The Mangled Jackboot

The appellation 'failed' or 'failing state' has vociferously been rejected by Pakistanis for years now, but it is amply clear, after what some have described as General PervezMusharraf's 'second coup' on November 3, 2007, that Pakistan is little more than a thuggery, where the Supreme Court can simply be overrun by troops and its Chief Justice dismissed with less ceremony than would attend the sacking of a peon in a civilized country. 

Those who express shock at these developments have apparently forgotten that this is precisely what Musharraf did in 1999, when his troops overran the residence of an elected Prime Minister, and secured his dismissal and eventual exile with comparable lack of ceremony. 

At that time, his actions attracted sharp censure and sanctions from across the world--but 9/11 and the marriage of convenience with the Bush Administration obviously changed all that. While some pro forma regrets have certainly been expressed, it is clear that, as far as the main thrust of international responses is concerned, it is to be business as usual with the Musharraf regime. 

Of course, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has made some appropriate noises to the effect that the US"does not support extra-constitutional measures", but this militates against the history of US foreign policy and particularly the policies of the current Administration. In any event, the impact of any condemnatory statements was quickly diluted by reassurances from the Pentagon that it had no plans to cut military assistance--the bulk of US aid--to Pakistan. It is significant that the US Central Command Chief, Admiral William Fallon, was in Islamabad at the time of the declaration of the Emergency. The cumulative thrust of US postures suggests that there is clear prior or subsequent US approval ofMusharraf's latest initiative. 

Interestingly, India has declared the Emergency an 'internal problem of Pakistan' and expressed the pious hope that"conditions of normalcy" (whatever these may be in Pakistan), "will soon return".'Regret' and 'grave concern' has also been variously expressed by other world leaders--but nothing that would trouble Musharraf on the international front has been, or is expected to be, initiated.

For all his rhetoric about the threat of terrorism and extremism--and the embarrassment these had caused him personally, as well as hisgovernment--this coup was principally directed against the judiciary and was uniquely intended to thwart the possible adverse Supreme Court decision on his controversial're-election' to the post of President while he continued to hold the office of Chief of Army Staff. This, as Hussain Haqqani notes, is crucial:"In the past… generals have suspended the Constitution to remove from power unpopular rulers, usually weakened civilians. This is the first time an unpopular military ruler has suspended the Constitution to save hisposition."

However, the marginal augmentation of power that Musharraf may believe he secures through this extreme measure, will be more than offset by the progressive crystallization of his regime as the target of all opposition--both violent and non-violent. It is, of course, unrealistic to expect the emasculated political parties--particularly BenazirBhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League(PML-N)--to put up much resistance. 

But street protests, led by lawyers, have the potential to snowball into something much bigger (as they did in Karachi in May 2007). Nevertheless, while the democratic opposition may easily be intimidated or even quelled by extreme force--though not without domestic and international political consequences--the violent opposition by the Islamist extremists can be relied upon to escalate continuously. The Emergency is already being projected by the radical constituency as an effort"to remove any remaining obstacles to the prosecution of the US-led 'war on terror' in theregion" and to clear the grounds for a dramatic intensification of the campaigns against the Islamist radicals in Pakistan.

It is evident that only an all-out campaign against the Islamists, particularly in the progressively Taliban-al Qaeda-dominated North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), is the only possible justification Musharraf can offer over the coming months, to keep both his domestic and international constituencies at bay. And it is clear that such a campaign will secure complete US support--if it has not already been presented to and approved by the Bush Administration. 

What is in question, however, is the nature of such a campaign, and the Pakistan ArmedForces' capacities to sustain it over an extended period of time. There are widespread reports of demoralisation, desertions and the refusal by'outside' (particularly Punjabi) regiments of the Army to serve in Waziristan and the NWFP, and a number of surrenders bygovernment forces--Army, Police and Paramilitary--to small Taliban contingents, which indicate a growing unwillingness, ideological conflict and ethnic polarisation within the Forces in their operations against the Islamists. 

On November 1, 2007, the Taliban paraded 50 'captured' paramilitary troops in the Swat Valley. Again, on November 3, the militants confirmed that another more than 100 Security Forces personnel had been'captured' in the same area. On November 4, the militants in South Waziristan freed 211 soldiers, including a Lieutenant Colonel and a Major--who had been'captured' without firing a shot on August 30--in an exchange deal against the release of 28 militants fromgovernment custody. Most of these 'captures' are, in fact, desertions or willing surrenders, with not a shot exchanged, and Musharraf is reported to have castigated the soldiers who were captured in the August 30 incident as having"acted unprofessionally". 

Unconfirmed Indian intelligence sources claim that Pakistan Armycommunications' chatter indicates 160 cases of desertion by soldiers--principally in the NWFP and FATA--in just five days between October 11 and October 16. Military operations against the Taliban-al Qaeda forces in NWFP and FATA have inflicted high costs on thegovernment troops, with a low kill ratio of 1:1.37. The Pakistan Army does, of course, retain enormous power to inflict harm on thecountry's population, but its monopoly on such power has been lost, and its capacities are now challenged by jihadi contenders seeking a wider space inPakistan's disordered political structure. Clearly, any intensification of the military campaigns against the Islamists in Pakistan will push the Army to the knife-edge, pitting traditional loyalties and religious fervour against an ebbing professionalism, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the Army and, indeed, the entire existing power structure in the country. 


The residual option, consequently, would be the dilution of ground troop operations and an increasing use of Air Power and, consequently and necessarily, a more indiscriminate campaign with potentially massive'collateral damage' on patterns characteristic of US 'counter-terrorism' campaigns. It is significant, within this context, that Pakistan has acquired or is in the process of acquiring a range of hi-tech'smart' bombs and missiles from the US, with laser guidance systems and backed by night-vision cameras and laser designators that would enable pilots to strike at purported'terrorist' concentrations with or without friendly ground troops in a target area. It has, for some time now, been evident that these weapon systems have been supplied to Pakistan for use in'counter-terrorism missions'. 

Given the spread and magnitude of the Islamist insurgencies in NWFP and FATA, however, an aerial campaign, in order to effectively quell extremist capacities, would have to be nothing less than genocidal. And while Musharraf has given fair warning of his intentions--declaring,"do not expect the same level of civil liberties and human rights…" --there will be natural limits to the scale of devastation he will be permitted to inflict on his own people, even under the cover of blanket censorship and repressive measures against the media. In any event, the Islamists have developed their own channels of information dissemination, and what happens in the NWFP and FATA will not long remain secret. 

In effect, Musharraf gains little--beyond his personal continuance in power--by the declaration of the Emergency. It is a move, moreover, that will take the processes of institutional decay and disintegration further forward in Pakistan. The Musharraf dictatorship has already infinitely weakened Pakistan over the past eight years, and the extreme measures that have now been adopted will augment centrifugal forces in the country, even as they destroy the possibilities of any alternative--and particularly democratic--leadership emerging. 

Pakistan's future remains wedded to chaos, and it must be clear that the unqualified support, on ludicrous'there is no alternative' (TINA) logic, that is currently being extended to the military regime in the country will become progressively unsustainable. It cannot remain sufficient for the'international community'--and particularly the US and neighbours such as India--simply to make the right noises, but continue with policies on Islamabad unchanged. A course correction will eventually be forced by events, but would best be initiated before the necessity becomes overwhelming, and the options further circumscribed. 

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management