The ongoing cease-fire between the Andhra Pradesh (AP) government and the Left Wing extremist (akaNaxalites) of the People's War Group (PWG) raises a number of questions. The PWG has remained unwavering inits ideological commitment to 'class annihilation', to capturing power through revolutionary warfare on theMaoist pattern, and in its rejection of Parliamentary democracy. This strategy entails building up of bases inrural and remote areas and transforming them, first, into 'guerrilla zones', and then into 'liberated zones',even as an area-wise seizure is consolidated, and cities are 'encircled'. Within the theoretical constructs ofits 'people's war' strategy, as well as the PWG's past practices, moreover, negotiations have been used as atactic and opportunity for recovery, consolidation and expansion. Under the circumstances, it is not clearwhat significant gains the state government expects to secure through a new phase of negotiations.
On June 16, 2004, officially, the AP government declared a three-month ceasefire against the PWG, withimmediate effect. It also accepted the remaining three PWG proposals - constitution of a supervisorycommittee, initial dialogue with mediators and final discussions between ministerial representatives and PWG statecommittee representatives. The official announcement came a day after the PWG state secretary, Ramakrishna,had laid down conditions for taking any steps to initiate talks with the government. The government and thepolitical parties have consistently appealed to the Naxalite groups, especially the PWG, to shun violence andcarry out their struggles as partners in the democratic set up. But each time in the past, talks have faileddue to lack of faith between the negotiating parties and because of PWG conditionalities.
The process of trying to seduce the PWG back into the 'mainstream' has a long and futile history. N.T. RamaRao initially adopted a soft approach towards the Naxalites, describing them as desabhaktalu (patriots)and annalu (elder brother) in 1982. The result was that, during the 1983 Assembly election campaign, hesecured significant advantage as a result of Naxalite support to his party. After the elections, the Naxaliteswere given free rein to consolidate their activities, and there was a spectacular surge in their strength.However, by 1985, a series of ambushes of police parties and official convoys had made political accommodationimpossible, as did the PWG's escalating demands. A Special Task Force was established and armed police postswere created in the worst-affected areas, as the security forces were given a 'free hand' to deal with theterrorists. By 1989, the Naxalites were in flight under sustained security forces' pressure.
Relief came with elections, once again. The PWG had begun flirting with the Marri Chenna Reddy led Congress-Iduring the elections of 1989, and Chenna Reddy unilaterally withdrew all restrictions on the activities of thePWG immediately after his government was sworn in. At this stage, the Naxalites had articulated threeconditions for talks: the freeing of all Naxalite prisoners who had undergone long spells of incarcerationwithout trial or conviction; allowing freedom to the extremists to hold public meetings; and restraining thepolice from interfering with the 'legitimate activities' of all shades of Naxalites. No talks, however,commenced, though relaxation of the state's pressure on the rebels continued. Once again, the PWG took fulladvantage of the government's 'soft approach', consolidating its strength before its excesses forced ChennaReddy's successor N. Janardhan Reddy to re-impose the ban on the organization, on May 21, 1992, by which timethe Naxalites were virtually running a parallel government in their areas of influence.
N. T. Rama Rao returned to power in 1994, setting into motion another phase of the 'soft' policy against theNaxalites. In 1995, the proscription on the PWG was relaxed for three months. A phase of gallopingconsolidation for the PWG followed, as a new generation of sophisticated arms, explosives and timing andtriggering devices became easily available. There was also an expansion of linkages with other extremistorganizations in the country, as well as with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, andthe revolutionary communist parties in Nepal and the Philippines. Linkages were also established with someideologically incompatible terrorist groups in India's Northeast.
The successor Chandrababu Naidu regime re-imposed the ban on the PWG on July 22, 1996, and a policy of armedconfrontation with the rebels was re-established. Nevertheless, intense public pressure and an Andhra PradeshHigh Court order to initiate 'proper measures' to contain the continuing violence compelled the outgoingTelugu Desam Party (TDP) government to invite the PWG for talks in January 2000. The PWG, however, turned downthe government's offer for a dialogue, pointing out that talks could not be held as long as the statecontinued its 'repression' of the 'mass movement'.
