. On June 1, 2006, for instance, NSCN-IM militants killed the 'Education Kilonser' of the Naga National Council (NNC), Mar Jamir, at a place near the BOC [Burma Oil Company] area of Kohima town. Previously, on May 19, 2006, NSCN-IM militants had killed a senior functionary of the NSCN-K, Nampang Konyak, at his residence in the Mon District. Most recently, in October, the NSCM-IM ordered the elimination of the former chief of the Sumi-Hoho (tribal council of the Sumi tribe), President Huska. The incident came to light after the man ordered to execute the task defected to the NSCN-K and spilled the beans, forcing the IM faction to issue a quick denial. It is not without reason that, on August 17, 2006, the NSCN-K accused the Naga Hoho, the NMA, the NSF and the NPMHR of directly supporting the NSCN-IM.
The NSCN-IM's writ runs supreme in most parts of the state. While its well-oiled'finance department' indulges in wide-spread 'tax-collection' activities, its 'home department' virtually runs the administration in thestate. Its 'crime suppression department' ensures control of its areas of dominance, administering a selective'justice' over various 'offenders'. Cadres, who are supposed to stay within the confines of the designated camps, move unhindered in the townships and country-side, enforcing the militant group's diktats. In fact, the futility of the ceasefire agreement was underlined on September 22, 2006, by the Inspector General of Assam Rifles (North), Major General S. S. Kumar: "The ceasefire is giving the NSCN-IM an opportunity to consolidate. Earlier, there were about 800 cadres of the NSCN-IM. Of late, the figure ranges between 2,000 to 2,500."
Interestingly, however, the NSCN-K, on the receiving end on most occasions in previous years, appears to be gaining in strength in Nagaland, even as it continues to face reverses in its periodic encounters with the Myanmarese Army in the Sagaing Division across the international boundary. Within Nagaland, the Khaplang cadres have engaged the rival IM faction frequently, often inflicting tactical losses. In February 2006, the NSCN-K wrested the Meluri area under Phek District from the NSCN-IM. The gain in the battlefield also translated into a reverse defection process of cadres from the IM faction to the Khaplang group. Though the numbers are not significant, sixteen IM cadres, including a senior cadre, 'Major' Lokishe, defected to the outfit, abandoning the IM faction, between August 5 and November 17, 2006.
The NSCN-K's new-found confidence was evident in the outfit's 'quit notice' of August 16 on the members of the Tangkhul tribe in Nagaland, accusing them of being "terrorist masterminds". The notice meant very little for the civilian population, as Tangkhuls are a tribe mostly based in the neighbouring Manipurstate, and are a microscopic minority within Nagaland. Understandably, the 'quit notice' was directed solely at theNSCN-IM 'general secretary', Thuingaleng Muivah, a Tangkhul from the Ukhrul District of Manipur. The NSCN-K resisted appeals from various bodies to withdraw the notice and killed at least two civilians belonging to the Tangkhul tribe in the Kohima District.
The shifting fortunes of particular militant groups thus add further uncertainties to the prospects for peace in thestate. While there is a near unanimity of perception regarding the breakdown of governance in neighbouring Manipur amidst unceasing militant violence, signs of an emerging collapse are also visible in Nagaland. Worse, while none of the major militant groups in Manipur are in any sort of peace deal with thegovernment, the violence in Nagaland occurs under the umbrella of the 'peace process' and an apparent'cease fire' in Nagaland.
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Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