The peace process was brought back into focus in April 2001, once again in the context of elections, thistime, to the local bodies in the state. The Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) on April 17, 2001, appealedto both the state government and the PWG to hammer out a plausible way for unconditional talks. In turn, thePWG leadership had responded through a public statement that proposed five conditions for holding talks withthe AP government, including, inter alia, a lifting of the ban on the group and action againstofficials involved in alleged 'fake encounters'. Responding to the PWG's charter of demands, the then TDPChief Minister Chandrababu Naidu - now in his second tenure - ruled out prospects of holding talks with thePWG unless the outfit was ready to give up arms.
Subsequent efforts by the same government, were, however, initiated on January 28, 2002, when the police wereinstructed not to resort to "unwanted and unnecessary action" against the PWG. The Naxalitesreciprocated by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. The government made an offer of talks, and the PWG namedrevolutionary writer P. Varavara Rao, and balladeer Gaddar as its representatives in preliminary negotiationsto determine the modalities for holding talks. The group also suggested that the CCC, headed by S.R. Sankaran,should act as observer during the talks. The peace process, however, received a jolt when four Naxalites ofthe PWG were killed in an encounter at Narella village, Karimnagar, while the talks were on. The PWG set adeadline of July 20, 2002, for the government to announce a cease-fire, a demand that was rejected byChandrababu Naidu, who declared that those violating the law would be dealt with resolutely. The governmentalso alleged that the Naxalites had been using the talks as a 'smokescreen' for expanding their base.
This, then, has been a regular pattern: the PWG has used the 'peace process' and periods of 'cease-fire' asopportunities to consolidate its position and expand its bases into new areas, and this has particularly beenthe case when it comes under pressure. Recent years have seen a massive expansion of the Naxalite movement,both within Andhra Pradesh, and in other states, through consolidation of the PWG's activities, as well asalliances with ideologically compatible partners. However, the PWG has been significantly weakened within itsown traditional area of domination. In several villages in north Telengana, long considered PWG strongholds,its dalams (armed squads) have suffered badly as a result of frequent police action, and cadres havesurrendered in large numbers. There has also been a thrust on development and people's participatory activity,which has helped in neutralizing the Naxalites' influence on villagers.
The current ceasefire and soft approach in Andhra Pradesh will have necessary and serious repercussions inneighboring Orissa and other states. The PWG has long worked to consolidate its position in Andhra-OrissaBorder Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) areas, and, with some relief within AP can be expected to divertsignificantly greater energies to Orissa. Other states, which may be more or less affected includeChhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Karnataka. The Naxalite problem cannot be treated as a problem of a particular stateor region alone. The Naxalite presence has already reached disturbing proportions in nine states, where theyseek to establish a 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ) extending from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranyaregion to Andhra Pradesh. Apart from their traditional strongholds, there has been a significant expansion ofNaxalite activities into new areas such as North Bihar, North Orissa, central Chhattisgarh and eastern UttarPradesh. A ceasefire in AP, far from solving the problem, may, in fact, compound it further, creatingopportunities for further extension of the 'people's war'.
These difficulties notwithstanding, the AP 'peace process' appears to have set a trend in motion, with theJharkhand government also offering a unilateral cease-fire with the PWG on June 19, 2004. The PWG's response,in this case, was a list of demands, including the immediate removal of paramilitary forces from extremiststrongholds, investigation of alleged 'fake encounters' and the lodging of criminal cases against the guilty,withdrawal of all Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) cases against cadres, and lifting of the ban on the PWG -a combination of demands that the state government would find nigh impossible to accept.
There is, today, an overwhelming need for a consolidated approach to the Naxalite problem, which extendsacross a number of states. Piecemeal efforts to solve the problem through negotiations in the past have onlyhelped entrench the movement further. This danger needs to be recognized before another ill-conceivedpolitical gambit creates additional spaces for further Naxalite expansion. While talks with the extremistsneed not be entirely ruled out, it is necessary for such talks to be coordinated across states so that apermanent solution is at least visible - however improbable it may be. At present, negotiations are, at best,no more than an interregnum in the rising graph of extreme Left Wing violence
Advertisement
Nihar Nayak is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia IntelligenceReview of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
